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 This dissertation examines Republican China’s state-led revolution under the 
Guomindang. Since the anti-Communist purge in 1927, the party-state had strived to re-
energize mass activism and dissolve proletarian political subjectivity with a rightwing 
program that stressed interclass and national unity. Under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership, 
the Guomindang put an end to the ideological ambiguity of Sun Yat-sen’s national 
revolution, broke ties the party forged with the Communist International in 1923, and 
launched an all-round assault on the fledging Chinese Communist Party. Refusing to 
challenge unequal power relationships domestically and abroad, Guomindang leaders 
promised to bring China and Asia back to their cultural essence and towards a superior 
ethical order. Despite its conservative socio-economic agenda, the party retained a radical 
organizational mode it derived from revolutionary socialism that prized Leninist 
vanguardism, reliance on mass involvement and cultural transformation. The Chinese 
nation-state under Guomindang rule experienced a conservative revolution and partook in 
a global fascist current that swept across Asia, Europe and Latin America during the 
second quarter of the twentieth century. 
 The distinctiveness of China’s conservative revolution is demonstrated in this 
dissertation through a multilayered study of its ideological formulations, mass 
mobilization programs, and ability to garner support from outside the Guomindang 
domestically and abroad. Senior party ideologues among radical conservatives, who 
produced tracts attacking the Guomindang’s Communist allies in the mid-1920s, 
provided theoretical justifications for the April 1927 purge and heralded the party-state’s 
drastic shift to the right. In the 1930s and 1940s, the Guomindang state deployed the 
scouting and wartime spiritual mobilization movements to re-channel mass activism 
towards strengthening the nation’s organic unity and consolidating defense against 
Japanese invasion. Potentially subversive popular demands were diffused through a new 
focus on refining and rationalizing consumption habits, time management and other 
social mores. Instead of political participation, popular will found expression in public 
rituals, physical recreation and cultural entertainments.  
 Conservative revolutionaries were adept in building elite support. The state’s goal 
of disciplining everyday life converged with liberal intellectual fear over a social order 
collapsing under mob rule. While uncomfortable with some authoritarian behaviors on 
the Guomindang’s part, prominent liberals such as Zhu Guangqian shared the state’s 
priority of reining in an intransigent mass society. Internationally, China’s repudiation of 
Soviet-supported anti-imperialist activities led the Guomindang to appeal to cultural 
affinities in the overtures it extended to the Indian independence movement. The 
regime’s celebration of Eastern spiritual superiority proved attractive to Pan-Asianists 
like Rabindranath Tagore and informed exchanges between the Guomindang and Indian 
National Congress at the height of the Second World War. In highlighting the ascendency 
of radical conservatism in China and its transnational circulation across Asia, this 
dissertation sheds light on the distinct qualities, often downplayed in the historical 
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China’s Other Revolution 
 
 
 At the risk of stating the obvious, this dissertation begins with the premise that 
Chiang Kai-shek’s (1887-1975) Nationalist regime presided over a revolution. 
China’s first nation-wide government since the fall of the dynastic system, having 
established its capital in Nanjing, claimed to inherit the incomplete national 
revolution (guomin geming) Sun Yat-sen bequeathed to his followers in 1925. The 
Guomindang (GMD) ran China until 1949 when its one-time coalition partner, the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), forced it to flee to Taiwan.
1
 On surface, there does 
not seem to be anything in this shorthand to which one would take exception. Upon 
closer observation, however, the narrative starts to unravel. Communist 
historiography typically characterizes Chiang’s government as counterrevolutionary, a 
betrayal of Sun’s leftist sympathies and accommodating attitude towards politicized 
workers and peasants. Historians tend to see the Nationalist regime’s short tenure on 
Mainland China, particularly the ten years leading up to Marco Polo Incident in 1937, 
as a period of relative stability and state consolidation. While scholarly verdicts differ 
on how well the GMD’s nation and society program fared, they agree that progress (or 
the lack thereof) in modern political governance, urban infrastructure, civil society, 
and cultural expression were results of revolutionary stagnation.
2
 Authoritarian 
                                                 
1
 I use “Communist” to refer to the Chinese political movement that was founded in 1921, while using 
“communist” to denote political ideologies that aspired to a classless social order. The same distinction 
applies between the Italian Fascist Party and fascist ideologies in general.   
   
2
 Two early works that represent contrasting assessments of the Nanjing Decade (1927-1937) were Paul 
K. T. Sih, The Strenuous Decade: China’s Nation-Building Efforts, 1927-1937 (Jamaica, N.Y.: St. 
John’s University Press, 1970) and Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist 
Rule, 1927-1937 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974). For a recent valediction to 
Nationalist achievements, see Frank Dikötter, The Age of Openness: China Before Mao (Berkeley: 





developmentalism marked Nationalist rule as distinct from the radical, tumultuous 
experimentation that otherwise permeated twentieth-century Chinese society and 
politics.                                                 
 Yet, the GMD held dearly the rhetoric of revolution. Dai Jitao (1891-1949), an 
ideologist working under Chiang, promised in 1929 radical changes in social 
organization and popular customs. He spoke of sacrifices and disruptions, warning 
that false starts and setbacks must not sway perseverance in the tasks ahead. He 
lamented that China’s inevitable revolutionary transformation saw little progress and 
too much suffering, blaming nihilistic faith among young people in Euro-American 
materialism and ideological platitudes imported from abroad. Impatience, lack of 
discipline and organization, desire for immediate results, and prurient interest in 
material comforts threatened to corrupt the nation. The most evil spirit (mogui) that 
haunted China, possessing gullible youths and flaming their instinctive luster for 
violence, was none other than communism.
3
  
 Inasmuch as the GMD claimed monopoly on China’s revolutionary course, the 
rightwing party-state was a reaction against the ascendant Communist movement. The 
anti-communist purge on April 12, 1927 thus marked the beginning of a conservative 
revolution. Not only was the state apparatus aimed against political apostasies, motion 
was set in place to form a social and intellectual bloc that countered proletarian 
politics. In the following two decades, the GMD worked assiduously to neuter the 
leftwing opposition. Aside from brutal crackdowns on ideological opponents, the 
party-state also attempted to steer popular and elite consent away from leftwing or 
class politics, cultivate social movements and an everyday culture that privileged 
                                                 
3
 Dai Jitao, “Zhong xuexiao yong qingnian xunlian jiaofan xu” [Preface to Youth Training Manual for 
middle schools], in Dai Jitao xiansheng wencun (hereafter cited as DJTXSWC) (Taipei: Zhongguo 





spiritual rejuvenation over realignment of property relations, and add an inter-Asian 
dimension to its otherwise staunchly nationalist project. This dissertation argues that 
the GMD, like fascist movements that raged from Berlin to Buenos Aires, represented 
a distinct quest for an alternative social order to capitalist modernity without 
challenging its structural premises. The regime stood at the vanguard of China’s 
contribution to a globalizing radical right fervor between the two world wars that 
bemoaned the rise of working-class politics, the unevenness of capitalist 
modernization, and inefficacies of liberal democracy. The fact that throughout its 
existence the party was plagued with chronic factionalism and included contradicting 
elements in its ideological mix should not prevent us from drawing generalizations on 
the nature of the Nationalist program and its embeddedness in interwar worldwide 
and continental political currents.    
 The GMD’s ill-fated alliance with the Communists was a testament to the 
tension between nation independence and social transformation, the two leitmotifs of 
China’s political modernity. In 1911, a loose Revolutionary Alliance headed by Sun 
Yat-sen (1866-1925) brought an end to Qing imperial rule by appealing to anti-
Manchu feelings and promising to enhance political participation for the new urban 
elite who flourished on China’s nascent industrial sector. The early promise of 
democratic republicanism quickly gave way to anger and disillusionment as military 
strongmen competed with one and another to mock parliamentary procedures, carve 
up the already fragmented country, and curry favor with various imperialist powers. 
Except for the Han nationalist goal of ridding off the Manchu ruling class, the 
founding of the Chinese Republic proved to be sorely inadequate, if not totally 
inconsequential, in establishing national and popular sovereignty. Events following 




his colleagues were originally committed. If the pressing problems facing China in the 
final years of the empire were to be addressed, the Republican movement had to be 
more than a seizure of power at the top. Young intellectuals and students in the 1910s 
and 1920s carrying the banner of what came to be known as the New Culture 
Movement (1917-1923) saw the wider society, and not merely state institutions, as the 
site of radical changes. Out of this broadened vision evolved political movements that 
recognized mass, and not only elite, participation as the ultimate source of legitimacy. 
While a vocal minority remained committed to liberal democracy, radical mass parties 
of both the left and the right soon dominated Chinese politics.      
        
The Rise of Mass Politics 
The New Culture Movement, which assumed a clearer political dimension 
following the May Fourth Incident in 1919, is best remembered as an iconoclastic 
attack on Confucianism, classical literature, feudalism and warlordism. Yet, energized 
by the northern-based Beiyang regime’s failure to reclaim formerly German-occupied 
Shanghai from Japanese ambitions at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, May Fourth 
radicals were equally frustrated with the constitutional arrangements that a succession 
of warlords, thinly disguised behind the façade of parliamentary procedures, had 
appropriated to their own advantage. Qu Qiubai (1899-1935), who made tentative 
moves to communism during this period, was representative of radicalized May 
Fourth youths who felt themselves awakened from the nightmare of liberal 
democracy.
4
 Rapid industrial growth in coastal cities in the 1910s through the 1920s 
gave rise to an urban bourgeois and proletariat, and injected a sense of reality to 
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erstwhile abstract categories of class and socialism.
5
 At least to Qu and his radicalized 
colleagues in urban centers, the masses had emerged as a formidable new subject of 
revolutionary action. Genuine social transformation was to involve the wider 
populace, not left to the whims of corrupt and inept politicians in Beijing.      
 While the masses was making appearances in New Culture radical discourses, 
Sun Yat-sen was progressively turning his back on the liberal democratic ideals to 
which an earlier incarnation of the GMD was committed.
6
 To the dismay of 
parliamentarians among Sun’s followers, the nationalist leader was also losing 
patience with what he saw as endless politicking among rival caucuses in parliament. 
Sun’s redefined national revolution was to adopt the agendas of the party’s radical 
wing which, like Qu, recognized the potential of mass society and was well-versed in 
discourses about class and socialism, albeit drawing vastly different conclusions about 
them than the communists. In organizational terms, Sun was attracted to the Leninist 
model whereby party functionaries simultaneously engaged and disciplined the 
masses in the revolutionary process.
7
  
 By the time the GMD reached a deal with the nascent CCP in 1923 to allow 
members of the latter join the national revolution and the Nationalist state, the two 
sides agreed that a mass movement led by a vanguard party was necessary to carry the 
revolution forward. Few had the appetite to fall back to the discredited 1912 
revolutionary agendas of republicanism and constitutionalism. The prospect of mass 
revolutionary movements was indeed frightening for many liberals.
8
 Yet, as I discuss 
                                                 
5
 Arif Dirlik, The Origins of Chinese Communism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 59. 
 
6
 Fitzgerald, Awakening China, 16-17, 190-191. 
 
7
 Ibid, 206. 
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below, despite their suspicion over the involvement of the hoi polloi in political 
movements, Chiang Kai-shek’s staunchly anti-communist GMD regularly received 
endorsement from among the liberal ranks. Liberals pledged support even though the 
Nationalist party-state had not jettisoned its role as a revolutionary vanguard in 
command of China’s politically awakened, voluntaristic populace.      
 
Disciplining Capitalism  
The GMD’s transformation into a mass party was accompanied by a heightened 
sense of China’s induction into global capitalism among the upper echelon of the 
party. Even as the GMD agreed to an alliance brokered by the Comintern, few were 
under the illusion that Sun was about to convert to Marxism. To the contrary, the 
leader of the Guangzhou-based party-state, with his newfound fascination with 
political discipline, took pains to put forth his Three People’s Principles – nationalism 
(minzu), democracy (minquan), and the much contended people’s livelihood 
(minsheng) – as the ideological yardstick of his followers’ loyalty to the revolutionary 
cause. Historian Yang Kuisong observes that Sun’s approach was not to meekly admit 
Communists to a united front, but to actively absorb a potentially rival party based on 
the assumption that Marxism could be subsumed under his minsheng principle.
9
 This 
required Sun to take on the problematic with which Karl Marx grappled. Sun’s 
assumption that national societies functioned as discreet units allowed him to see 
capitalism in the early twentieth century as being geographically circumscribed. He 
was nonetheless acutely aware of “the onslaught of Euro-American economic 
currents” in an underdeveloped China, citing land speculation in treaty ports like 
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 Yang Kuisong, Guomindang de “lian Gong” yu “fan Gong” [Kuomintang: Unity with Communists 







 Yet, China’s underdevelopment could also save the 
country from the excesses of capitalism and the hegemony of the bourgeoisie that 
plagued economically advanced societies. Intellectually attracted to the American 
political economist Henry George, Sun believed that the social crises facing Europe 
and North America could be kept at bay if a strong state could levy land taxes and 
redistribute future rises in land price to tenants. In other words, Sun was ultimately 
committed to private property and his self-professed agreement with communist 
ideals was limited at most to the adoption of a redistributive mechanism for newly 
accumulated capital.
11
 The aim of the national revolution, as Sun declared in his 
lectures on the minsheng principle, was not to fight for a communist society through 
class struggle and the abolishment of capitalist production relations but to prevent a 
capitalist society from taking shape in the first place. 
Against the typical Marxist position that capitalist development was (and still is) 
global but uneven, the idea that capitalism could be contained before being fully 
introduced into China held currency among Sun’s disciples. Insofar as China’s 
incipient capitalist economy was inseparable from imperialist intrusion, particularly 
since the mid-nineteenth century, the Nationalists’ quest for national independence 
thus assumed a clear social dimension. Dai Jitao, who lent theoretical credence to the 
GMD rightwing in its opposition against the united front after Sun’s death in 1925, 
was more explicit in linking the fight against imperialism and pursuit of social 
development. In fact, he argued in 1925 that while imperialism was prompted not 
only by socio-economic considerations alone, people’s livelihood could not be 
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 Sun Yat-sen, Sanmin zhuyi [Three people’s principles] (Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1978), 224. 
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pursued without first securing national independence.
12
 In another treatise on the May 
Thirteenth Incident of 1925 in which police officers opened fire on protesting students 
and workers in Shanghai’s International Settlement, Dai faulted the “unequal treaties” 
that privileged the operation of imperialist interests in China for depriving the country 
of export industries and monopolizing the flow of capital.
13
 To further the dual goals 
of securing national independence and building a modern economy, he recommended 
alliance with the Soviet Union and incorporation of selected socialist principles.
14
 In 
less than two years, however, the party polemicist would drastically change his mind.  
Writing just after the death of Sun Yat-sen, Dai was concerned that the peasants 
and workers whom the Nationalist revolution had recently brought under its fold 
would fall under the spell of historical materialism and communism, despite what he 
felt as their questionable effectiveness as the basis for social programs.
15
 The GMD 
right’s wariness of the Communists’ growing ideological and organizational influence 
within China’s mass political movement, along with the fear of proletarian 
internationalism and Soviet designs on Asia, would eventually derail the alliance Sun 
created and steer the national revolution in a conservative direction despite its 
continued commitment to mass politics and the professed rejection of imperial 
capitalism. It is this conservative revolution, which began with Chiang Kai-shek’s 
anti-communist coup in April 1927, on which my narrative in the following chapters 
will focus. 
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 Dai, Guomin geming yu Zhongguo Guomindang [The Nationalist revolution and the Guomindang] 
(1925; reprint, Shanghai: n.p., 1928), 70 (page citations are to the reprint edition). 
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 Dai, Zhongguo duli yundong de jidian [The basis of China’s independence movement] (Guangzhou: 
Minzhi shuju, 1925), 18-30. 
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 Dai, Guomin geming yu Zhongguo Guomindang, 71-72. 
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Conservative Revolution and China’s Political Modernity 
 Dai’s complaint of Marxism’s foreignness and aloofness from the pressing issues 
an emerging nation-state faced was far from unique. The German philosopher Oswald 
Spengler wrote some six years before Dai that a materialist vision of history, with its 
emphasis on relations of production, was the ideology of cosmopolitan city dwellers 
wrenched off from religion and traditional values.
16
 At stake was not only the alleged 
inadequacy of Marxist social analysis, but also the idea that global communism was a 
symptom of a morally depleted, culturally adrift, and materially obsessed urban 
modernity which stood at odds with the quest for a coherent, conflict-free national 
community. A Nationalist, who identified himself only by the name Shiyong, echoed 
this sentiment when he wrote to Dai in 1927 and accused the CCP of enticing urban 
youths who knew little about the Three People’s Principles with faint promises of 
vanity, money and sexual pleasure.
17
 Fear of communism as a foreign-originated and 
controlled threat to the fabric of the ethnos, along with a deep anxiety over the urban 
cosmopolitanism and social fragmentation that accompanied global capital, formed 
the lowest common denominator linking conservative revolutionary regimes that 
gained increasing influence around the globe during the interwar period.
18
 
 The origins of the phrase “conservative revolution” might be attributed to 
Frederick Engels, who described the 1830 Polish insurrection against direct Russian 
rule as an attempt on the part of the Polish aristocracy to return to the status quo ante 
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 Oswald Spengler, Preußentum und Sozialismus [Prussiandom and socialism], in Politische schriften 
(Munich and Berlin: Beck, 1933), 83-85, cited in Roger Woods, The Conservative Revolution in the 
Weimar Republic (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 66. 
 
17
 Shiyong to Dai Jitao, 1927, wubu, 1339, Kuomintang Archives.  
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of relatively autonomy under the Czar and defend their own narrow class interests. 
“The insurrection of 1830,” Engels declared, “was neither a national revolution … nor 
a social or a political revolution; it changed nothing in the internal condition of the 
people; it was a conservative revolution.”19 In the twentieth century, conservative 
revolution was generally associated with such radical rightwing intellectual 
heavyweights as writer Hugo von Hoffmannsthal, phenomenologist Martin Heidegger 
and political philosopher Carl Schmitt. At the same time, it was also associated with 
mass movements and paramilitary squads on the far right of the political spectrum.
20
 
Given the German origins of conservative revolution, is it appropriate to apply the 
term to rightist movements elsewhere such as that led by the GMD in China?  
 While jealously guarding its revolutionary credentials against the Communists, 
the GMD did not identify its movement as conservative (baoshou). Nor did GMD 
theoreticians trace their ideas to German radical conservatives’, insisting that their 
only inspiration was Sun Yat-sen. By using conservative revolution as a heuristic and 
analytical category, I do not presuppose foreign influences and local reception. 
Rather, I am pointing to the existence of a constellation of economic and political 
forces in the tumultuous years between the two world wars with which rightwing 
movements, whether operating in China, continental Europe or elsewhere, had to 
tackle. Varying degrees of industrialization across the world led to the rise of the 
urban masses, whose dispositions and everyday habits were manifestations of an 
expanding global capitalist modernity. Young students and other urbanites engaged in 
frivolous consumption and individualist pursuits. Conservative nationalists in 
                                                 
19
 Frederick Engels, “On the Polish Question,” Marxists Internet Archives, 
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cosmopolitan cities were wary as they saw communism becoming a potent force as 
both a mass organization championing workers and an ideology embraced by radical 
students and intellectuals. That these “foreign” ideas were sponsored by political 
parties with deep links to Moscow exacerbated anxieties over their subversive 
potential. Frustration with the individualism of young cosmopolitans, spiritless 
consumerism of urbanites, and workers and intellectuals who privileged social 
revolution over national revival shaped radical conservative visions in different 
locations.    
 As products of the social and economic transformations that undergirded the 
nation-state system, conservative revolutions aimed for an alternative modernity that 
could overcome the excesses of capitalist globalization and political liberalism. Yet, 
unlike the left and particularly revolutionary socialists, conservative revolutionaries 
opposed egalitarian ideals that sought to empower the lower classes. Instead, they 
espoused “a form of revolutionary reaction” in their refusal to challenge the private 
property system that increasingly defined socio-political hierarchy in modern 
societies.
21
 As distinctly reactionary alternatives to liberal capitalism, radical 
conservative movements had enjoyed considerable influence across the world since 
the mid-nineteenth century. For example, it has been argued that the reform programs 
the new Meiji state implemented in nineteenth-century Japan constituted a 
conservative revolution. The heavy representation of the old samurai class among the 
new political elite, obsession with social order in the face of imperialist intrusion from 
the West, rejection of political liberalism, and search for a pristine authentic national 
culture amidst crumbling pre-industrial social relations were hallmarks of a form of 
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radical conservatism that anticipated fascist politics in twentieth-century Japan.
22
 
Furthermore, despite its traditional moralism, the Meiji conservative revolution was 
thoroughly modern, not least due to Japanese leaders’ full embrace of the modern 
state apparatus and new mass mobilization tools such as political parties and the print 
media.
23
 Of course, the social makeup of the mid to late nineteenth-century world 
differed drastically from that during the interwar period. In this earlier period, 
industrialization and the mass public were in their formative stage in most parts of the 
globe, the nation-state was a new concept, and communism had yet to emerge as a 
major force in the political scene. Yet, the high premium put on social order, the fear 
that class politics would exacerbate the deep crises brought on by capitalism and 
imperialist encroachment, and the mobilization of voluntaristic and classless citizenry 
would continue to drive radical conservative politics in the twentieth century. 
 
Historiographic Treatments of the GMD-Led Revolution  
 There is a continuous debate among historians on how to place the GMD 
movement within the global circuit of interwar rightwing politics. Scholars differed 
rigorously on whether the GMD was a fascist regime. Implicit is these diverging 
views are disagreements over the nature of fascism and whether Republican China’s 
experience of modernity, given the country’s underdeveloped economy, largely 
agrarian society, and crumpling Neo-Confucian orthodoxy, was comparable to that of 
Euro-America. Despite the fact that radical conservative movements in the “core” 
European fascist states of Italy and Germany differed in many counts, historians have 
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been reluctant to include the GMD among their ranks. Rather than recognizing that 
Nazism and Italian Fascism formed parts of a worldwide conservative revolutionary 
trend, many students of modern Chinese history see the GMD as a faint facsimile of 
fascism in Europe. China’s rightwing radicalism was therefore derivative and 
superficial, a Western import that had little basis in the specificities of the Republican 
period. Lloyd Eastman’s classical study of the GMD regime caused considerable 
controversy by revealing the efforts made by such party groupings as the Blue Shirts 
or Lixingshe to emulate the organization, aesthetics, and ideological dispositions of 
the Nazi party in the 1930s.
24
 Yet, Eastman also argues that the GMD as a whole 
lacked any ideological identity, as the party was staffed mostly by opportunistic 
functionaries who shunned the masses and merely pursued their own individual 
interests. In Eastman’s account, young cadres who wished to re-engage the masses 
through fascist mobilization were on the fringes of the party and merely supplied 
Chiang Kai-shek with ammunitions to manage intra-party power struggle. The 
historian credited with unearthing the GMD’s encounter with fascism considers 
Nationalist cadres to be too cynical to have fully embraced fascist politics.
25
 The 
GMD revolution was never redefined by the April 12 1927 coup. The revolution, as 
the title of Eastman’s famous book suggests, was simply aborted by its custodians. 
 The reluctance to count the GMD among interwar radical conservative regimes 
was expressed more clearly by those who denied any profound fascist current in 
Republican China. William Kirby, a specialist in twentieth-century Sino-German 
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relations, argues that “there was no ‘fascist movement’ in China but rather a vogue 
that coincided with the emergence of a close Sino-German friendship.” Chinese 
admirers of the Nazi movement, Kirby points out, pursued competing political 
interests, had no agreement on what fascism meant, and were too enmeshed in 
factional struggles to have a clear grasp of National Socialism.
26
 Chinese Nationalists, 
however, were apparently not the only ones who failed to understand fascism. The 
nature of fascism continues to elude scholars today, not the least because of the 
apparent contradiction between its radical activism and its investment in capitalist 
economics.
27
 Perhaps the power of fascism lay precisely in its ideological ambiguity, 
that it put a premium not on conceptual rigor and clarity but spiritual devotion and 
sacrifice.
28
 Kirby’s argument of a superficial fascist vogue within the GMD also 
assumes that the party’s functionaries and theoreticians were mere observers of 
foreign developments, thus denying that the staunchly anti-communist party was an 
active contributor to the global effervescence of radical right activism in its own right. 
 The insistence that the GMD was a different animal from Western political 
movements on the same end of the political spectrum is also informed by the belief 
among many scholars that Republican China itself was incomparable with Western 
societies despite its many connections with global socio-economic trends through 
imperialism, urban consumption, and the movement of people. The lingering 
influence of traditional social ideals is taken to mean that heuristic categories that 
originate from studies of Euro-America have limited applicability concerning China’s 
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political modernity. Benjamin Schwartz wrote in 1976 that while conservatism in 
modern China, alongside liberalism and radicalism, was unmistakably a result of 
Western influence, it differed from its European and American counterparts because 
Chinese conservatives did not necessarily defend the political status-quo. Contrasting 
the late Qing revolutionary Zhang Binglin and “conservative modernizer” Chiang 
Kai-shek, Schwartz concluded that conservatism in China was a cultural position, not 
a political one that called for the conservation of existing state institutions.
29
  
 The notion that traditional culture was a determining factor setting China apart 
from contemporary trends in the West even informs those who think that there are 
strong echoes of fascism in GMD ideology and organization. Frederic Wakeman 
suggests that Chiang’s regime embodied “Confucian fascism,” drawing attention to 
the radical nature of the GMD’s social engineering program in molding a disciplined 
national subject. Yet, despite Chiang’s fascination with the rapid ascendency of 
Germany, Italy and Turkey as formidable interwar powers, the GMD strongman’s 
“nativist” Confucian moralism “lent a fussy air to his imitative fascism.”30 For 
Wakeman, if the GMD party-state emulated the latest fascist organizational form, its 
ideological commitments were unmistakably indebted to China’s dynastic past and 
had little in common with movements led by Hitler and Mussolini. What is not 
acknowledged in studies that privilege China’s cultural uniqueness is that combining 
valorization of national communitarian values, entrenchment of capitalist social 
relations, and revolutionary modes of political activism was not peculiar to Chiang’s 
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government. These features were, in fact, common among contemporary conservative 
revolutions around the world.
31
 Restoring a primordial, hierarchal social order was the 
shared desire of radical conservative movements which saw their respective nations as 
being distinct and beleaguered by hostile forces from outside.         
 One alternative to narratives of Chinese cultural particularism is to reject fascism 
as a specific mode of politics altogether, to the point where the distinction between 
radical left and radical right is denied. This approach underpins political scientist A. 
James Gregor’s study of twentieth-century Chinese revolutions. Rejecting what he 
sees as a misleading dichotomy between Marxist (leftwing) and fascist (rightwing) 
revolutions, Gregor suggests that fascism was “born of nationalism and Marxist 
revolutionary syndicalism.” Having dismissed any qualitative difference between the 
left and the right, he goes on to lump Sun Yat-sen and Mao Zedong (1893-1976) 
together with figures as diverse as Mussolini, Lenin and Stalin as redemptive 
nationalists committed to developmentalism and an aggrandized state.
32
 As for the 
ideological dispositions of the post-1927 GMD, Gregor has the following to say: 
It was not Italian Fascism or German National Socialism, per se, that Chiang 
Kai-shek or the Blue Shirts recommended to the revolutionaries of China. What 
the Blue Shirts found admirable in Italian Fascism and German National 
Socialism was the same thing they and Sun Yat-sen found attractive in 
Bolshevism. All these movements had succeeded in restoring dignity to their 
respective national communities.
33
             
                        
The argument that mass political movements of all ideological hues, except perhaps 
parties committed to liberal democracy, were identical is well-established in Cold 
War-era studies on totalitarianism influenced by Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of 
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Totalitarianism (1951). It condemns successive Chinese states for leading the country 
through decades of continuous revolutionary turmoil and failing to build Western-
style institutions such as elected parliaments, private property, and a media industry 
not controlled by the government. The strategy of eliding the specificities of fascism 
by collapsing radical conservatism together with communism serves to delegitimize 
critiques of reigning liberal capitalist norms.
34
 It also obscures the fact that while 
radical rightwing movements aimed at entrenching capitalism and private ownership, 
their leftwing nemeses were committed to their demise.
35
 Gregor’s refusal to 
characterize the GMD as fascist is thus driven not primarily by how much or how 
little Chiang was attracted to the Fascist and Nazi movements. What more, indeed, 
could Mussolini or Hilter have offered to Chiang other than a way to extinguish his 
communist enemies, build a strong militarized nation, and thrive alongside Shanghai 
industrialists and financiers? Moreover, while fascist movements adopted the 
organizational strategies and anti-capitalist rhetoric of Bolshevism, they rejected 
everything that formed the core of a communist movement, including class struggle 
and the overthrow of private property. The goal of German and Italian fascists in 
setting up revolutionary regimes was precisely to snub the very possibility of social 
revolution.
36
 Radical conservative activities were crusaders against communist 
parties, not fellow travelers of revolutionary socialists.  
 There are definitely more fruitful ways of accounting for the ideological import 
of radical right politics in relation to capitalist accumulation under China’s 
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fragmented sovereignty, limited but rapid urbanization, continuous political 
upheavals, and drastic cultural changes at both elite and popular levels during the 
second quarter of the twentieth century. Arif Dirlik’s pioneering study on the New 
Life Movement, an elaborate attempt led by Chiang and his Methodist wife to combat 
communism by transforming the everyday habits of citizens, makes the brilliant 
observation that the GMD was both revolutionary and conservative. The regime was 
conservative in its valorization of traditional values and opposition to social 
revolution. Yet, the GMD’s ideal conservative polity entailed radical mechanisms for 
mobilizing and managing the emerging urban and rural masses, with a view to 
incorporating these new forces into a carefully crafted revolution from the top.
37
 What 
marked the GMD’s conservatism and drew it to the ideological fold of Hitler, 
Mussolini and Franco were its vanguard party organization, a heavy dose of vehement 
anti-communism, and its determination to engage social forces and constituents that 
defined political modernity. This is precisely the point Michael Lestz makes in his 
study of the GMD “new right,” comprising Dai Jitao and other party functionaries-
cum-ideologues who played a crucial role in defining the post-April 12 coup order 
under Chiang. Rightwing agitators in GMD had limited understanding of Italian 
Fascism. Yet, their commitment to an anti-communist revolution, conscious adoption 
of Leninist organizational methods, and devotion to both native traditions and 
modernization put their party in the same league as European radical right 
movements.
38
 The GMD’s participation in the politics of reaction implied not studious 
copying of some supposed European prototype but partaking in a common approach 
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to handling the advance of class struggle, drastic cultural changes in urban society, the 
threats of imperialist intrusion, and uneven development of global capitalism.   
 More recent works have, from multiple angles, shown that far from being a 
guileless imitator of fascism so that it could maintain its despotic elite control over an 
estranged populace, practices and agendas associated with radical conservative 
politics were engrained in the party across factional divides. They informed party-
state behaviors in debates on economic development, in the administration of justice, 
and in the creation of a new national culture during the Nanjing Decade (1927-1937) 
when the GMD maintained an increasingly tight grip on its relatively urbanized and 
economically advanced stronghold in the southeastern provinces. While insisting 
upon China’s indebtedness to radical conservative currents in Europe, Margherita 
Zanasi argues that intra-party confrontations between Chiang Kai-shek and Wang 
Jingwei (1883-1944), and the latter’s eventual collaboration with the Japanese, were 
underpinned by struggles between two competing fascist modes of economic planning 
and nation-building.
39
 While not concerned with fascism per se, Eugenia Lean’s study 
on the GMD’s selective sanctioning of violence in the 1930s demonstrates how, by 
overriding the judicial process and granting state pardons to Shi Jianqiao (1906-1979) 
and presenting her murder of warlord Sun Chuanfang (1885-1935) as an act of filial 
heroism, the Nanjing regime not only shrewdly rode on the tide of public emotions 
that had swung to the assassin's favor and made clear the GMD's superior position 
vis-à-vis the judicial establishment. More significantly, however, the GMD state also 
sought to endorse the assassination as embodiment of what it lauded as the timeless 
Chinese virtue of filial piety and legitimize violence as a means to bring about order 
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and rebirth to the nation.
40
  
 The valorization of irrational violence as an extra-legal means to justice, an 
appeal to a national essence, and a quest to manipulate and channel mass emotions 
were indeed salient elements of interwar radical conservative politics around the 
world. Revisiting the New Life Movement and cognate programs in social 
engineering, Margaret Clinton sees the GMD’s fusion of restorationist sentiments vis-
à-vis Confucianism and commitment to radical streamlining of society for mass 
industrial production as major ideological strains the Chinese regimes shared with 
fascist movements abroad.
41
 Under GMD rule, there might not be a clearly calibrated 
set of fascist agendas with which a disciplined mass movement could identify. 
Nevertheless, to borrow Antonio Gramsci’s famous formulation, it would not be an 
overstatement to argue that the global politics of radical conservatism held hegemony 
over the Nationalist political class in the 1930s and 1940s. 
 
China’s Conservative Revolution: Consent and the Everyday   
 More importantly, the conservative revolution held sway not only among party 
cadres but also commanded consent from civil society, even if alignment of popular 
consciousness with party-state priorities was limited and ephemeral.
42
 Radical 
conservatism was an ideological formation par excellence in that it took individuals 
rather than socio-economic system to the heart of revolutionary action. Everyday life 
was elevated to become the main site for state intervention as the radical impulses of 
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Nationalist cadres were displaced from confrontational political activities after the 
anti-communist coup. If the national revolution continued to thrive on engagement 
with the masses, its vitality under the new regime derived not from popular political 
insurgencies but from an overhaul of work attitudes, leisure activities, consumption 
and domestic habits. Students and workers who took to the street to fight against 
imperialists and exploitative industrialists under the GMD-CCP united front period 
were herded back inside classrooms and factory plants. Instead of taking the state to 
task on everyday injustices, citizens were exhorted to first put their own house in 
order. Quotidian personal behaviors and biases, thought to provide the material of 
social fabric, were where the conundrum of and solutions to China’s difficult modern 
transformation resided. Whereas the call for non-militant mass activism reflected the 
state’s own shifting role in mass society, it held genuine attraction for urban middle 
and intellectual classes who craved a more stable order that facilitated individual 
development and gradual improvement.      
In recent years, historians of modern China have taken considerable interest in 
the everyday, seeing in the category a wealth of new materials and fresh interpretative 
angles to be pursued. Hanchao Lu identifies the everyday closely with material 
culture, specifically basic necessities such as clothing, shelter and food. Tracking how 
daily items of consumption – piped water, electricity, bean products, etc. – were 
received, rejected, and rumored on by poor urbanites through time helps recover 
popular voices beyond elite textual sources like newspapers, novels, or even popular 
entertainments. Lu’s typical twentieth-century Chinese urbanite was an apolitical, 
toiling wage-earner who was either illiterate, or could afford little time and money on 
reading materials. It is only through examining common people’s “material lives” and 




to revolutionary ideologies and elite politics.
43
 Contrasted with Lu’s empiricist 
approach, other scholars see the everyday as a philosophical concept deployed by 
historical actors to make sense of modern experiences and devise strategies for 
intervention. Taking the quotidian as the site where new capitalist economic and 
social realities clashed with traditional practices and moral norms, Rebecca Karl 
demonstrates how female labor was embroiled in reflections on family-based 
economic production under China’s semi-colonial modernity. A practice once hailed 
by the late imperial state as a social virtue borne by elite women in the domestic 
sphere, female labor became associated with modern slavery and a lens through which 
Chinese feminists understood the everyday violence women endured in the national 
and global contexts at the turn of the twentieth century.
44
 Rather than concrete 
artifacts and consumables, the everyday can be taken as a heuristic device for 
sweeping critiques on socio-historical formations.         
A balanced approach between the tangible and the abstract treats everyday life as 
a space formed by the totality of human activities under capitalism. Under this 
conceptualization, the quotidian encompassed social beings’ entire lived experience – 
not just arts, politics, or indeed material culture in isolation – as they negotiated the 
contradictions, unevenness, and reification of modernity.
45
 As social spaces, the 
everyday lives of different communities were intertwined and in tension with one 
another. In 1910s China, for example, the New Culture Movement opened a space on 
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the Peking University campus where individualism was prized, social hierarchy 
questioned, and political causes spontaneously organized by energetic and rebellious 
students. This everyday culture, centered on dormitories, libraries, classrooms, set in 
motion a political dynamic that gave rise to the May Fourth students’ movement in 
1919.
46
 At the same time, the burgeoning print media in the 1920s elevated 
individuals’ mundane manners and habits into important matters imbued with social 
significance. Matters such as the free-wheeling student culture, romance between men 
and women, and the commodified urban life became problems that came under 
intensifying elite intellectual scrutiny and state management.
47
           
The conservative revolution turned social criticism and activism attributed to the 
everyday since the turn of the twentieth century on its head. GMD theorists like Dai 
Jitao inherited late Qing intellectuals’ interest in seeing everyday experience as 
suggestive of profound social processes. Yet, instead of interrogating the historical 
conditions that engendered cultural alienation, radical conservatives adopted the 
idealist position that mistook transforming individuals’ private life for realigning 
social relations. Sun’s ruminations on minsheng were repackaged by radical 
conservatives into a theoretical program that competed against historical materialism, 
with cultivation of individuals living contented, healthy daily routine identified as the 
revolution’s top agenda. Intellectual and political intervention into power relations 
was de-emphasized as popular customs and tastes were invested with moral 
significance, detached from political economy,  and placed under bureaucratic 
oversight.  
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Mass politics under Chiang’s Nationalist regime focused on refining the minutiae 
of public and private behaviors – hygienic practices, leisure activities, diet, sleeping 
habits, etc – in the name of rebuilding the nation’s spiritual strength. If progressive 
students’ politics in the 1920s was contingent on an everyday culture formed from the 
bottom up without state control, the GMD state acted vigorously to blunt the 
subversive edge of organized politics by meticulously rationalizing daily routines.
48
 It 
deployed nationwide campaigns and mass recreational bodies to guide the people in 
organizing their working and leisure hours. Recent studies have shed much light on 
the New Life Movement, Chiang’s flagship social movement launched in 1934, as an 
attempt at creating a new popular culture in light of the GMD’s militant anti-
communism, strident nationalism, and commitment to industrial modernization.
49
 Yet, 
the New Life Movement was but one facet of a political praxis that cast a longer 
shadow over civil society throughout the Nationalist reign. The GMD’s striving for 
domination over time and space had a strong impact on mass organizations like the 
scouting movement and reflected the party’s long-standing policy to neuter what 
Henri Lefebvre calls the “counter spaces” of spontaneous, non-hierarchal leisure 
activities.
50
 In 1937, when the Nationalist government enjoined the entire population 
to fight against Japan, the prosaic deportment of producers and consumers became 
more tightly tied to the nation’s epic struggle for survival. Similar to the fascist 
management of workers’ leisure time in wartime Japan, total war in the late 1930s and 
1940s consolidated everyday life as an object to be molded and beautified at will by 
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Aestheticization of Everyday Culture 
 The pervasiveness of the conservative revolution rested also on its appeal, much 
more as a cultural position than a concrete political program, to the modern 
intelligentsia. By abstracting everyday life from socio-political structure, the GMD 
offered an aesthetic solution to social dislocation and moral malaise that stroke a 
chord with many Chinese intellectual minds. Journalists and cultural critics, who 
abhorred the state’s heavy-handed approach to intellectual dissent, shared with 
Nationalists the fear that the nation’s spiritual vitality was in terminal decline. They, 
too, believed that social disaffection could be ameliorated by rechanneling popular 
desires from utilitarian concerns to pursuits in sports, art, and politically non-
threatening activities.
52
 While the GMD had started to co-opt urban educators since 
the late 1920s with the rituals and hierarchies of scouting, it was during the Second 
Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) that the broader liberal-leaning intelligentsia was 
being asked to contribute actively to the radical conservative project. Cultural critic 
and cosmopolitan humanist Zhu Guangqian (1897-1986) began writing for the state-
run press in 1942, calling on his compatriots to stop directing their angst over social 
injustice against the government. He argued that the masses should sublimate, with 
state guidance if necessary, their discontents in art and salubrious pastimes, thereby 
converging with the GMD’s claim that it was uniquely placed to deliver a disaffected 
people from spiritual stupor.  
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Aestheticization also underwrote Nationalist China’s appeal to foreign 
nationalists. Imperialism-driven capitalist development across Asia engendered an 
ideology that demanded Eastern societies to fight in unison against Western 
domination. The idealist version of Pan-Asianism envisioned Euro-American 
modernity as spiritual degradation to be overcome by the materially transcendent 
wholeness of Eastern cultures, and not as a historically-specific formation that 
governed global political and social structures. It proposed that peaceful exchanges of 
goodwill, philosophies and literatures between Asian peoples would cleanse the 
modern world of its fetish with material progress and technological violence. The 
pretension to leadership of a redemptive Pan-Asianist union informed the GMD’s 
outreach to Indian anti-colonialists, as the former failed to persuade the Japanese to 
adopt a more conciliatory policy towards China in the 1930s. Nationalist China’s self-
representation as embodying a new Asia attracted measured sympathy from figures 
close to and affiliated with the Indian National Congress. As a project that professed 
to surmount social conflicts through the beautification of work, leisure, individual 
bodies and national spirit, China’s conservative revolution aspired to rallying a 
unified Asia-wide response to the challenges of capitalist globalization.                
Compared with the fascist regimes in Germany, Italy and Japan, Nationalist 
China was a weak government. Despite ideological compatibilities, popular and 
intellectual consent to GMD rule could be abruptly withdrawn. Rather than a set of 
clearly defined positions, radical conservatism in Republican China encompassed 
multivalent dispositions to which the GMD state was not always able to give an 
organizational form. In his introduction to a recent volume on fascism in Japan, Alan 




fascism’s name.” 53 He describes a broad consensus among anti-communist politicians 
and intellectuals who believed that overcoming social alienation and fragmentation 
required rationalizing daily routines, aestheticizing labor, and fetishizing the nation. 
Similarly, China’s conservative revolution was an effervescence of intellectual, mass, 
and state activism that often lacked effective coordination. Shared desirability for an 
orderly community that respected authority among elite and even popular opinions 
compensated for the GMD’s failure to mobilize the masses with a clear set of political 
agendas and institutional networks. 
 
Outline of Chapters 
 My narrative of China’s other revolutionary experiment, one that has received far 
less scholarly scrutiny than communism, will be based on a variety of printed 
materials and unpublished archival sources. I study theoretical tracts attributed to 
major party ideologues, periodicals published at the national and local levels, official 
documents and training materials of GMD-initiated social movements, records of 
diplomatic activities, petitions sent by individual citizens to the Nationalist 
government, and memoirs of important and minor historical actors. Juxtaposing 
different genres of sources allows me to approach the conservative revolution as both 
discursive and organizational practices, and to engage the experiment as a fully 
fledged undertaking rather than mere aberrant developments or empty theoretical 
musings.  
 The chapters that follow are grouped into three parts: ideology, social 
movements, alliances. Part I, comprising chapter 1, examines the ideological 
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foundational of the conservative revolution, tracing it to the anti-communist purge on 
April 12, 1927 that cumulated in Chiang’s dominance over the GMD. It reconstructs 
the radical conservative decoupling of revolutionary activism from communism, 
follows state-devised modes of mass mobilization at peace and at war, and excavates 
ideological and institutional links the GMD cultivated domestically and overseas. It 
reflects on the Nationalist experiment not only as a Chinese revolution, but also in the 
context of anti-Western (including anti-Soviet) nationalism in Asia. A distinct 
revolutionary identity united rightwing activists within the GMD who, in the mid and 
late-twenties, grew increasingly uncomfortable with the growing strength of CCP 
organization. They were alarmed by the ways that working-class militancy, Soviet 
influence and communist internationalism could sabotage national cohesion. While 
much scholarly attention has been expended on the struggle for control of the party-
state machine between staunch right-wingers on one hand and Communists and their 
GMD sympathizers on the other, the import of the radical conservative ascendency 
within the Nationalist movement vis-à-vis the global history of revolutions and 
counter-revolutions has received less attention. By focusing on Li Shizeng, Hu 
Hanmin and particularly Dai Jitao – GMD anti-communists who were familiar with 
Marxism but rejected it for a philosophy of people’s livelihood – I chart out how the 
quest for a coherent social order that put premium on spiritual transformation of 
everyday life, inter-class cooperation, and a strong sense of cultural distinctiveness 
ran up against an ideology that promoted violent changes to property relations and 
internationalist solidarity. At stake in the redefinition of the GMD revolution from a 
national liberation movement to a conservative revolution were competing visions of 
how to deal with the challenges of colonialism, uneven economic development, and 




over which the two revolutionary camps fought bitterly, were not unique to China but 
also weighed heavily on the minds of modern nationalist intellectuals and political 
activists in Asia and beyond.  
Part II, which is consisted of chapters 2 and 3, explores execution of the 
conservative revolution as social movements. Nationalist-sponsored social 
movements aspired to simultaneously mobilize the masses and demobilize their 
independent political desires. Chapter 2 investigates the identification of urban youth 
as the embodiment of undesirable cultural changes and target of revolutionary 
transformation. Specifically, this chapter focuses on how the party-state appropriated 
the scouting movement and transformed it into an exemplary youth movement of 
urban China before and during the Nanjing Decade. As a treaty-port institution 
steeped in the ideals of individual responsibility and development, scouting struck a 
chord with the Nationalist desire to steer young people away from hedonistic urban 
pleasures and subversive political ideas in favor of docile labor, loyalty to the nation, 
and community service. The extensive adoption of training methods, personnel, 
aesthetics, and international network of the Chinese scouts demonstrated the affinity 
between conservative revolutionaries’ visions of salubrious, productive everyday life 
and those of liberal educators. Meanwhile, the martial, authority-respecting culture 
implied in Lord Baden-Powell’s brainchild appealed to Nationalists who envisioned 
the scout body as the party’s youth wing that groomed future cadres and military 
officers. The restructuring of the scouts as a branch of the more ideologically distinct 
Three People’s Principles Youth Corps during the Second Sino-Japanese War put to 
relief tensions between an interventionist, top-down approach to social mobilization 
and one that focuses more on persuasion among conservative revolutionaries. 




and operation of which shared striking similarities with Japan’s movement of the 
same name. The Second Sino-Japanese War was China’s first total war against a 
foreign belligerent, to which the entire population, not just soldiers, was expected to 
contribute. The Nationalist regime, having retreated to the inland city of Chongqing, 
was uprooted from its relatively developed base on the east coast and confronted with 
both an overwhelming rural population in the hinterland and a restive refugee 
community. Yet, unlike the first decade of its reign when its legitimacy faced 
formidable challenge, Chiang’s government emerged in the late 1930s as the 
unquestioned guarantor of national survival. Confronted with a foreign enemy, class 
struggle was further delegitimized and the CCP  was forced to pledge loyalty to 
Chongqing for the sake of national unity. As in Japan and its East Asian empire, the 
Second Sino-Japanese War created an opportunity for the state to reassert hegemony 
over culture, the economy, and political life. Complete government control over 
society, much trumpeted by party ideologues in the early 1930s, came close to reality 
since 1937 with journalists and writers, producers and consumers, students and young 
children mobilized to join soldiers in an all-round fight against Japan. Under the 
slogan of “nation-building through the resistance war” (kangzhan jianguo), the 
Nationalists built upon its efforts in the 1930s and furthered the realization of a 
community bound by technological rationalization, aesthetic orderliness and spiritual 
authenticity that would last beyond the total war period. The valorization of ascetic 
productivism, engagement of popular cultural forms, and intensified vilification of 
communism as a foreign threat to the social fabric contributed to the quest for a new 
order of militant unity befitting a great nation. Out of the miseries and displacement 
of war, the GMD envisioned, would emerge an everyday regime of moral rectitude, 




Part III, comprising chapters 4 and 5, reveals the alliances the GMD built with 
nonpartisan figures to secure consent from wider elite communities in China and 
elsewhere in Asia. Disdain for mass moral apathy, divisive class politics, and an 
ignorant populace drew the intellectual elite to a state that could be relied upon to 
keep the peace and bring moral uplift to the public. As well, the GMD’s preference for 
spiritual rejuvenation over social liberation gave rise to Pan-Asian sentiments with 
which Indian nationalists could connect. While support for the Nationalist project is 
hard to quantify, chapter 4 demonstrates the ideological bases of GMD’s rapport with 
liberal humanism. I examine how Zhu Guangqian (1897-1986), a prominent humanist 
aesthetician who identified with the liberal tradition of Benedetto Croce, allowed his 
cultural criticism to be deployed by the party-state in its micro-management of 
citizens’ collective consciousness and behaviors. For Zhu, the state was an imperfect 
guardian of intellectual individuality, a civilizing agent that ensured his young, 
immature compatriots became responsible members of society. In a country where 
manipulative demagogues and gullible youngsters threatened to run over classrooms 
and studios, the GMD state, despite its less than stellar record in protecting 
intellectual freedom, was counted upon to tame plebeian nihilism and safeguard 
culture from being swamped by politics and commercialism.     
Chapter 5 discusses the little studied courtship between the GMD and prominent 
Indian anti-colonialists both within the Indian National Congress movement and 
without. Focusing on the remarkable story of the Nationalist-funded Cheena Bhavana, 
the sinological institute attached to Rabindranath Tagore’s university Visva-Bharati, I 
argue that a common faith in the efficacy of spiritual renewal as an antidote to the 
mechanized modern civilization brought to Asia by Euro-America drew together the 




movement on another. In this regard, a reaction against modern industrial rationality 
put into dialogue Dai Jitao, the Chinese Buddhist leader Taixu, and Tagore. Shared 
revolt against “Western” modernity formed the backdrop to the Congress’s sympathy 
for China. However, partnership between the two nationalist movements during the 
Second World War was ultimately determined by geopolitical and ideological 
considerations rather than cultural values. Moreover, this partnership unraveled as 
soon as India’s agenda of national liberation in the late 1940s diverged from the 
GMD’s gradual abandonment of any pretense to challenge the capitalist status-quo in 
favor of admission as a junior partner in the U.S.-led Cold War crusade against 
communism in Asia. 
The dissertation concludes with an epilogue assessing the relevance of the 
conservative revolution in wider social discourse and its legacy beyond the 
Nationalists’ defeat by the CCP at the Chinese Civil War in 1949. It teases out the 
ways in which the language of anti-communism was internalized as a vernacular by 
local communities in the 1930s and 1940s. The same vernacular resurfaced in 
propaganda literature sponsored by the Nationalist state in 1950s Taiwan as the island 
saw the return of total war spiritual mobilization under the GMD’s reinvigorated 
struggle with communism. What became even less perceptible with the party-state 
and its revolution, which survived by courtesy of U.S. military patronage, was any 
commitment to an alternative to capitalism and imperialism.           
          
                                    
                      













Theorizing Revolutionary Activism  
Party Purification and the Rise of Radical Conservatism 
 
 
 The set of events surrounding the GMD’s April 12 rightwing coup d'état had a 
significant impact on the course of modern Chinese history and the history of global 
revolutions. In the early morning of April 12, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek, with the support of 
southern-based military strongman Bai Chongxi (1893-1966) and such Shanghai gang 
leaders as Du Yuesheng (1888-1951), launched a brutal crackdown on Communists and 
labor unionists. As a participant in the Nationalists’ military expedition against the 
Beiyang regime and its affiliated warlords, the Communist-led labor movement had just 
wrested control of China’s industrial and financial hub away from its enemies. The 
unionists subsequently set up a provisional municipal government that alarmed 
industrialists and foreign powers who held the economic reins of the metropolis. The 
coup catapulted Chiang Kai-shek and his rightwing coterie to the leadership of the GMD 
and the national revolution (guomin geming) the party was conducting with their 
erstwhile Communist allies. After a brief period of split with the Wuhan-based GMD left, 
the party-state which Chiang headed and transplanted to Nanjing became the 
internationally recognized national government of China.  
 This chapter reconsiders the April 12 coup as the foundational moment of a 
conservative revolution that found expression in a newly-established national state based 
in Nanjing. It reconstructs an anti-communist approach to capitalism embraced by key 
GMD intellectuals involved in the coup, basing their political activism on particular 




(qingdang), as the GMD called the purge, was widely condemned by the left as a 
counterrevolutionary act. Song Qingling (1893-1981), Sun’s widow and a Communist 
sympathizer, had no doubts that the revolution for national liberation was betrayed. She 
did not mince her words when she chided her former comrades in August 1927 for 
“allowing the new militarist clique in the Yangtze to capture and utilize the Kuomintang,” 
alluding to Chiang’s military background and power base.1 For party cadres in charge of 
the Nanjing-based government, however, the coup meant not the end of the revolution but 
recalibration of its objectives. Dai Jitao, the theoretician of the ascendant GMD right, was 
quick to reframe labor activism under the redefined priorities of the revolution, just as the 
new regime was busy subsuming the militant Communist-affiliated labor movement 
under a nexus of party and gangster-run “yellow” unions.2 Praising labor for being the 
vanguard of the national revolution, Dai told workers in the former bastion of labor 
activism in Guangzhou in May 1927 to endure greater hardship and work cooperatively 
for the development of their industries instead of holding strikes and fighting for their 
own class interests. The harsh realities of imperialism that defined China’s predicament 
rendered delusionary the striving of internationalist working-class solidarity as pursued 
by Communists, anarchists and others whom Dai branded as “reactionary elements” 
(fandong fenzi). National independence, formerly tied to a nascent proletarian political 
subjectivity, now required self-imposed bitter discipline (woxin changdan) on workers’ 
part. Only by raising productivity could the state provide co-operatives, schools and 
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insurance for the laboring masses.
3
 Anything that threatened the nation’s fledging 
industries opened China to more imperialist domination.      
 Indeed, at stake in the party purification campaign were the heavily contested 
meanings of China’s national revolution as institutionalized in the rivalries between the 
GMD and the CCP. The two parties disagreed on whether national liberation should also 
entail a wider attack on global capital or if the aim of securing China’s survival in a 
hostile geopolitical environment was to be pursued without upsetting socio-economic 
relations domestically and abroad. Curiously, the ideological import of the April 12 coup 
has been downplayed in recent scholarly literature. After decades of competing 
historiograhic orthodoxies imposed by the two Chinese states during the Cold War, 
historians are urged “to lay ideology aside and … see Chiang not as a hero or a villain but 
as a human being,” focusing instead on the GMD’s pragmatic concerns over being 
outmaneuvered by the Comintern and the CCP.
4
 Yang Kuisong’s majestic study of GMD-
CCP relations sheds important light on the simmering ideological rifts between the two 
allies, but it still tends to see the collapse of the united front more as a result of raw power 




 While I do not doubt the centrality of institutional power or even personal 
intrigues in political struggles, I believe one should confront the April 12 coup critically 
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in the wider politics of revolution in China without making a caricature of either Chiang 
or the party-state he led. The collapse of the GMD-CCP alliance was a culmination of 
deep-seated disagreements among modern Chinese revolutionaries on how a late 
developing, semi-colonized society could reclaim control of its political sovereignty, 
spearhead economic modernization, and construct a coherent subjectivity that 
encompassed the nation’s diverse and uneven economic and cultural landscape. Like 
many fully colonized societies, China’s quest for national independence was 
simultaneously a process of social and cultural remaking. Chinese revolutionaries 
confronted the danger that, under capitalism, formal political independence could just 
result in deeper economic dependence on Western imperialist interests.
6
 Although 
geming, which embodied the cosmological theory of the Mandate of Heaven, had long 
existed in the political discourse of imperial China, the character compound acquired 
distinctly modern significance as it became enmeshed in nationalist politics by the late 
nineteenth century. As political activists and intellectuals pondered on the events that 
created the modern French and Japanese nation-states, figures like Sun Yat-sen and Liang 
Qichao (1873-1929) oscillated between advocating violent struggle against the Qing state 
and prescribing gradualist social reforms outside the political realm.
7
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 The debate between proponents of organized mass politics targeting the reigning 
socio-political edifice, and those who wanted a more limited program of cross-class 
national uplift continued into the Republican era. This debate is further intensified by the 
intellectual ferment of the New Culture Movement and the Comintern-engineered 
alliance between Sun’s GMD and the CCP. The April 12 coup realigned the terms of the 
debate by bringing to the surface two distinct approaches to delivering China from 
economic underdevelopment and semi-colonial existence. On one hand, there was the 
Communist coupling of national liberation with class struggle. One the other hand, the 
radical right committed the GMD to a unique solution that was both conservative in its 
resolute opposition to class conflict and radical in its investment in mass politics as the 
harbinger of an independent nation free from the problems inherent in capitalist 
modernity. The radical conservatives’ eventual victory brought about a program that 
promised an ethical and aesthetic, rather than social, revolution.      
          
A Rightist Revolution 
 The conservative revolutionary paradigm was first and foremost a reaction against 
the rise of communism and labor militancy. Yet, due to the strong Soviet influence on 
China’s national revolution in the 1920s, the stamp of Leninism was remarkably 
pronounced even on the prolific treatises authored by anti-communist GMD intellectuals 
in the days leading to and immediately after the rightwing seizure of Shanghai. The quest 
for organizational and ideological conformity that underlay Sun Yat-sen’s fascination 
with democratic centralism remained as relevant for the radical right as it was for the left. 
But it was not only the Leninist model of state and party-building that survived the April 





12 coup. Chiang Kai-shek’s GMD regime also inherited priorities that confronted other 
national liberation movements inspired by the promise of the new Soviet Union: national 
independence and world revolution, engagement of workers and peasants, and the 
dialectic between vanguardism and the spontaneity of mass activism. In this sense, even 
as the GMD no longer challenged production relations between classes, the national 
revolution after 1927 continued to display the form of a Third World revolt against 
imperialist hegemony emanating from Euro-America and Japan.  
 The interwar years saw the increasing urbanization and industrialization of 
colonized and semi-colonized societies, which were more than ever incorporated into 
global capitalism as exporters to the metropoles. The laboring masses became a core 
component of nationalist movements led by westernized elites, pushing for both national 
independence and overhaul of social relations.
8
 In China, strikes against foreign 
capitalists and their governments in Shanghai and Guangzhou during the 1910s and 
1920s left a strong impression on the GMD elite, convincing them of the need to enlarge 
the revolutionary bloc so that it included not only the educated few but also the mass of 
urban workers. Dai Jitao (1891-1949), Hu Hanmin (1879-1936), and Li Shizeng (1881-
1973), who would emerge as ideologues of the radical right, were key contributors to the 
early debates on leftwing politics in China. The French-educated Li was one of the 
country’s first anarchists and joined Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Alliance in 1906 as an 
ardent advocate of mutual aid. In the 1910s and 1920s, he worked to bring young Chinese 
students to France on a work-study program, in which many future Communists had their 
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first experience of industrial labor and became radicalized. As Chinese students and 
workers became politically active in the late 1910s, Dai and Hu were attracted to 
Marxism as they mused on the potential prowess of urban workers in furthering 
nationalist objectives in light of Lenin’s Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.9  
 In the immediate days after the purge, Dai and Hu still showed interest in 
Marxism and deployed it to criticize the CCP and the Soviet Union. They republished the 
German socialist Karl Kautsky’s The Economic Doctrines of Karl Marx (1887), which 
Dai first translated from Takabatake Motoyuki’s Japanese rendition from 1919 to 1920.10 
Dai argued in one of the prefaces to his Chinese rendition of Kautsky, an ardent critic of 
Bolshevism, that many young activists were ignorant of Marx’s writings. They failed, 
therefore, to discern the imperialist ambitions of the Comintern, subscribing blindly to the 
fallacious mission of world revolution with no concern for China’s own survival.11 
Elsewhere, in a more provocative speech, Dai accused the CCP of sacrificing the 
“completely uneducated, utterly feeble and undisciplined” Chinese masses to the global 
struggle between imperialism and world communism. Without subscribing to strict 
discipline and organization under Sun Yat-senism, he warned, the nation and its people 
would never be recovered from their plight. To prevent talented youths from falling in 
droves to the Communist embrace, “faithful leaders” of the party had no choice but to 
                                                 
9
 Herman William Mast III, “An Intellectual Biography of Tai Chi-t’ao from 1891 to 1928,” (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Illinois, 1970), 66-72. 
 
10
 Dai Jitao and Hu Hanmin trans., Ziben lun jieshuo (Shanghai: Minzhi shuju, 1927). The Chinese title 
drew directly from the Japanese version Shihon ron kaisetsu, literally “Explication of Capital”.  
Paralleling the political trajectories of his Chinese translators, Takabatake Motoyuki (1886-1928) was a 
Japanese Marxist who became an ardent advocate of national socialism, claiming to have reconciled 
Marxism with the supposedly indigenous values of a corporatist national polity embodied by the Emperor. 
(Germaine A. Hoston, “Marxism and National Socialism in Taishô Japan: The Thought of Takabatake 
Motoyuki,” Journal of Asian Studies 44 [1984]: 46.)  
 
11









 Dai and his party colleagues presented in treatises published around the dramatic 
unraveling of the united front the GMD’s utopian vision of mass politics that promised 
not only national independence but a new, salubrious form of moral and social existence. 
The national revolution purged of Marxist influences would prove superior to Soviet-
style communism by eventually ending all forms of violent struggles that had been a 
feature of human civilization since the beginning of history. The socialist internationalism 
that inspired Third World revolutions and the GMD’s own mobilization of urban workers 
in a common anti-imperialist struggle were transformed by the new custodians of the 
nationalist movement into a cosmopolitan utopianism, embodied in the Confucian ideal 
of datong, or Great Harmony.
13
     
 The party intellectuals explored in this chapter were early theoreticians among the 
GMD’s radical conservatives. The group corresponded largely to the clique that the Wang 
Jingwei-led “left” faction in the party called the “new right,” cadres who coalesced 
around Chiang Kai-shek in the months leading up to the April 12 purge and the 
consolidation of the Nanjing regime.
14
 It overlapped with, but was distinct from the 
coterie of GMD elders who met on Western Hills, Beijing in late 1925 to condemn the 
pro-CCP attitude held by Wang (1883-1944) and the Guangzhou-based Nationalist 
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government he had led since Sun’s death in March. Dai and Li, initially skeptical of the 
elders’ hardline stance on the united front in 1925, ended up being fervent anti-
communists in 1927.
15
 Ideologically, radical conservatives distinguished themselves 
from their leftwing and liberal critics primarily by claiming to remove foreign elements 
from the orthodoxy of Sun Yat-senism. It combined social conservatism with a party 
structure modeled on the GMD’s former Soviet ally.16 In addition to similar claims of 
being committed to reviving their nation’s primordial greatness, there was more that put 
the GMD radical conservatives in league with their rightwing equivalents active in 
Europe, Japan and Latin America. Most notably, party theoreticians who provided the 
ideological dimension of Chiang’s China insisted that their regime was at the same time a 
revolutionary movement unbound by the crippled constitutional arrangements that Sun 
and his followers once supported.  
 In justifying the crackdown on Communists and the Shanghai labor movement, 
conservative revolutionaries like Dai and Hu took pains to differentiate themselves from 
ultranationalists and liberal politicians committed to the moribund constitutional order of 
the northern-based Beiyang warlord government against which the GMD was launching a 
military expedition. “The Chinese Nationalist Party,” Hu stated brusquely, “does not sit 
about parliament and give flowery speeches, score applauses or cast votes.” It mission 
was to smash the existing order so that a new one guided by Sun’s Three People’s 
Principles could be built.
17
 They saw themselves as agents of pure revolutionary fervor 
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working to displace both the inertia of the party elite and the communist pseudo-
revolution. Li, on the other hand, accused Marxism and Marxist-Leninism of being 
historically regressive and claimed what he called the revolution of minsheng -- people’s 
livelihood or life of the masses – as more compatible with the latest advances in human 
civilization.
18
 The rightwing of the GMD branded itself not as a force of the part-warlord 
and part-parliamentary establishment, but one that was leading a mass political 
movement towards a third way that was neither capitalist nor communist as being 
practiced by imperialist powers in Euro-America or the Soviet Union.    
             
 
Depoliticizing Minsheng  
 GMD ideologues’ main complaint against communism was that it misrecognized 
capitalist imperialism as the ultimate reason for China’s plight, when the country’s most 
profound crisis was low level of national morale and development. In the summer of 
1925, Dai published two influential polemics, Philosophical Foundations of Sun Yat-
senism (Sun Wen zhuyi zhi zhexue de jichu) and China’s National Revolution and the 
Guomindang (Guomin geming yu Zhongguo Guomindang). The pamphlets became so 
influential among politically aware readers that they were compared to Chen Duxiu’s 
(1879-1942) famed magazine New Youth (Xin qingnian). The GMD Central Executive 
Committee in Guangzhou, then still committed to the united front, censured China’s 
National Revolution.
19
 Marxism, Dai argued in the two tracts, was philosophically too 
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simple-minded, being premised on a materialist reading of history. He observed in 
Philosophical Foundations that Marxist politics was concerned only with the economic 
life of the people.
20
 This lop-sided understanding of humanity informed Chinese 
Communists’ flawed internationalism and neglect of the nation. It was pure “wishful 
thinking,” Dai declared in China’s National Revolution, that the competition between 
nations for survival would be overcome “once the economic structure was changed and 
capitalism eradicated.”21 While claiming to remain unequivocal in his opposition to the 
infamous unequal treaties, Dai warned his country not to take part in a full-scale political 
struggle against imperialism, particularly any Comintern-led global initiative. China 
needed economic development (jianshe) and imports such as German science and 
American machines from industrially-advanced countries. “Not having developed our 
own country and rejuvenated our nation,” Dai stated, “there could be no talk of world 
revolution.”22 A resolute stance against imperialism had to wait until the all-important 
national “self-confidence” (zixin li) and “awakening” (juewu) were attained, which were 
themselves contingent on the development of the citizenry’s material well-being (wuzhi 
de jianshe) with the input of global capital and technology.
23
 Playing with the slippages 
inherent in the compound geming, Dai’s national revolution was a plea for reformism 
even as it alluded to an end to capitalist hegemony and a world revolution against 
imperialism in the indeterminate future. 
                                                 
20
 Dai, Sun Wen zhuyi zhi zhexue de jichu (1925; reprint, Taipei: Zhongyang gaizao weiyuan hui wenwu 
gongying chu, 1951), 15 (page citations are to the reprint edition). 
  
21
 Dai, Guomin geming yu Zhongguo Guomindang, 68-69.  
  
22
 Dai, Dai Jitao zuijin yanlun, 8. 
 
23





In contradistinction to Marxist myopia on production relations, GMD ideologues 
claimed to offer a vision for humanity in its wholeness. They touted Sun Yat-sen as the 
premier theoretician of a total, instead of a narrowly materialist, revolution. Hu Hanmin 
claimed that Sun had unlocked the basis of human evolution, allowing the late leader to 
supersede European social theorists such as Rousseau and Marx. For Hu, all previous 
revolutionary theories were flawed for they erroneously considered particular episodes in 
history – struggles between church and monarchy in the Renaissance period, monarchy 
and civil rights leading up to the French Revolution, proletarians and the bourgeoisie in 
the twentieth century, etc. – as universal and timeless. Sun’s unique insight was to realize 
that humans had always been prone to struggle against one another. An exclusive focus 
on re-arranging political institutions or economic interests would therefore not solve the 
world’s problems. Only the Three People’s Principles – with their equal attention to the 
interlocked nature of nationhood, political structures, and economics – could address the 
totality of social life.
24
 Only Sun Yat-sen’s total revolution could put an end to conflicts 
between peoples by preventing the degeneration of healthy nationalism into expansionary 
imperialism, developing a non-capitalist modern economy, and safeguarding genuine 
democracy from “hypocritical bourgeois democratic politics.”25    
While Hu was cautious in emphasizing Sun’s three-pronged approach to 
revolution, Dai performed a more creative reading of his mentor’s ideas, identifying 
minsheng as the core of revolution. The principle of minsheng, commonly rendered as 
people’s livelihood or socialism, was the most controversial aspect of Sun’s political 
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theory that was contested by both Nationalists and Communists as vindication of their 
own social vision. Dai made two important interventions that effectively revised Sun’s 
program. First, he subsumed the other two core elements of the Three People’s Principles, 
nationalism and democracy, under the minsheng principle. He argued that the fight for an 
independent nation-state and the empowerment of the citizenry, including disenfranchised 
workers and peasants, was in the broadest sense part of a coherent endeavor to transform 
people’s livelihood.26 Minsheng was thus the ultimate goal of national and political 
revolution, a conceptualization of social life that is much broader and more ambitious in 
scope than the constitutional infrastructure of a political entity. 
Having established the centrality of minsheng, Dai then went about redrawing the 
remit of people’s livelihood so that it would not lend itself to calls for changes in the 
socio-economic structure. The faithful interpreter of Sun Yat-senism realized he was on 
rather flimsy ground here, as Sun died without delivering all his lectures on the issue.
27
 
That, however, did not deter Dai from building on what he saw as the revered 
revolutionary’s inchoate theoretical impulses. Publicized lectures on minsheng, as Dai 
acknowledged, indeed covered the breadth of the people’s everyday life with emphasis on 
material aspects such as clothing (yi), food (shi), housing (zhu), and transportation (xing). 
Conceptualized as the core site for such radical interventions as land reform and political 
enfranchisement of the masses, Sun’s minsheng referred to the concrete everyday needs 
of a poverty-stricken population. As an ideological category, minsheng was what Harry 
Harootunian calls “the minimal unity of temporal experience,” allowing one to 
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understand the disorienting and violent social changes that global capitalism unleashed as 
one totality.
28
 Dai inherited Sun’s expansive vision of the social, but was evidently 
unimpressed by its mundane materialism. Claiming privileged access to Sun’s 
handwritten notes and private conversations with his wife, Dai argued that the late leader 
was preoccupied with yu – the reproduction (shengyu), cultivation (yangyu) and 
education (jiaoyu) of the populace. On one level, yu was about population management, 
sustaining the living (yangsheng) and disposing the dead (songsi). It was concerned with 
entitlement to a good life among all its members, young and old. Combined with le 
(happiness), which Dai introduced with yu to complete Sun’s theory of minsheng, the 
national revolution became a campaign to create for the citizenry “beautiful and elegant 
enjoyment” (youmei gaoshang de xiangle).29 Sun’s original emphasis on political 
economy – the seemingly commonsensical fundamentals of everyday life that 
nonetheless alluded to the complex social processes of a late developing, semi-colonial 
China – was transformed under Dai into a principle of aesthetics, a nebulous quest for the 
beautification of life. This politics of beauty, to which Sun’s minsheng was attributed, 
was touted to have surpassed the epistemological naiveté (danchun) of communism and 
its exclusive focus on economic life.
30
 Just as significantly, the minsheng “total 
revolution” also delegitimized any “narrow” campaign that aimed for a fundamental and 
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immediate overhaul of production relations and imperialist privileges in China and the 
wider world.    
 
Resetting the Agenda: A Revolution of Ethics 
Dai’s call for the aestheticization of life exhibited what Harootunian in a different 
context calls a phenomenological conceptualization of the everyday. Harootunian 
observes that attention to every minutiae of social existence might paradoxically result in 
a failure to reveal its underlying processes.
31
 Superficial phenomena overshadowed 
deeper structural determinants in Dai’s understanding of minsheng. Ironically, Dai was 
among the first senior GMD cadres who coupled transformation of lived experience with 
reflections on cultural reification under capitalism. In his younger, more left-leaning days, 
the intricate ties between politics, culture, and morality were brought to bear under a 
critique on bourgeois culture and commodifcation of mass entertainment. In “Drama and 
the Common People” (Yanxi yu pingmin), a now obscure essay that appeared in a special 
edition of the party organ Republican Daily (Minguo ribao) marking the alliance between 
the GMD and the CCP, Dai reminisced about the pure bliss to which the masses were 
treated by drama troupes during temple fairs and other local festivals when he was a child 
in his native Sichuan province. China’s belated encounter with modern consumerism 
meant that such carnivalesque scenes in which people freely put on colorful costumes and 
munched on their noodles while sitting randomly to soak in the free performance had 
become all but memories in just a few decades, even as this form of popular 
entertainment had been the norm for generations. In glittering Shanghai, one could only 
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find exclusive theaters in which prices were carefully calibrated, standardized and set 
prohibitively high for most common people.
32
 The rowdy but authentic happiness of folk 
entertainment was transformed into the genteel philistinism of urban consumer society. 
Far from sentimental nostalgia for an irrecoverable past, Dai’s childhood memory 
provided the impetus for a revolutionary future. “What is the purpose of revolution?” Dai 
posed rhetorically. “It is,” he continued,   
to wrest the new culture which destroyed our old culture away from the minority 
so that the common people as a whole can reclaim the privileged position (xingfu 
de diwei) where they can partake of that new culture. Our goal is not excessive, 
for our ancestors had always possessed such privilege. In places where the 
encounter with modern civilization (jindai wenming) came somewhat late, even a 
man in his thirties like myself can recall the beauty of human sentiments and 
happiness of the common people.
33
   
 
The call to arms targeted at GMD cadres for the construction of a new national culture 
was all the more striking, given Dai’s mature career as a traditionalist, considering how it 
implied not return to “old culture” but effort to reinvent the new. As a premier 
spokesperson of China’s organized nationalism, Dai was echoing the theoretical and 
creative experimentations of his contemporaries in the New Culture Movement.  
Indeed, in 1919, amidst the excitement of the May Fourth Movement, he wrote 
precisely that the rise of private property and the commodification of labor, which 
resulted in the displacement of workers from agrarian society, meant that Confucian 
ethics had become obsolete. Rather than seeking a return to antiquity, the imminent task 
facing the nation today was the creation of a new ethics that would address the 
inadequacies of capitalist social relations. He singled out in particular the 
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compartmentalization of morality into distinct public (gongde) and private (side) realms, 
a recent phenomenon that emerged from the ashes of an agrarian, family-centered 
economy.
34
 Dai called for a socialist ethics that befitted a modern industrial society.
35
 
This new ethics entailed a utopian communist ideal of benevolence (ren’ai) and fraternity 
(you’ai) based on which the young and the old would be taken care of by the social 
collective as a whole and all members of society would treat each other as their own 
kin.
36
 The state as an agent for moral change had yet to enter Dai’s theorization. But his 
“socialist ethics,” a decidedly idealist rendering of social relations, would justify the 
revolutionary state’s active engineering of the everyday as a cultural, instead of politico-
economic, project.                                                                                
Six years later, when such key concepts as benevolence (ren) acquired 
conservative Confucian connotations in Dai’s reinterpretation of the Three People’s 
Principles, the nation-state was privileged as the agent and embodiment of an ethical 
construct. This contrasted with Sun’s emphasis on economic life in his minsheng 
principle and Communist insistence on the transformation of production relations as the 
foundation of any revolutionary enterprise. The man who wrote in 1919 that Confucius 
was hopelessly harking back to ancient ideals that had lost relevance to the crumbling 
social order even during the philosopher’s own lifetime now argued that non-compliance 
with Confucian tenets, the “foundation of peace and happiness,” was to blame for all the 
chaos and carnage China had ever experienced since the Warring States period (475-221 
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 He went on to observe that Sun Yat-sen had inherited the moral enterprise of the 
ancient Chinese thinker that was in sharp contrast to the alleged moral agnosticism of 
Karl Marx and Vladimir I. Lenin. “The basis of nationalism,” Dai declared in allusion to 
the Three People’s Principles, “is the ethics of filial piety (xiaoci). The basis of 
democracy is the ethics of trust and righteousness (xinyi). The basis of people’s livelihood 
is the ethics of benevolence and peace (ren’ai heping).”38  
The GMD claimed to represent the unique Chinese moral ideals that Sun Yat-sen 
inherited from Confucius and his disciples. Dai’s reduction of Confucian universalist 
pretensions to the core of state-sanctioned national spirit (Zhongguo minzu de jingshen) 
served to establish what Antonio Gramsci calls “the autonomous, educative and moral 
activity of the secular State.” Unlike the cosmopolitan aloofness of premodern states run 
by an intellectual or ecclesiastical caste, Gramsci argues that modern political formations 
actively shape mass moral norms to serve the interests of the ruling classes.
39
 The 
reconciliation of such abstract cosmopolitan ideals as benevolence and fraternity with the 
logic of modern nation-states was far from peculiar to rightwing Chinese revolutionaries. 
Extending Benedict Anderson’s famous thesis of the modern nation as an “imagined 
community,” Karatani Kôjin describes how the nation-state became the practical 
realization of fraternity. The Proudhonian ideal of mutual aid, which Marx had criticized 
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as an empty romantic imaginary, was institutionalized in nation-states that promised 
equality under capitalism. Yet, as capitalism and equality were inherently incompatible, 
fraternal ideals degenerated into state-sponsored illusions that had no basis in social 
reality. Proudhonian or cosmopolitan political ethics as constitutive of modern 
nationalism, therefore, laid the groundwork for fascism insofar as it promised an 
egalitarian realm without confronting the private property system that governed social 
relations.
40
 Karatani’s insight is germane to our understanding of GMD radical 
conservatism not the least because among supporters of the April 12 coup were Chinese 
anarchists indebted to the French tradition.             
                          
Theorizing Revolutionary Vanguardism 
While endowing the ethical state with the mission of building a benevolent, 
conflict-free nation, the exact composition of that state apparatus remained to be 
accounted for. Marxism might have become an anathema to all conservative Nationalists, 
but those who fought against the united front did not agree on whether the party should 
continue to operate along Leninist lines. The standard Proudhonian position would have 
favored a decentralized, local and participatory mode of government, a prescription that 
could not be further removed from a one-party state whose hold on power rested largely 
on the military. The jarring gap between anarchist ideals and a party-state engaged in 
violent internal power struggles proved slightly uncomfortable for the academic Li 
Shizeng who brought an anarchist critique of Marxist-Leninism to bear in justifying the 
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GMD’s clean break with communism.41 The Sorbonne biology graduate adopted an 
evolutionary notion of history and tied Proudhon’s notion of human freedom to Sun’s 
minsheng revolution, touting both as expressions of the latest stage of civilizational 
progress. He attacked communism for its economism and statism, the latter Li glossed in 
French as statisme or etatisme, and ridiculed dictatorship of the proletariat for being a 
pretext for an authoritarian polity (zhuanzhi zhengti) and the Third International for being 
a virulent form of imperialistic overreach. The best antidote to such revolutionary 
despotism was Proudhonism – class reconciliation (quanmin zhuyi/reconciliation des 
classes), universal harmony (datong zhuyi/conciliation universelle), decentralization, and 
anarcho-syndicalism, etc. “If what are better and new belong to the left and what are 
mediocre and old belong to the right,” Li quipped, “then it is obvious that Proudhonists 
are leftists and Marxists rightists.”42 In what might be best described as vivid anticipation 
of Cold World ideological moralism, Li contextualized the struggle between the Three 
People’s Principles and what he called pseudo-communism as the global final battle 
between freedom and authoritarianism. He made the observation, twenty years before 
Hannah Arendt when the horrors of fascism were yet to fully manifest themselves, that 
Soviet communism and Italian fascism were different in name only.
43
 “Should such a 
gigantic authoritarian country as Soviet Russia have its way and fulfill its ambition of 
establishing the universal authoritarian state that exists in the minds of a great many 
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dreamers,” Li warned ominously, “the result would be no less disastrous than Shi 
Huangdi.” Recalling popular imagination of the maligned first emperor (259-210 BCE) 
of the Qin dynasty who maintained iron-fist control over a vast territory by suppressing 
intellectual activities, a much more powerful twentieth-century Soviet empire, Li 
declared, could only mean “the end of human freedom.”44 The apparent Confucian 
indignation over the specter of a modern Qin empire writ large barely disguised the 
anarchist desire for a new civilization in which the coercive functions of the state 
machinery would be safely consigned to the dustbin of history. 
All of this would have constituted a cogent and even prescient critique of the 
failings of Stalinism if Li had not been, at the same time, trying to present the GMD as 
compatible with the quest for personal freedom, participatory democracy and 
internationalism.
45
 His dubious labeling of the Soviet bureaucracy as the latest 
installment of Oriental despotism aside, Li’s contemporary observation that the 
disciplinary power of both state socialism and fascism rested in their combination of 
organizational might and ability to demand unwavering political faith from activists was 
of tremendous insight.
46
 Li was more equivocal, however, when he attempted to establish 
the link between the GMD’s rightwing coup and an anarchist program. He claimed that 
the GMD, like Proudhon, was conducting a political and social revolution based on the 
ideal of universal harmony, a program that was historically more advanced than 
economic revolutions and the simple competition for control over the state machinery. 
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While Sun Yat-sen and his Shanghai-based successors were working to construct a new 
political and even world order, Soviet Russia was myopically obsessed with class 
struggle and the usurpation of state power, which Li dismissed as “court revolt” 
(gongting geming).
47
 Having catapulted Sun’s minsheng revolution into the pantheon of 
revolutionary politics and evolutionary progress, Li backtracked slightly in his 
identification of the GMD with what he called the Proudhonian revolution (Pu pai 
geming). Li conceded that “China’s fourth-order revolution,” a more evolved form of 
political activism compared with class, political, and court revolutions, “is a revolution 
for the entire populace (quanmin geming) adapted to the complex demands of the 
situation.”48 Proudhon favored absolute freedom, to which he admitted the GMD was not 
committed. Yet, the strength of the minsheng principle lay precisely in its ambiguity, thus 
allowing the Three People’s Principles as a whole to absorb various revolutionary ideas 
from abroad when circumstances so required. The catholicity of the Three People’s 
Principles meant it was ultimately compatible with anarchism. More specifically, Li 
argued that being a revolution for the entire populace – precisely that Sun’s expansive 
notions of nationhood and political right were not contingent on an analysis of class 
conflicts – the GMD movement was a good enough approximation of Proudhon’s 
reconciliation des classes. As Li concluded almost apologetically, “Although there are 
differences in the nature [of the two political perspectives, they] at least can co-exist, do 
not contradict each other and are not mutually exclusive. This is totally unlike the 
despotism (zhuanheng) and cruelness (yanku) of Marxists and the Communist Party.” The 
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affinity between anarchism and the Chiang’s GMD derived as much from their inherent 
similarities as from their shared irreconcilability with communism, either at the 
theoretical level or in Bolshevik revolutionary practices. 
Even areas where the two parties shared broad agreements did not escape Li’s list 
of distinctions between the GMD and its nemesis. He acknowledged, for example, that 
detractors had accused Sun of promoting a strong central state, an objective also 
attributed to the CCP, in contrast with federalists like the southern warlord Chen 
Jiongming and constitutionalists within the GMD’s early incarnations.49 Citing the 
Outline for Nation-building (Jianguo dagang), Li argued however that Sun and his 
followers, in particular Dai Jitao, actually called for a form of local government far 
superior to federalism. In this system, individual self-governing counties would cooperate 
to form a polity based on mutual aid (fenzhi hezuo).
50
 To reclaim the elusive anarchist 
credentials of the GMD, Li even offered to concede that Sun might have preferred a 
centralized authoritarian state, “just as a family might rely on the parents to maintain 
unity.” He was quick to add, however, that now that the irreplaceable “father” had died, 
the “siblings” who constituted the nation had no choice but to take charge of their own 
affairs and work together in a spontaneous fashion. “Even if Sun did not support 
federalism before,” Li continued convolutedly, “it is wrong to construe that he would 
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oppose cooperative self-governance in his death.”51 The same benefit of the doubt was 
not extended to the other side of the political divide, despite the continual anarchist 
inflections in Chinese Communist discourses and practices. The lone figure within and 
without the GMD resolutely opposed to local self-governance was one Chen Duxiu, the 
secretary-general of the authoritarian Marxist-Leninist CCP.
52
           
By shedding communist impurities, the GMD could set China back to its destined 
transformation into a participatory polity. But Li’s labored projection of anarchist desires 
onto party purification was not shared by his colleagues. Dai and Hu wanted to reclaim, 
not renounce, Leninist vanguardism for their own purposes. Dai, in particular, disdained 
the political dilettantism of anarchists and, like Marxists, associated anarchism with 
utopian socialism. For Dai, anarchism was an instance of hollow Enlightenment idealism, 
a Kantian rendering of universal peace based on human reason and sentiments that took 
no account of historical dynamics. Dai charged, “Although their sentiments are most 
beautiful, their ideals lofty and their actions free from bounds, anarchists are always 
prone to compromises when confronted with the present conjuncture.”53 In the past, he 
added, those who adopted China’s traditional disdain for social discipline and religious 
negation of reality might have become Daoists and led a secluded life away from 
humanity. Nowadays, one should not be surprised to find such withdrawal syndrome 
among anarchists in cosmopolitan Shanghai – “connoisseurs of leisure literature 
(xiaoxian wenxue) and enthusiasts of religious ideas among aristocratic playboys.”54 A 
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combination of decadent aestheticism, anti-social religiosity and infantile utopianism was 
naturally no recipe for a sustainable revolutionary regime.                              
The problem with the national revolution so far, therefore, was that the GMD 
allowed for too much anarchism, not too little. If it was not for the party’s failure to rein 
in its cadres, the Communists would long have been absorbed into one political bloc as 
Sun envisioned and not become such a headache. For Dai, only a disciplined, 
ideologically committed vanguard would lead China towards economic modernization, 
independence from imperialist domination and cultural renaissance. To mobilize the 
intellectually wanting laboring masses, and more crucially, to ensure they did not insist 
on their own interests at others’ expense, the elite would have to first submit to one 
doctrine and one central leadership.
55
 Having witnessed Sun’s many failures before the 
reorganization of the GMD on the Leninist model, Dai no longer had the appetite for 
ideological diversity or a multi-vocal party elite. What he demanded was exclusive 
loyalty to the Three People’s Principles:  
There is no basis of unity in a political party other than ideology (zhuyi). Ideology 
is the nerve system of a party. Ideology also constitutes the blood veins of a party. 
Without a nerve system and blood veins, an animal could no longer be an animal. 
Without ideology, a party could no longer be a party.
56
    
 
The party was an organic entity, a life form that could be brought to an abrupt end should 
its core element – ideological discipline – be taken away. Dai, who was under such 
immense pressure working for Sun’s embattled Guangzhou-based regime in the early 
1920s that he once descended into mental disorder and threw himself into the river while 
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traveling to Sichuan for negotiations with regional strongmen, saw intraparty ideological 
non-conformity as nothing less than a disease. Both rightwing and leftwing deviations 
were virulent diseases (bing) attacking the body of the party.
57
 Stating upfront in 
unequivocal terms that the GMD was a party that upheld the orthodoxy of the Three 
People’s Principles and operated on a democratic centralist structure (minzhu de jiquan 
zhi), Dai’s main complaint with the CCP was not that it was despotic but that it resembled 




 Extending his body metaphor, Dai argued that any organization was exclusive in 
nature. The existence of a tightly-knit Communist caucus, which paid no more than lip 
service to the Three People’s Principles, was a parasite on the GMD’s carcass (quke). The 
admission of Communists into the GMD was like “a large body (quanti) enveloping a 
smaller one.” Yet, 
 as the small body worked to organize itself and manifest its exclusivity, the old 
cells [in the larger body] lose their vitality. Meanwhile, the small body feeds 
vociferously on the fresh nutrients, making the deformed [larger] body unable to 




Straying from the overall tenor of his treatise, Dai added that he was mainly concerned 
not with ideological incompatibilities but with a political parasite sucking on the 
organizational potency of its senior partner from within. He urged Communists working 
under the GMD banner to show unqualified loyalty towards the party, just as members of 
the clandestine anti-Qing Revolutionary Alliance had worked under a single organization 
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in spite of their varying ideological persuasions.
60
 There is no doubt, however, that in 
Dai’s eyes, the eclecticism and slack organization of an underground anti-Manchu body 
no longer had a future with the professional revolutionaries of a Leninist vanguard party.   
          
The Body/Machine of the Party: Purge as Cleansing 
 Dai laid out a politics of faithful dynamism and redemptive action, not quiet 
deliberation and careful balance. Divided loyalties must be purged, not accommodated. 
The party-state he envisioned would not be a conversation of discrete political agents in 
the Enlightenment liberal democratic tradition. Instead, it would create a super-humanly 
agency by collectivizing the dynamism of individuals. While most famously known for 
his devotion to Confucianism, Dai’s admiration for an ethics of benevolence and 
righteousness was actually anchored in an understanding of social beings that was far 
removed from the composed and rational humanism attributed to the great intellectual 
tradition.
61
 He began Nationalist Revolution with a vivid, metaphysical account of life 
that evokes vitalist philosopher Henri Bergson’s celebration of creative irrational instincts. 
“Survival,” he mused in a cryptic passage, 
 is simultaneously the original and ultimate goal of human life. Whenever the act 
of survival is frustrated, the impulse of life (sheng de chongdong) brings out in 
human a strong lust for survival (shengcun de yuwang). Thanks to the differing 
abilities within humankind and changing milieu of historical time, the lust for 
survival expresses itself in varying intensity and modes. … These different 
manifestations of the same lust are self-aggrandizing (duzhan) and exclusionary 
(paita) in nature, while possessing at the same time the tendency to unify and 
dominate. … The actual contents of the lust for survival constitute the enabler and 
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origins of life, the necessary basis on which maintenance of life depends.
62
                      
 
      Dai located this potent will to life not in individual subjects but in the collective 
(tuanti) that embodied and synthesized the impulses and instincts of human existence. 
That collective was the party, the reigning ideological orthodoxy of which unified human 
urges. Inasmuch as ideology was the realization of raw instincts, it required not reason 
and logic but simple faith (xinyang) and devotion (xinfeng).
63
 Dai’s vision of a GMD 
commandeering irrational human dynamism was, not unlike those of contemporary 
fascist movements abroad, a powerful metaphorical rendering of the mobilized masses as 
a living body whose vitality had to be both unleashed and reined in. In the fascist 
celebration of political violence in interwar France, to take one particularly vivid example, 
mass energy was visualized in the “bodies” of grand muscular sculptures that evoked the 
larger-than-life icons from ancient Greece.
64 
The party, with its sublimated primordial human senses and desires, was not only 
endowed with organic corporeality but also imagined as a ruthlessly efficient modern 
machine that rationalized and smoothed out the idiosyncrasies of its functionaries. While 
Li Shizeng believed that human progress would eventually make all forms of 
centralization obsolete, Dai argued that modernity required an even more tightly-knitted, 
standardized structure of top-down administration. “In today’s industrial civilization 
where science is the norm,” he observed, “all social organizations operate under the 
principle by which labor works with a unified purpose but is assigned separately to 
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individual tasks. A party is also a society and it, of course, cannot afford to deviate from 
this principle.”65 Dai’s promise to bring the latest management technologies of the 
mundane modern factory floor to bear on the organic revolutionary body might sound 
paradoxical. Yet, the Taylorist doctrine of instrumental rationality was not necessarily 
antithetical to the political sublimation of the primordial life impulses. Modern political 
culture, as Zygmunt Bauman observes, is a garden culture. The health, vitality and 
continuous growth of a society-as-garden require meticulous management, whereby 
elements deemed incompatible with the utopia of beauty were brutally and 
unsentimentally “weeded.”66 A similar notion of society as an organic, corporatist entity 
underwrote the fascist promise to re-inject life into a national body plagued by the 
illnesses of “mechanistic” communism and liberalism.67                
It was this condensation of rationalization, surgical weeding and neutralization of 
diseases that conditioned the April 12 coup and distinguished it from being merely the 
intensification of rivalries between two power-hungry camps which were no longer 
willing to make space for each other. Historian Huang Jinlin astutely observes that party 
purification targeted not only Communists but also liberals and rightwing figures within 
and without the GMD who questioned Chiang’s supremacy.68 He argues that the coup 
was a violent denouement of the GMD’s endeavor to maintain hegemony over the mantra 
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of revolutionary truth from which its legitimacy and power ultimately derived.
69
 
However, one should not exaggerate the arbitrariness of the purge as Huang seems to 
have done, and the fact that rightists and liberals were targeted did not render spurious its 
anti-communism.
70
 At stake in the bloody campaign was not only monopolization of 
coercive state power or hegemony over the now sanctified symbol of revolution but the 
building of a sleek, powerful and ruthless party-state machine that could re-inject vitality 
into the Chinese nation and deliver it from “corruption and debauchery.” The revolution, 
Dai told students at the party-run Sun Yat-sen University in 1927, was a matter of life and 
death, the only worthy key to “national survival and development.”71 
While taking aim at Communist ideological fantasy and neglect of nationhood, 
Dai was anxious to prevent the purge from becoming a license for the spread of the 
“rightist disease” (youqing bing) that was also threatening the vitality of the regrouped 
revolutionary organ. For the GMD elder, the Communists’ formidable strength within his 
party contributed considerably to the inertia of Nationalist cadres, which contrasted 
sharply with the CCP’s dynamism. Developments that pervaded the GMD rank-and-files 
resembled those confronting revolutionary movements that had became too accustomed 
to holding the reins of state power and lost interest in attacking the status quo. Addressing 
elite university students who could soon join the party-state apparatus, Dai chided 
bureaucrats who monopolized day-to-day functioning of government for not attending to 
political theories and lacking a proper understanding of the GMD platform. All they knew 
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were narrow managerial chores and a smattering of communist slogans that they 
perfunctorily brandished at mass rallies. Worse still, there were those for whom anti-
communism meant a rejection of revolutionary activism itself. These people, who “failed 
to oppose imperialism, warlordism and bureaucratization, and who refused to join the 
masses,” were pandering to the anti-communism of such hideous counterrevolutionary 
figures as the Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin (1875-1928). The distinctions and, 
indeed, commonalities between communism and the Three People’s Principles were 
naturally beyond the grasp of these foot-soldiers of warlords and bureaucrats.
72
 For Dai, 
rightist deviation – the degeneration of the GMD nomenklatura – was as virulent a cancer 
as the malicious Communist caucus on the already fragile body of the mass party.                                        
Compared to the more easily identified target, communism, Dai’s complaint of 
faltering revolutionary enthusiasm among party-state functionaries was admittedly more 
nebulous. Yet, like Hu Hanmin, Dai’s fear that the GMD would become a zombie 
movement by being reduced to a nexus of bureaucratic procedures was inseparable from 
his distrust of liberalism and parliamentary democracy. With the benefit of hindsight and 
the ideological acumen of Sun Yat-sen’s minsheng principle, Dai attacked those who saw 
changes in the constitutional order of the state as the ultimate goal of political activism. 
While nationalists obsessed with taking revenge on the Manchus failed to understand the 
political and cultural innovations necessary for nation-building, those who fetishized 
representative democracy were also incapable of effecting wider changes in social 
organization. Dai acknowledged the critical role played by constitutional monarchists and 
the late Qing bureaucratic elite in the Sichuan railway dispute that eventually culminated 
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in the 1911 Revolution. However, their “formalism” (xingshi zhuyi) – the wishful idea 
that “changing the political structure into a constitutional polity and turning the state into 
a republic alone would lead to prosperity” – disabled them from making further 
contributions to the revolution once the Qing court was toppled and a Republican 
parliament was founded.
73
 Worse still, parliamentary politics, which cohabitated with the 
warlord-dominated executive in Beijing, became a playground for corrupt politicians. 
These politicians, many of whom former anti-Qing revolutionaries who had long lost 
sense of ideological purpose, were merrily making compromises with militarists, 
bureaucrats and social notables from the old order, even as they retained a pathetic sense 
of superiority as parliamentarians of the republic.
74
 Dai saw a timid GMD party 
bureaucracy, planted within the civil service and the military, reinforced by political 
careerists (zhengke) too comfortably ensconced in the parliamentary chamber. He had 
little sympathy for the anti-communists of this new Republican establishment. He noted 
sarcastically of cadres whose grasp of revolutionary theory was shaky, observing that “if 
it were not for the admission of Communists into the GMD, I am afraid these gentlemen 
would not even remember to feel confused or befuddled.”75  
More than a nihilistic power struggle, party purification was a campaign to 
remake the lethargic GMD into the dynamic machine and robust body that true 
revolutionary politics required. It aimed to cleanse elements within the revolutionary bloc 
that mistook acquisition of state power for nation-building. It was simultaneously a full-
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frontal attack on communist ideologies and an internal insurgency against the GMD 
nomenklatura of which Dai was a part. Such animosity towards bureaucratism anticipated 
a recurring theme in twentieth-century China, expressed most rigorously by Mao Zedong 
in the 1960s, which saw a newly entrenched state apparatus locking horns with the 
revolutionary zeal that was supposed to unite the ruling party. Dai saw within the 
Communist Party the strength of ideological faith that remained elusive to the GMD.
76
 
The CCP might be numerically weak, but it compelled its cadres to subscribe firmly to a 
common platform. If the Communists were just a “ruble party” (lubu dang) thirsty for 
Russian money, Dai quipped, the brute force of dictatorship would be quite enough to 
eradicate it. But dictatorial violence, which could presumably be more effectively applied 
to self-serving state bureaucrats who constituted the GMD mainstay than to Communists, 
could not guarantee a conversion in ideological piety.
77
  
To ensure mass devotion to the GMD-led national revolution, the imminent task 
for Nationalists was to create new social norms and values that permeated everyday 
culture. In a move that again reminds one of Gramsci’s insight on the state’s 
entanglement with civil society, Dai advanced the argument that more than monopolizing 
the coercive apparatus of state power, winning hegemony in such ideological arenas as 
religion and aesthetics required specific attention to commanding faith and artistic 
production.
78
 “If we consign party purification only to political power,” he warned, “I 
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can say for certain that it would be impossible to achieve a clean sweep (chedi 
chengqing)” against communism.79 Dai was regretful that Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary 
coalition failed to play a leadership role in creating a new national popular culture. He 
complained that most revolutionaries – “stubborn and inadequate” in thinking – refused 
to support Chinese language reform in 1914, leaving the important task five years later to 
such non-party intellectuals as liberal Hu Shi (1891-1962) and communist Chen Duxiu.
80
 
Without securing hegemony in the cultural sphere, the goal of fashioning a national 
revolution free from communist inflections would forever be elusive. For communism, a 
more malicious and stubborn tumor infecting the GMD’s nerve system than corruption, 
was an ideological malaise that wrecked havoc on those lacking piety towards the Three 
People’s Principle. Dai complained that radicalized youths, yet to be fully formed in their 
sap and vigor (xueqi weiding), were dancing to the tune of the CCP as if possessed by 
evil spirits (zhong le fengmo).
81
 The strong communist cultural influence on young minds 
and bodies was particularly worrisome as the future vitality of the national revolution 
depended ever more on a new generation of committed GMD cadres who are not fixated 
on securing stable government positions.    
                                                  
Reclaiming the Youthful Masses 
 Compared with disciplined and enthusiastic Communists, devotees of 
parliamentary democracy among Sun Yat-sen’s followers appeared inept and 
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anachronistic to the radically-inclined young generation. Parliamentarians, along with 
self-serving party-state functionaries and militarists running the Beiyang regime, were 
tainted with warlordism and failure of the early Republican experiment. As was the case 
in interwar Europe, liberal politics in China were associated with a weak and irrelevant 
establishment. In Mussolini’s Italy, Fascists promised to rejuvenate the nation by 
replacing an older generation of liberal custodians of the corrupt capitalist regime with a 
youthful, forward-looking party elite. The Fascist elite could then build a new economic 
and moral order that was simultaneously anti-leftist and anti-liberal, putting in place a 
corporatism that would resist the spread of bourgeois capitalist social atomization.
82
 In 
China, where the liberal tradition was even weaker than Italy’s, constitutional democracy 
was thoroughly implicated in the social chaos, weak foreign policy and reactionary 
behaviors attributed to the Beiyang warlord regime. Conservative revolutionaries like Dai 
had no doubt that the liberal experiment instituted by Sun had already run its course. 
Decadent parliamentarians, all “childish old citizens” (youzhi de lao guomin), were 
incapable of providing the rigorous discipline needed of a mass revolutionary party.
83
 
Constitutionalism was at once puerile and senile, and could hardly compete with 
communism in energizing idealistic youth.    
 It was imperative that the “old” inertia of parliamentarianism be cleansed so that 
the GMD would be ready to thwart off the pernicious influence of “youthful” leftist 
nihilism. Here again, one sees early echoes of the easily disturbed balance between 
inaction and adventurism that gave rise to subsequent debates in China’s revolutionary 
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history. In an almost poignant note, Dai recalled that when he was young, he and his 
fellow revolutionaries were as romantically-minded as today’s radical youths. Coupling 
bodily degeneration with declining national strength, he lamented how adolescent 
excesses had resulted in the poor health and weak spirit of experienced revolutionaries, 
thus undermining the entire enterprise of China’s regeneration itself. Dai found a model 
of youthful stamina and mature discipline in Japan’s Meiji oligarchs, crediting the 
spectacular success of the Meiji state-building program to the elders’ own personal 
discipline and the inherent virility of the Japanese race. He warned of the detriments of 
frivolous (erxi) revolutionary activism and, reneging on his earlier enthusiasm for new 
ethics and culture, claimed that the chaos resulting from the destruction of China’s 
existing social order could be worse than that of the late Ming period, which concluded 
with the founding of the “alien” Manchu empire. The crux of GMD anti-communism was 
to punish debauched (zongyu) youths who threatened the moral fabric of society, the 
licentious cosmopolitan playboys who doubled as perpetuators of leftwing adventurism.
84
 
Dai’s ideal revolutionary youth was someone like the mining engineer Chen Lifu (1900-
2001), who joined the party in 1925 prompted not by any dilettantish fantasy but his 
fervent commitment to industrial modernity – the railways, highways, coastal ports and 
industrial enterprises promised in Sun’s nation-building blueprint.85 Only when both 
bureaucratic inertia and juvenile indiscipline were fully purged could the GMD get on 
with the strenuous work of modernizing China. 
 China’s future lay with the politically awakened masses who exuded youthful élan 
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and submitted themselves to the rigor of modern production. The working people were 
set to become the new subject of the revolutionary party, replacing Nationalist 
parliamentarians, entrepreneurs and industrialists who had presided over the state and 
state-owned enterprises since the fall of the imperial system. For Dai, the Republican 
political and technocratic establishment was no better than a crop of warlords, 
bureaucrats, corrupt magistrates and exploitative factory managers who cared little about 
the revolution. They were middle-aged men who failed to attend party branch meetings 
and alienated young intellectuals and activists.
86
 The failure of the GMD machine to 
inspire and mobilize youths gave those with ulterior motives an opportunity to pursue 
their own selfish agenda. Alluding to the Communist penchant for class struggle, Dai 
chided those who reaped political benefits by engaging youths and the masses in 
destructive political campaigns.
87
 Indeed, the youth often stood in for the entire masses 
(minzhong), whose lack of education and proper training presented the greatest challenge 
for the self-anointed custodians of the young nation-state. Adopting strong populist 
language, Dai accused the right of failing to recognize that workers and peasants’ well-
being was the core of the quest for national liberation. He declared that like all modern 
revolutions, the Chinese revolution was one in which the peasants and proletariat, 
aroused from their collective stupor, strived to reclaim their own fate.
88
 The “young” 
masses, yet to realize their own potential, was to be the key to a new order that 
transcended both the defunct scholar-gentry polity of late imperial China and the liberal 
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parliamentarianism that was ridden with crises even in the imperialist West.    
Yet, as we have seen earlier in the chapter, even as workers were endowed with 
political subjectivity, it was subsumed under a nebulous community of life (gongtong 
shenghuo) presided over by the nation-state. The idealization of the nation as an 
organically bound, hierarchically organized volk free from social and economic conflicts 
pervaded Dai’s re-articulation of minsheng. The state, Dai argued, had the important task 
of overseeing the renewal of the nation’s culture (wenhua), an expansive nexus that 
incorporated the entirety of “the people’s way of living, society’s existence, citizens’ 
economic well-being, and the life of the masses.”89 By perfecting the material and 
spiritual well-being of the masses and structuring collective life through generational, 
gender and other social hierarchies, the revolutionary state would return China to its 
rightful place among the most vibrant and creative nations. This fetishization of cultural 
rebirth, the quest to revitalize traditional spiritual virtues and the fear of social 
degeneration coalesced in Dai’s accusation of young Chinese Communists for being both 
hard-headed materialists in denial of Confucian moral norms and licentious urban 
decadents who indulged in sex.
90
 Invested in the priority of maintaining social order and 
the hypothesized livelihood of a unified nation, the political subjectivity of workers and 
peasants could only be realized under the GMD state’s watchful eyes.      
While Dai acknowledged that modern revolution was unthinkable without the 
proletariat, he refused to address the specific historical conjuncture that conditioned labor 
in semicolonial, late-industrializing China, confining the capitalist exploitation of labor 
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safely within the colonial metropoles.
91
 In China, labor (gongzuo) was no more than the 
inherent human ability to improvise on the gifts of nature, the transhistorical imperative 
of satisfying the material and spiritual needs of human existence.
92
 Dai’s understanding 
of production, at least as far as China was concerned, belonged to what Louis Althusser 
aptly calls an anthropological ideology of labor – an idealist, depoliticized concept of 
production as the basis of social existence.
93
 In his compartmentalization of the global 
political economy, the appropriation of use value by the wage system applied only to the 
West, while labor in China could only be understood through the highly hypothesized 
notion of culture.
94
 Conceding that Chinese-owned modern industries had thrived with 
the boycott of foreign goods amidst the nationalist fervor of the May Fourth Movement, 
during which class identities of both the fledging bourgeoisie and the urban proletariat 
were sharpened, Dai insisted nonetheless that industrial development and capitalism in 
China were still in their nascent stage. He argued further that there were no inherent 
contradictions between the interests of China’s small bourgeoisie and the goals of 
national revolution, thus rejecting any program that aimed at liquidating the capitalist 
class. Indeed, he attributed the hostility of a small section of the national bourgeoisie 
towards the revolution to imperialist treachery and “unrealistic” Communist demands.95  
With class struggle delegitimized as an option and industrial development held as 
the key to revolutionary success, the Communist mobilization of the masses was deemed 
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counterproductive and self-serving. Dai criticized the CCP for its instrumentalist 
relationship with the masses, in which the people were cavalierly sacrificed in political 
struggles for the sole benefit of the Bolshevik organization. A truly symbiotic relationship 
with the masses, he proposed, would see the party vanguard pursue the “real interests” of 
the masses and re-channel their ignorant impulses. For example, if workers wanted to call 
a strike, visionary union leaders would discern the heavy price that such action could 
entail and persuade their less knowledgeable compatriots to hold such destructive 
campaign off. Rather than riding on the tide of spontaneous workers action, top union 
officials must resist “dangerous mob psychology” (weixian de qunzhong xinli) and exert 
authority over the masses. All revolutionary organization and propaganda were to tie the 
party-led mass movement (qunzhong yundong) tightly under sole aim of safeguarding the 
national collective.
96
 Class interests and workers’ political agency must take back seat.     
Mass politics under the GMD was conceived to prohibit workers, peasants and 
sympathetic intellectuals from taking matters into their own hands. Despite his occasional 
nods to Marxist language, Dai’s ultimate concern was not to give organized expression to 
the inchoate instincts of the proletariat and peasantry as independent political subjects in 
their own right. Instead, like how Sun Yat-sen viewed labor in the early 1920s, Dai 
subsumed working class activism under the vision of a national society unified in a 
common struggle against foreign domination. The GMD’s politics of class did not allow 
for class conflicts.
97
 Quoting from Sun’s 1919 treatise on psychological reconstruction, 
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Dai credited the late revolutionary’s privileging of direct action over deep knowledge as 
the key to harnessing the power of the ignorant and heteronomous populace. Like 
architecture in which division of labor dictated that construction workers dutifully take 
heed from the technical intelligentsia, future political campaigns would not see a meeting 
of minds between activists – a strategy proved to be inconsequential in the 1913 Second 
Revolution as most GMD parliamentarians refused to rally behind Sun in his military 
insurrection against Yuan Shikai. Instead, humble masses would faithfully execute 
directives from the messianic party leadership.
98
 For a populace stuck in their intellectual 
stupor, it was far easier to blindly perform the revolution than to make full sense of its 
theoretical basis. Even if Sun’s intellectual breakthroughs remained forever elusive for 
the clueless rank and file of the party, they could just play cogs in the wheels of the 
revolutionary machine. Those who possessed intellect (zhi) should of course lead the task 
of implementing the GMD program. Those who did not have the intellect must still join 
the action (xing).
99
   
Such celebration of the working class while denying the need for class struggle 
differentiated Dai from “Third World” Marxist revolutionaries. For Lenin, the up-and-
coming Chinese Communist organizer Mao Zedong and Italian contemporary Gramsci, 
the party’s pedagogical and agitational capabilities were wielded to interpellate a 
coherent, organized political subject out of the agricultural and urban masses. The goal of 
national liberation movements was to make the subalterns aware of the totality of social 
structure and their critical role in the creation of a new political and economic order. The 
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fragmented and uninitiated masses presented a transitory condition to be overcome in the 
process of building a viable national revolutionary movement.
100
 For the GMD, on the 
other hand, inadequate political consciousness among the populace was accepted 
ontologically as a symptom of national weakness. To liberate the masses from the 
nation’s plight, the subalterns had to submit themselves to the dictates of an enlightened 
elite, the gifted minority who possessed the intellect to set themselves apart from the rest. 
Whereas communism promised to place workers and peasants in the revolutionary 
vanguard, the radical right envisioned them as humble underlings of the party leadership. 
         
The Victory of Radical Conservatism 
The ideological eclecticism of Hu Hanmin, Li Shizeng and Dai Jitao did not mean 
that the April 12 coup and the larger campaign against communism were just cynical 
moves to consolidate the GMD’s monopoly on an expanding state apparatus. Instead, the 
coup was a necessary step for radical conservative Nationalists to invigorate a national 
revolution challenged by the party elite’s deepening entrenchment in the still fragile 
bureaucratic apparatus on one hand, and on the other, the CCP’s ideological and 
institutional claim on the revolutionary high ground. Reacting against the revolutionary 
fatigue of the apparatchiks and committed to suppressing proletarian political subjectivity, 
the desire for an anti-communist, nationalist activism constituted the ideological identity 
of the radical conservatives. This core group of intellectually-inclined party elders was 
anxious that Sun Yat-sen’s enterprise could soon be corrupted beyond repair by 
established interests in the party-state or hijacked by alien leftwing nihilism. While there 
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was no unified radical conservative ideology, one cannot dismiss the unmistakable 
impulse to craft a third way to industrial modernity for a nation-state struggling to 
reclaim its sovereignty from capitalist imperialism while resisting fundamental changes 
to nascent capitalist social relations. This contradictory attitude towards handling China’s 
predicament was itself a defining element of this revolutionary identity.  
Nationalists vowed to bring the revolution forward, albeit in a conservative 
direction. Whether in the form of Dai’s state capitalism or Li’s anarcho-syndicalism, 
radical conservatives shared with their leftwing nemeses an impatience with institutional 
procedures and preference for direct political action. The GMD encouraged mass 
participation but, unlike Communists, allowed no challenges to the structure of socio-
economic power. Nationalists celebrated the virile energy of the masses, but were 
alarmed that the latter could join the radical left. They acknowledged workers’ political 
potential, but were quick to marginalize class as the basis of political action by placing it 
under a strictly cross-class national framework. While uncomfortable with social anomie 
and the ideological lethargy of government officials, the national revolution was 
committed to consolidating the modern capitalist economy that underpinned cultural 
commodification and the creation of a bureaucratic elite in an urbanizing society. The 
ideal result of the GMD’s third way approach to global capitalism and its communist 
alternative would see the burgeoning bourgeoisie in China continue to thrive and the 
workers and peasants’ movement reduced to welfarist activism under the party-state’s 
stewardship.     
Out of party purification emerged a political ethics that claimed to transcend the 




minsheng principle laid claim to superiority as an all-round philosophy that enjoined the 
people to pursue both economic welfare and spiritual fullness as members of the Chinese 
national community. In practice, the Nationalist government undertook aesthetic 
tinkering of quotidian phenomena while leaving structural production relations untouched. 
It strived to depoliticize the demands of the laboring masses and reduced them to cultural 
problems. Social alienation, urban worker militancy, political inertia were attributed to 
the lack of a refined, dynamic and civic-minded communal lifestyle among the masses. 
The youth, whom GMD leaders most wanted to reclaim for the national revolution, was 
particularly targeted by state-sponsored mobilization campaigns. These initiatives, as we 
shall see in the next section, offered opportunities for the populace to take part in social 
movements while containing their political ambitions within the state’s confines. The 
minutiae of everyday experience – what individuals consumed, how they spent their time, 
their behaviors in public and at home – took the place of social structures as prized 
objects of revolutionary realigning. School children joined scouting and learned to perfect 
their bodies and minds, pledging obedience to authority and readying themselves for a 
life of docile production. The war of resistance against Japan presented an opportunity for 
the entire populace to be molded into one laboring body bound by pious devotion to the 
nation-state. Yet, even as the GMD defined the ultimate goal of the national revolution in 
the language of spiritual rejuvenation, the very concrete political imperative of 











Reining in the Masses 
The Scouts of China as a Guomindang Youth Movement 
 
 
 In the immediate aftermath of the party purification movement in 1927, radical 
conservatives not only had to wrest control over the GMD machinery from Communists 
and compete for legitimacy with Wang Jingwei’s relatively left-leaning faction. They 
were also confronted with the task of winning over the masses who played an 
increasingly critical political role under the united front. The alliance with Communists 
bequeathed to the GMD a double-edged sword. On one hand, cadres had already acquired 
experience organizing peasants, workers and students. Yet on the other, as Dai Jitao 
painfully came to realize, demands from the grassroots could equally cause a headache 
for the revolutionary elite. Communist influence over these emerging constituents must 
be displaced if radical conservatives in the GMD were to secure monopoly over the 
political process. The masses represented a politically potent but unpredictable totality 
that occupied an ambiguous position in the conservative revolutionary project. In urban 
centers like Shanghai and Guangzhou, both core sites of social activism, the ascendant 
radical conservatives faced the apparently paradoxical task of taming student and labor 
militancy on one hand and tapping their nationalist sentiments and support for a state that 
brought down the maligned warlord regime in the north on the other. As the confusion 
over an internal split within the GMD ended in Chiang Kai-shek’s favor, the new 
Nanjing-based regime had to sustain and discipline the élan of the urban youth while 
directing it to activities that bolstered, not threatened, the social order. 
 Shifting youth engagement from one mode of social activism to another took 
multiple forms. In the days leading up to the April 12 coup, Chiang’s functionaries acted 
80 
to develop alternatives to the then Communist-dominated, GMD-affiliated student 
movement and its equivalents for peasants and workers. Radical right figures determined 
to exterminate their political enemies took a leaf out of what Chen Lifu, then Chiang’s 
secretary, recalled as a “favorite trick of the Communists” – forming clandestine party 
cells within student and labor unions to influence and eventually take over larger 
organizations.
1
 The aggressive mobilization of young citizens seemed to have petered out 
as soon as the Nanjing regime consolidated power over its rivals to the left. Historian 
Huang Jianli suggests that the consensus within the GMD mainstream by the end of 1927 
was to confine young people to the classroom. The party-state demobilized inter-school 
student unions, substituting them with self-governing associations (zizhi hui) based at 
individual campuses and barred from participating in school administration.
2
 Unleashing 
the all-powerful but fickle energy of young urbanites was a formidable task for the 
Nationalist state that did not have much faith in students’ judgment. Young people, as I 
discussed in the previous chapter, were considered by radical conservative ideologues as 
politically unreliable, intellectually naïve, emotionally unstable, and waiting to be 
exploited and sacrificed by unscrupulous politicians, even as he celebrated youthful spirit 
as a regenerative mechanism for the Nationalist movement. 
 The GMD’s hesitant embrace of youth as a political and ideological construct was 
put to relief by the scouting movement. Introduced during the earliest days of Republican 
China as a new means to engage youngsters, scout troops quickly spread across 
missionary and secular schools in treaty ports such as Guangzhou, Shanghai, Ningbo, 
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Wuhan and Nanjing. Despite the association of scouting with the British Empire and the 
Western presence in China, the GMD set up its own scout troops in 1926 and unified all 
scouting organizations in the country under one national body in 1927. While 
intensifying control over the leadership and curriculum of the scouting movement, the 
GMD absorbed rather than replaced the personnel and international network of the 
former civic organizations. Until it was subsumed under the Three People’s Youth Corps 
in 1940, the GMD resisted turning the Scouts of China into a full-fledged youth wing of 
the party. In its training methods, ideological contents and aesthetic manifestations, 
scouting exhibited two modes of molding mass society. First, it served to build individual 
character and instill apolitical civic consciousness in the young citizenry. The movement 
was part of an everyday culture that promoted submission to authority over political 
dissent, technical knowhow over bookish contemplation, and obligatory happiness over 
discontent. Second, scouting also made room for a more militant approach to forming the 
national revolution’s future vanguard. There were tensions built into youth mobilization 
under the GMD, but, at the fundamental level, the two occasional conflicting approaches 
to mass engagement complemented one another as the new state attempted to win 
consent among upwardly mobile urban dwellers while preserving its propensity for action 
as a disciplined movement.           
     
Mass Organizations and Chiang Kai-shek’s GMD  
 Traditionally, the GMD has been considered to be adverse to mass politics. 
Historians point to an in-built ambiguity that underscored the party’s relationship with the 
masses since the May Fourth Movement. Party leaders since Sun Yat-sen had wanted to 
82 
capitalize on popular fervor but could never bring themselves to fully endorse it, 
particularly when the loyalty of student and other mass organizations was far from 
guaranteed.
3
 Indeed, party leaders demonstrated a clear disinclination towards students’ 
participation in national politics after 1927. Nation-wide student networks were dissolved 
by Dai Jitao and University Council (Daxue yuan) president Cai Yuanpei (1868-1940), 
and students’ role in mass movements was severely limited and defined by individual 
school authorities. Like any other ruling party, the GMD right was less eager to engage 
the people directly in the political process after it secured state power. Arif Dirlik 
suggests, however, that the GMD’s failure to embrace the masses was indicative not just 
of political inertia but of a deeper paradox that plagued the party’s revolutionary 
ideology. He argues that some party leaders, particularly Wang Jingwei, had as late as 
1930 hoped that the GMD could maintain an active social base to distinguish the party 
from the burgeoning bureaucratic infrastructure. Yet, even activists who appreciated the 
need to sustain grassroots enthusiasm feared that popular demands, once given an 
organization form, would have social revolutionary implications that engendered class 
conflicts and threatened interclass unity that underwrote the national revolution.
4
 In sharp 
contrast to communist and other fascist parties, which identified strongly with politicized 
youths, the impulse of the conservative GMD leadership was to depoliticize and tame 
mass enthusiasm, including that of party loyalists.
5
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 Chiang quickly grew disillusioned with the Lixingshe, a secret organization inaugurated by the Leader 
himself in February 1932. Chiang’s former pupils at the Whampoa Military Academy who staffed the 
clique and its front groups were faulted for their naiveté, sectarian zeal and high ego. (Wakeman, 
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 The portrayal of the post-1927 GMD as a cautious bureaucratic establishment 
estranged from the populace obscures the ways in which the regime continued to engage 
the masses, harnessing, cultivating, and disciplining youth activism after the end of party 
purification. After all, a core priority of radical conservatives like Dai Jitao was precisely 
to cleanse bureaucratic inertia and assert the party as a popular political force. 
Admittedly, the GMD did not have the equivalent of the paramilitary, ideologically-
driven Hitler Youth that prepared future National Socialist cadres. But tapping mass 
energy in overtly political campaigns was not necessarily the norm among radical 
rightwing regimes in the interwar period. Worker and youth organizations in Fascist Italy, 
even as they became integral parts of Mussolini’s party-state, were primarily engaged in 
managing recreational programs like sports, mass outings, and widening access to such 
commercial entertainments as theater and radio. Grouped according to sex, age and 
activity, Fascist associations were, as historian Victoria De Grazia aptly suggests, truly 
mass organizations set up to counter class-based political consciousness. Instead of 
developing campaigns that prized strong partisan commitments, Italian Fascists’ outreach 
to the people emphasized the subtle neutralization of antagonistic popular demands by 
embedding an elaborate network of social services and leisure-time management 
initiatives in the everyday life of the masses. By channeling citizens’ expectations to 
focus on individual consumption, the Fascist establishment worked to avoid class 
tensions from coalescing into proletarian agitations for changes in social relations. The 
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Italian fascist state co-opted local networks, the Catholic Church and, most significantly, 
an emerging consumer market to organize consent for a corporatist economic order.
6
     
 The concept of consent facilitates a re-examination of GMD youth mobilization 
strategy for it focuses attention beyond institutions like student unions, paramilitary 
organization, and party-affiliated secret societies. Consent, as De Grazia borrows from 
Gramsci, emphasizes the subtle and often unarticulated dispositions in popular 
consciousness that lend legitimacy to the ruling bloc. It evokes Dai’s insight that a 
revolution in people’s livelihood must deliver a new national popular culture that infused 
public and private life, from a modernized common language to affordable drama 
performances. Cultural and ideological maneuvers that apparently had no significant 
political bearing were in fact critical in sustaining state hegemony and diverting popular 
quest for participation in the polity to non-threatening modes of activism. By realizing 
how quotidian experience was integral to the efficacy of social orders, we begin to unveil 
the ideological mechanism that allowed a new fascist regime to transition from a 
revolutionary movement that mobilized cadres for the seizure of state power to a dynamic 
order that organized active consent from a much broader constituency.
7
 The state’s 
interface with society necessarily had to expand beyond the limited number of political 
activists to encompass a vast array of communities and networks.  
 The quest for consent did not mean GMD gave up using violence to suppress 
political dissent. As Dai realized, however, dictatorial power alone could not produce 
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ideological loyalty among the governed. The ruling bloc had to align popular sensibilities 
with the new socio-economic hierarchy. It laid claims on the New Culture ideal of 
nuclear family, tapping the juridical, symbolic and widespread sentimental investment in 
an emerging institution associated with the modern urban petit-bourgeoisie.
8
 During the 
New Life Movement, the state seized on film, literature, and sensational media events to 
craft a new paradigm in moral activism.
9
 Scouting was enlisted by the GMD to cultivate 
mass consent from before the April 12 coup, through the New Life Movement, and right 
up to the Second Sino-Japanese War and beyond. Instead of simply withdrawing itself 
from the masses, the party-state was more sophisticated in motivating popular sentiments 
to bolster support for its campaigns against the Communist challenge or more protean 
threats like modern consumerism, unhygienic customs and tardiness.   
 
Scouting before 1927 
 The GMD’s co-optation of scouting represented another layer to the regime’s 
scheme to secure popular consent, using a set of institutions, rituals and pedagogical 
practices inspired by a liberal concept of social participation. Founded by British general 
Robert Baden-Powell in 1907, scouting was very much a product of British metropolitan 
entanglement with its overseas empire. A celebrated career soldier with stints in India, 
Malta and Africa, Baden-Powell got his inspiration for the organizing and training of 
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boys from his experience fighting the indigenous Matabele population in Rhodesia in 
1896 and setting up the South African Constabulary from 1900 to 1902.
10
 The new youth 
program, invested with a romantic attachment to the outdoor as an allegory to imperial 
adventurism, fused such mid-Victorian bourgeois value as individual responsibility with 
more immediate anxieties over foreign threats, socialist politics, and the pernicious 
effects of modern life in Britain. The idea was “to produce efficient recruits for the 
empire” through a mass movement that revitalize the martial quality of an urbanized, 
effete and debauch young citizenry in the metropole. Scouting spread across British 
colonies in North America, Africa and South Asia in the early twentieth century, 
adopting a “dual guise” as both an expression of imperial commonwealth and a vehicle 
for promoting socio-political cohesion through personal service and brotherhood.
11
 While 
undoubtedly steeped in imperial ideology as Pax Britannica began to unravel, scouting 
caught on in colonial societies as industrialization outside the metropole produced a small 
but powerful urban middle class.              
 The two faces of scouting co-existed in tension as the practice was first 
introduced to semi-colonial China in 1912 around the time when the republic was 
founded. China’s first scout groups, whether attributed to the Wuchang-based missionary 
school teacher Yan Jialin or institutions operated by the municipal administration of 
Shanghai’s British-dominated International Settlement, were strongly tied to the cultural 
and military might of the West. Scout leaders and scouts who wrote about their 
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experiences at Shanghai Municipal Council schools recalled the alien and exotic allure of 
the activity, from the English verbal commands to the distinct navy blue jacket and khaki 
shorts that participants wore.
12
 The association of scouting with Western imperialist 
presence was reinforced by suggestions that Shanghai’s International Settlement 
community led a nascent nation-wide scouting movement. G. S. F. Kemp, principal of the 
Public School for Chinese, declared in a 1917 issue of New Youth that his Boy Scouts 
Association of China, founded in April 1913, was to “spread the Scout Movement over 
China,” leading a unified organ comprising not only troops in Shanghai, but also local 
associations in Hankou, Guangzhou, Suzhou, Tianjin, Beijing and Nanjing. Appealing to 
“the gentry of China” for financial support, Kemp emphasized the apolitical dimension of 
the movement he putatively led. “Scouting is not intended to make soldiers of boys,” 
Kemp assured his potential Chinese sponsors, “nor is it intended to lead youths to 
interfere in the government of the country.” He highlighted how scouting was a potent 
tool to structure the quotidian routine of pampered, ill-disciplined youths. Instead of 
“dawdling about the streets and alleys” and being waited on by servants, boys filled 
“every moment” of their leisure time with open air, healthy habits, lively music and 
physical labor.
13
 One of Kemp’s Chinese collaborators, Li Qifan of the Shanghai-based 
Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), was quoted by Education Review (Jiaoyu 
zazhi) as saying that the practice was being localized for the interior, devising sets of 
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Chinese verbal commands and replacing the expensive woolen uniform with cotton.
14
 
Adapting to local sensibilities, scouting was presented as a timely innovation designed to 
rescue urban China from the malaises that were already plaguing industrialized society in 
the West – wastefulness, juvenile restlessness, and declining moral standards.   
 Aside from its foreignness, early Chinese observers writing during the Great War 
saw scouting as a form of military preparation. In the same issue of Education Journal 
that published Li Qifan’s plan for the popularization of the youth program in the 
hinterland, an article that investigated scouting in the United States compared the Anglo-
American initiatives in their “militarism” (junguo zhuyi) to the systematic training and 
drilling of German youths since the end of the Franco-Prussian War. Identifying the 
origins of boy scouts in Baden-Powell’s experience as a general in South Africa, the 
article emphasized the mobilization of youths as members of the wider settler community 
against indigenous Zulu insurgents. Scouting, rendered by the author as “young volunteer 
corps” (shaonian yiyong tuan) in Chinese, was a means to train a reserve force.15 
Scouting’s inherent ambiguity as an avowedly non-military venture with military origins 
and army-like uniforms, hierarchies and drills reflected the blurring of demarcations 
between the trenches and civilian populations in modern European warfare. It also held 
resonance among Republican educators towards the end of the First World War as they 
moved China’s physical culture away from an emphasis on military citizenship through 
rigid calisthenics popular during the late Qing to competitive sports that contributed more 
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directly to individual cultivation.
16
 The 1917 curriculum adopted in the city of Wuxi for 
scouts, who ranged from twelve to more than twenty years of age, placed knowledge of 
the military ranks, ceremonies and hierarchies and such quasi-military skills as weaponry 
and cartography among a wide list of optional subjects ranging from swimming, hiking 
and survival in the wild to translation, music and horticulture. Indeed, one recent 
amendment to the curriculum was to relegate military training from a core to an optional 
subject so as to avoid the impression that scouting was a cadet program for the armed 
forces.
17
 Scouting became a means to subsume military training under a broader program 
that cultivated a range of capabilities and knowledge that future citizens should possess. 
 From the end of the First World War until the April 12 coup in 1927, scouting 
spread across institutions in the coastal provinces. Prominent high schools adopted the 
organization as part of their overall curricula. For reformist proponents, scouting 
embodied latest American pragmatist education theories that privileged action in learning 
and the molding of children as social beings.
18
 They also saw the movement as a device 
for nation-building, particularly in the face of attempts spearheaded by figures like Kemp 
to run scouting from Shanghai’s International Settlement. The Nanjing-based Chinese 
Scouts Research Association (Zhonghua tongzijun yanjiuhui), initiated by organizers 
from Jiangsu province in 1921, offered itself as the first contact point for scout troops 
across the fragmented country. Educators in Jiangsu also petitioned the provincial 
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government, controlled by a Zhili Clique warlord, to provide financial support for the 257 
scout troops and their 7,237 participants through extra budget provisions for schools. In 
piquing the state’s interest in scouting, the movement was portrayed as an international 
fraternity for fully-fledged nations. Compared to the United States, where the Congress 
passed a resolution identifying scouting as a national undertaking (guojia shiye), China 
did not even have a unified network for scouts organizations at the provincial level.
19
 The 
state’s failure to provide funding and an overall institutional structure for scouts from 
Tianjin in the north to Taishan in the south was a reminder of China’s status as a semi-
colonized and internally fragmented country unqualified to stand among the family of 
twentieth-century nations.   
 The alignment of scouting with the nationalist project in China echoed similar 
developments in colonial societies under the British. While Baden-Powell valued 
conformity to social order and invested in the civilizing and proselytizing missions 
inherent to the British Empire, the youth movement he pioneered became a vehicle for 
nationalist agitations in Ireland, Palestine and India. In the 1910s, the British Raj refused 
to extend recognition to scouting for fear that Indian nationalists would turn it into a 
militant anti-colonial movement. The lack of official sponsorship, however, did not 
prohibit nationalist activists and foreign missionaries from imitating the boy scouts in the 
metropole and launching similar undertakings for Indians.
20
 In early twentieth-century 
China, the linking of scouting with nationalist mobilization was strongest in the GMD’s 
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base in Guangdong where the movement was coordinated by provincial authorities. 
Historian Robert Culp argues that the centralization of scouting was a new development 
during the Nanjing Decade (1927-1937) that the GMD imposed on heretofore loosely 
federated troops in Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang.
21
 While this might have been the 
case in the lower Yangzi region, on which Culp’s research focuses, the situation was 
rather different in the southern province. The state in Guangdong required all troops to 
register with a province-wide body run by the American-educated Wang Xianzhao, a 
YMCA organizer who pioneered scouting in Guangzhou in 1915, and Cheng Zuyi, of the 
Guangdong Higher Normal College. All scouts in the province wore the same set of 
uniform, operated under one organizational structure and students from different schools 
were sent to receive training as scout leaders.
22
 In the provincial capital, mayor Sun Ke 
(1891-1973) placed scouting under the direction of the municipal education department 
in 1924 and began to formulate a unified curriculum. The practice was extended to girls 
and introduced to the school curriculum at the upper primary level and beyond.
23
    
 The hybridity inherent to scouting with hints of militarism, imperialism, 
reformism and nationalism allowed the newly reorganized GMD regime to build a 
disciplined mass organization on the foundation of an existing movement. A Leninist 
party was able to reach out to a Westernized, missionary school-educated urban elite 
                                                 
21
 Culp, Articulating Citizenship, 180; idem, “Zhongguo tongzijun – Nanjing shinian tongzijun shouce 
zhong de gongmin xunlian yu shehui yishi” [Scouting for Chinese boys: civic training and social 
consciousness in Nanjing Decade boy scout handbooks], Xin shixue 11, no. 4 (2000): 25. 
   
22
 Chen Juequan, “Guangzhou tongzijun shilue” [Brief history of scouting in Guangzhou], in Guangdong 
wenshi ziliao, ed. Zhongguo renmin zhengxie huiyi Guangdong sheng weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu 
weiyuanhui, no. 73 (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1993), 149-150. Li Pusheng, “Tongzijun 
zhi lueshi” [Brief history of scouting], special edition on the scout carnival, Guangzhou Minguo ribao, 23 
May 1925, 4.  
 
23
 Chen Juequan, “Guangzhou tongzijun shilue,” 150. 
 
92 
committed not necessarily to Sun Yat-sen’s political agenda but to training physically 
virile youngsters versed in practical skills and devoted to general social service. 
Furthermore, scouting’s internationalist pretensions allowed the GMD to maintain a 
moderate image when dealing with foreign educators, who, as in the case of Shanghai, 
introduced the practice to Guangzhou and remained powerful organizers. The GMD and 
its affiliated institutions enjoyed a close working relationship with the American-funded 
Lingnan University. Lingnan scouts participated in province-wide activities while their 
American leaders were invited to train future scoutmasters at the party-run Guangdong 
University (the predecessor of Sun Yat-sen University that incorporated the Higher 
Normal College).
24
 When an entourage of 125 scouts, scout leaders and photographers 
from Lingnan went camping outside Guangzhou in 1926, these “prominent Chinese 
citizens and students” enjoyed the protection of a 75-strong contingent from the National 
Revolutionary Army.
25
 Despite its increasingly fervent nationalism, the GMD’s stance 
towards foreign scout organizers at this early stage was one of gentle co-optation rather 
than outright incorporation into party-controlled bodies.      
 The GMD’s accommodating attitude did not mean that the party concurred with 
the values foreign scout organizers believed the movement should imbue in young boys 
and girls. While scouting as envisioned by Kemp belonged to an Anglo-American liberal 
tradition that valued the cultivation of individualistic citizenship and social activism that 
did not serve specific political causes, scout educators working under the GMD thought 
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otherwise. Nationalism and anti-imperialism were the main motivations behind their 
efforts to promote the practice in institutions run by the party-state. Li Pusheng, an Aceh-
born teacher who was among the first batch of scout leaders trained by Wang Xianzhao 
in 1917, cited Baden-Powell’s military victories in South Africa and Japan’s investment 
in building a young generation with strong physical prowess as his inspirations for 
scouting education in China. As the chief scout (tongjun zhuren) at the affiliated 
secondary and primary schools of Guangzhou’s Higher Normal College, Li led boys in a 
city-wide rally against brutal treatment of Shanghai textile workers on strike by the 
British in May 1925. After the Guangzhou demonstration itself ended in bloodshed on 
June 23, at which a scout was killed by British troops along with some sixty protestors, Li 
decided that the GMD was the only force capable of freeing China from imperialist 
influence. Upon joining the GMD as a cadre at the Youth Department, the radicalized 
activist suggested that the party needed its own scouting apparatus.
26
 In 1926, the Youth 
Department submitted a plan to the party headquarters for the reorganization of scouting 
as the Nationalist youth wing. Directly challenging the apolitical claims Kemp and others 
made for scouting, the proposal accused the organization of being a product of Anglo-
American influence and a tool of imperialist encroachment into China.
27
 The GMD 
inaugurated the Party Scouts (dang tongzijun) on May 5, 1926, shortly before it 
embarked on a military expedition against the warlord regime in Beijing.    
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 The Party Scouts constituted not as much an entirely new organization as 
reconfiguration of the existing scouting movement formed under provincial and 
municipal aegis. Scout activists from Guangdong University, including Li Pusheng, were 
charged with the formulation of the new body’s regulations and their implementation, 
while the university president was to serve as the director-general (zong ganshi).
28
 
Aligning the ideological import and operational infrastructure of scouting and the party-
state apparatus in Guangdong anticipated the GMD’s approach to the youth organization 
network after radical conservatives gained the reins of power after April 1927. Scouting 
methods were valorized due to their purported compatibility with Sun Yat-sen’s mass 
mobilization theory. The Youth Department’s proposal called on scout leaders to 
“penetrate deep down” (shenqian) into the people’s mind, just like how their British, 
American and Japanese counterparts instilled support for the monarchy, bourgeois rule 
and “Great Japanism” (da Riben zhuyi) in their respective young citizenries.29 They 
received training in military organization, learned to master new media like cartoon and 
public speaking, and were taught GMD key policies through the angles of class analysis 
and mass psychology.
30
 While the GMD claimed scouting for itself only in 1926, the 
party made its imprint on scouting as part of its revolutionary praxis even before the 
founding of the Party Scouts. The Guangdong-wide scout carnival in 1925, held to raise 
funds for a memorial hall dedicated to the recently deceased Sun Yat-sen, demonstrated 
the party’s ideological investment in a movement with controversial origins. Zou Lu 
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(1885-1954), the Guangdong University president who participated in early agitations 
against the GMD-CCP united front, censured Western imperialists for their militaristic 
(jun guomin) scouting education but exculpated Baden-Powell. The British lieutenant-
general’s military-inspired training methods were lauded for promoting order and beauty 
in schools while subjects like hiking, first aid, and fire fighting were praised for imparting 
eminently practical skills on adolescents.
31
 The imperialist pretensions that informed 
scouting were set aside in Li Pusheng’s admiration for how Baden-Powell managed to 
deploy urban youths among the South African English-speaking colonialist community in 
arduous military tasks like transmitting messages, transporting supplies, and gathering 
intelligence as if they were nothing more than enjoyable pastimes.
32
   
 Having separated scouting from its problematic history, GMD affiliates claimed 
the movement as their own. Anticipating developments in the Nanjing Decade, scout 
training in Guangdong was rebranded as a tool for putting into practice Sun’s proclivity 
for guided action over political consciousness in working with the populace, a theory 
central to Dai Jitao’s formulation of GMD vanguardism. The emphasis on hands-on 
learning was touted as a natural extension of Sun’s exhortation to his less intellectually-
inclined comrades to execute (xing) the revolution, even if they could not understand 
(zhi) it. Similarly, young children learnt surveying techniques without understanding 
geometry; they knew how to identify directions by using a compass and observing stars, 
even if they were too young to make tails and heads of physics and astronomy. Most 
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significantly, scouts were constantly cheerful, putting on smiles as they received orders 
from superiors. The ability to appear joyful without appreciating the “philosophy of 
smiles” (xiao zhi zhexue) was touted as another instance of how actual practice took the 
pride of place in scouting.
33
 Displaying happiness without being happy was thus the 
quotidian counterpart to mass enthusiasm for revolutionary action in the absence of 
conscious conviction in concrete revolutionary aims. Experiential learning, a core tenet of 
John Dewey’s progressive education tradition to which scouting belonged, contributed to 
shaping a skilled, target-oriented citizenry whose social activism was matched by their 
underdeveloped political consciousness. 
 
Transition to a New Order: Politicization and Depoliticization 
 The ostensible paradox built into this depoliticization of political participation in 
the GMD’s early experimentations with scouting shaped the movement’s direction after 
the 1927 coup. Much changed as the center of GMD was shifted from Guangzhou to 
Nanjing. Activists like Li Pusheng remained in Guangzhou and were marginalized from 
the new order in the making.
34
 With just over 8,000 party scouts divided into forty troops, 
the relocated Nationalist state did not believe its short-lived centralization attempt in the 
south would serve as the foundation for a nationwide scouting network. Dai Jitao did not 
mince his words explaining to his comrades in Guangdong why their earlier efforts had 
become irrelevant.
35
 “In the past,” the now Nanjing-based official observed in 1931,  
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scouting was not initiated and run by the GMD but was a system imported from 
abroad, therefore activists then were not deeply tied to the party. If they were to 
work for us before scout training in various locales was given a unified form, they 
would not only fail to benefit the development of the movement but even 
jeopardize (youwu yu) party supervision of the scout enterprise. … The Central 
Executive’s position on scouting organization in Guangdong is that our party 
must first control and unify things there. Only when this is achieved can we 
consider recruitment of personnel.
36
      
 
Dai overstated the degree to which scouting was free from state influence before 1927, 
but he articulated eloquently Nanjing’s determination to take firm control over 
organizations that dealt with the masses and ensured their absolute loyalty to the post-
coup regime. That the southern province was quickly slipping into the hands of warlord 
Chen Jitang (1890-1954), who held the true reins of power in the former Nationalist base 
from 1929 to 1936, did not inspire confidence. In 1933, Dai accused scout leaders in 
Guangdong of a more serious crime: “Bolshevizing” (chihua) the movement.37  A 
Nationalist-led scouting movement, loyal to the Republic and the Three People’s 
Principles, was to be launched anew from the nation’s new capital.    
 Dai’s remark that activists long involved in imperialist institutions were 
disqualified from playing a central role in key party initiatives was, however, more a 
statement of preference than a strictly enforced policy. One core scout functionary who 
worked to bring scouts across the country under Nanjing’s fold was Zhang Zhongren 
(1898-1971), a graduate of the missionary-run Tianjin Anglo-Chinese School (Xinxue 
xueyuan). Zhang, who spearheaded his alma mater’s scout troop in 1915 while working 
at the American consulate, was appointed a commander (siling) at the Scouts of the 
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Chinese Nationalist Party (Zhongguo Guomindang tongzijun) in 1928 and played an 
active role fine-tuning the Nationalist regime’s centralizing imperative in disciplining 
youth activism. Commander Zhang and his unrelated fellow scout activist Zhang 
Xiaoliang (1905-1982) served respectively on the planning and preparatory committees 
of the Scouts of China General Association (Zhongguo tongzijun zonghui). In fact, Zhang 
Zhongren was credited with proposing the general association to provide Chinese 
scouting with a national locus. The association was envisaged as a “sound, independent 
and standing central organization” modeled on Boy Scouts of America.38 Reforms to 
scouting organization began in 1929, when Zhang Zhongren’s central command (siling 
bu) was placed directly under the GMD Central Executive Committee instead of the 
Training Department. Another symbolic but no less significant change was to rebrand the 
Scouts of the Chinese Nationalist Party into the less partisan-sounding Scouts of China 
(Zhongguo tongzijun).  
 These results of these initiatives, which cumulated in the founding of the Scouts 
of China General Association in 1934, were ambiguous enough to allow for different 
interpretations. Zhang Zhongren saw the partial distancing of scouting from the GMD 
apparatus and his American-style organizational framework as right steps towards liberal 
democracy. He heaped praise in a 1935 speech to future scout leaders on scouting bodies 
in Britain and particularly the United States for embodying the democratic principles that 
governed public life in the two countries, even as he was also enthusiastic about scouting 
in authoritarian Japan. In contrast to the GMD’s hegemonic claims over politics and 
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society, Zhang touted the United States Congress, which granted a charter to Boy Scouts 
of America in 1916, as a mechanism for citizens to push for change and progress without 
a revolution. While many GMD cadres saw scouts as future successors of the national 
revolution and envisioned thorough infusion of the Three People’s Principles in the scout 
curriculum, Zhang argued that character (pin’ge) cultivation should hold pride of place.39 
The admirer of parliamentarianism was more vigilant of fascist challenges to Anglo-
American liberalism emanating from Mussolini’s Italy than his spiritual mentor. Unlike 
Baden-Powell, who endorsed Opera Nazionale Balilla as a program that built character 
and body, Zhang accused the Fascist youth organization in a 1935 article of exhibiting a 
narrow nationalist vision. With its overt “political agenda and program,” the Balilla was 
“a scouting-like concoction that was decidedly not scouting.”40 Governed by its own 
organizational apparatus instead of belonging to a department of the GMD was for Zhang 
an indication that China’s premier youth movement was at least moving in America’s 
direction instead of Italy’s. 
 Reality was, however, more complicated. Dai, who would become the vice-
president of the General Association, headed a Training Department that opposed 
changes in nomenclature. As late as 1928, the department complained that the name 
“Scouts of China” failed to reflect the GMD’s authority over the organization.41 Even as 
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central command was transferred out from the Training Department, Dai vowed that the 
party would continue to provide direction and ideological justification for scouting.
42
 
Unlike student unions, which were dismantled in favor of individual self-governing 
associations that were isolated from one another, the GMD took a more nuanced, 
corporatist strategy in managing scouting by co-opting reformist functionaries within the 
movement even if their political sensibilities were in some variance with the rightwing 
majority’s. The penetration of overtly partisan groupings like Lixingshe into the civil 
society organization was partial and took place in a low-profile manner.
43
 The GMD’s 
overall approach to scouting, and to education as general, was to project itself as beyond 
politics. The regime’s claim to political disinterestedness not only appealed to figures and 
organizations initially uneasy with the GMD but rendered opponents of the party-state 
politically self-serving and even morally dubious. Among the first within the party to 
think seriously about the shape of mass politics under a consolidated Nationalist regime, 
Dai pledged in the lead up to the coup that future youth movement would concentrate on 
improving academic attainments and cultivation of hearts and minds. Instead of treating 
teenagers as politicians’ private soldiers, the conservative revolution would bring young 
protesters back to study and work. Future struggle for national survival was to take place 
in “libraries, laboratories and workshops.”44 For educated youth, contributing to the new 
social order, not political factionalism, was the way forward. 
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 Dai’s dictum that the national revolution would no longer be launched from the 
street appealed to the habits of the Westernized bourgeoisie, to which Zhang Zhongren 
belonged, and to the aspirations of modestly educated white-collar “petit urbanites” who 
would by the 1930s make up 40 percent of Shanghai’s population.45 His revised 
minsheng program, with the two new additional categories of cultivation (yu) and leisure 
(le), had found a home in the middle-class civility that scouting promoted. Scout 
curriculum placed considerable emphasis on what Culp identifies as treaty port ideals of 
hygiene and etiquette. Cub scouts (you tongjun), recruited from primary schools, were 
assessed in their ability to exemplify a modern healthy urban lifestyle that included 
practices such as keeping nails neat and short, taking regular baths, breathing with one’s 
nose, and avoiding used towels.
46
 Older participants were introduced to sophisticated but 
expensive hobbies like photography. Scouts for whom a camera was out of reach could 
spend leisure time gathering mementos from everyday life. They could collect shells and 
plant specimens while camping or, more in tune with their urban commercial 
surroundings, keep track of photographs, trademarks, or advertisements for movies, 
spoken drama and exhibitions.
47
 Girl scouts learned “feminine” labor like needlework. 
The association of scouting with medieval Europe’s “chivalric heroism” (qishi de 
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yingxiong qigai) and survival in the wilderness was far from forgotten.
48
 But Zhang 
Xiaoliang also acknowledged that a program that promised only rustic adventures could 
not be popular among parents. Urbanites were hardly excited by the prospect of sending 
their children out in the forest to brave the elements. While appealing to active and 
outdoor-loving children with a curriculum of camping, hiking, swimming, knot-tying and 
flag-signaling, scout leaders needed to persuade skeptical parents that a training regime 
that traced its origins to the bushes in southern Africa would produce “successful modern 
youths” in urban China.49 Sensitivity to the tastes and social ideals of the upwardly 
mobile middle class defined the tenor of Chinese scouting and GMD youth politics for 
the rest of its rule in Mainland China. 
 
 
Figure 1. Girl scouts at a Nanjing high school performing needlework. (Zhongguo tongzijun 2, no. 
2 [1936], 10.)  
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 The GMD’s displacement of mass movements from political struggle to economic 
production found an ideal outlet in scouting, which engaged urban students in innocuous 
social activities and personal cultivation. Shared dispositions in varied matters from 
bathroom habits to fashionable pastimes positioned the ruling party as the guardian of 
petit-bourgeois values and lifestyle. Yet, it is important not to confuse the wide range of 
artistic and athletic endeavors promoted by scouting as a sign of Nationalist China’s 
pluralism and distinction with other radical conservative regimes.
50
 The promise to divert 
young people’s attention from divisive political strife to bodily training and spiritual 
cultivation was inseparable from the GMD critique of communism as materialistic and 
unpatriotic, and of leftwing students as effete cosmopolitans overwhelmed by puerile 
angst and hedonistic desires. Scouting was the ideal mass movement for the GMD, for it 
combined voluntarism, action, discipline and political ideals that lent support to reigning 
power relations. Despite its jealously guarded apolitical image, Baden-Powell’s scouting 
was a response to elite fears over decline in Britain’s moral, physical and military 
qualities among the working masses of early twentieth-century industrial society. Not 
unlike Republican China, Edwardian Britain was beset by a deep sense of crisis: 
urbanization produced crime and weak bodies, labor unions threatened “natural” social 
hierarchy, and the heretofore almighty empire was challenged by an ascendant Germany. 
To reinstall discipline and order, Baden-Powell proposed a “total ideology” that fully 
conditioned youths’ values and emotional responses through carefully crafted games, 
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rules and rituals. The totalizing ambitions of British scouting, as well as the imperative to 
train individuals into virile and patriotic citizens who shunned away from disruptive 




 In China, the radical nature of the scouting experiment was put to even higher 
relief by its association with the New Life Movement. Launched in 1934, the same year 
in which the Scouts of China General Association was founded, the New Life Movement 
traced its root to campaigns that targeted erstwhile Communist sympathizers after 
Nationalist forces wiped out the CCP-led Jiangxi Soviet in the rural hinterland. The 
movement was a revolutionary experiment that sought to eliminate wastes, change habits, 
strengthen bodies, tame leftwing radicalism and prepare a nimble citizenry who took on 
production orders with relish and military-like determination. It intervened in the most 
mundane of everyday chores: the clothes one wore, the food prepared in family kitchens, 
the side of the street pedestrians walked on, spitting and urinating in public.
52
 While 
Chiang Kai-shek and other Nationalist leader took pain to portray the New Life 
Movement as a restoration of China’s Confucian values, the prominence of scouting 
highlighted how the GMD partook in a wider global current that cut across radical 
rightwing and conservative liberal social activism. As vice-president of the Scouts of 
China, Dai Jitao brought together conservative elitist disdain for the incivility of his 
underclass brethren and ambitions for radical transformations in the body politic. Echoing 
the patrician tone of Baden-Powell’s 1908 Scout Law, Dai derided his compatriots for 
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being self-obsessed and resentful of those who achieved fame and success. The “new 
life” (xin shengming) he envisioned for youngsters would aim for civic harmony in which 
loyal and contented citizens went out of their way to help one another, despite the class 
distinctions that had set them apart in the first place.
 53
 Scouting contributed to the New 
Life agenda by projecting a unified social body that valued service and “usefulness” of its 
members. The pragmatic dictum of “learning by doing” – acquiring practical skills that 
were applicable in factory floors and laboratories instead of knowledge – ensured that 




 In its exhortations for the populace to minimize consumption, uphold public 
civility, engage in household production and avoid foreign fashion items, the New Life 
Movement was a total mass movement that subsumed the more specific mandate of 
scouting. Chiang Kai-shek’s 1934 Outline of the New Life Movement (Xin shenghuo 
yundong gangyao), a long list of proper behaviors that constituted a revolution in 
everyday culture, was duly reproduced in the commemorative publication marking the 
launch of the Scouts of China general association.
55
 Scouts became foot soldiers of the 
New Life ideal, patrolling streets to make sure public spaces were hygienic and 
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pedestrians wore clean, decent clothes.
56
 The injection of propriety, whether expressed as 
Confucian-inspired rites (li) or modern-sounding courtesy (lijie), into a productivist ethos 
characterized both the indigenous New Life Movement and the treaty-port-originated 
youth organization as the two initiatives set about promoting individual cultivation and 
nurturing reliable and healthy workers. 
 The investment in middle-class ideals of civility was, moreover, intimately tied to 
the GMD’s core political agenda that was geared to diffuse leftwing influence in mass 
politics. Like the New Life Movement, the ongoing military campaigns against 
Communists motivated the state’s interest in scouting. As Dai explained to scouts in 
Hankou, a city close to a major Communist base on the border of Hubei province, “red 
bandits” (chifei) were degenerates who grew up without the cultivation that scouting 
afforded. He said,  
 President Chiang of the Scouts of China, who is also the chairman of the Military 
Affairs Commission, visited Hankou recently. He had won a number of battles 
and purged many red bandits. We must press on to destroy red banditry from its 
root. We should realize that these bandits are also Chinese; they are our 
compatriots and brothers. Why is it that they fail to seek self-improvement and 
instead make trouble? It is because they did not receive an education and never 
learned how to become an upright person (zuoren de daoli). This is one sure 
indication of China’s decay and gloom.57  
 
The link between brutal suppression of dissent and patriarchal concern for people’s moral 
well-being could not be clearer. Along with Chiang Kai-shek’s military prowess, Dai 
enlisted the scouting doctrine of doing a good turn to somebody every day, translated 
pithily into Chinese as “a good deed a day” (rixing yishan), as a weapon for uprooting 
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Communist savagery. Thus, a well-organized ideological and military challenge to the 
GMD was reduced to pockets of apolitical, if no less subversive, social deviance. 
Edification, by introducing an indigenized version of English public school 
sophistication, was the apolitical side of a total political strategy devised to safeguard the 
conservative revolution.    
       
Productive Ambiguity and Its Limits 
 Scouting’s origins in cosmopolitan treaty-port culture, petit-bourgeois outlook, 
and focus on consumption habits and hands-on skills appealed to the urban elite who 
identified solution to China’s problems in the refinement of people’s private life, 
particularly among the lower classes. At the same time, a productive ambiguity over the 
nature of scouting since the uniformed movement was introduced by missionary schools 
left room for GMD cadres to project their own militaristic desires. This co-habilitation of 
civic and militaristic ideals is vividly illustrated by events like the second national 
jamboree, the only nation-wide camping assembly the Scouts of China General 
Association managed to stage in the Nationalist capital of Nanjing.
58
 The 1936 jamboree, 
a five-day event held in October, brought more than 13,000 boys and girls from across 
the nation to its ceremonial center, forging a sense of cosmopolitan fraternity and 
common citizenship that transcended the cultural variations and political tensions that 
divided provinces. Zhang Xiaoliang, relishing his memory of the previous national 
jamboree, enthused on the brotherhood and mutual cooperation of the transient young 
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community despite differences in dialects, religions, customs. His guide for participants 
at the 1936 jamboree reiterated scout organizers’ commitment to grooming self-reliant 
and resourceful citizens with distinct habits and tastes. These dispositions distinguished 
scouts from the uncouth lower classes, while serving as commonalities among privileged 
youths from across the vast and tenuously unified country. 
 Participants learned to behave as privileged citizens who nonetheless strived for 
economic self-sufficiency and avoided conspicuous consumption. While realizing that the 
expensive trip would likely be paid for by middle-class parents or through pocket money, 
Zhang encouraged scouts to raise funds with their own labor. Urbanites could deliver 
newspapers or earn money by contributing to mass-circulating publications themselves; 
rural children could grow vegetables, farm fish, or sell their own handicraft products. 
Those who eventually made their way to Nanjing were advised not to flaunt their wealth 
when bringing gifts for exchange with their peers. Instead of splurging on expensive 
souvenirs from confectionary stores and flashy department stores in the capital, campers 
should either prepare handmade mementos or purchase specialties from their hometowns 
with their own savings. They were warned not to express their juvenile individuality by 
tampering with their scout uniforms. At the campsite, located in the stunning Sun Yat-sen 
Mausoleum, young people deftly deployed modern amenities to prepare food, 
communicate with their hometowns and make themselves warm and comfortable. They 
would have soap, threads and needles, stamps and letter pads, knives, basic medicine, a 
watch, and a camera with extra film ready in their backpacks. They would tour and 
admire Nanjing’s modernizing urban landscape in groups, making the most out of their 




 Apart from dance or theatrical performances that drew on motifs from the 
provinces, the jamboree promoted a new nation-wide class identity that traversed regional 
specificities and shunned the sort of overt ideological allegiances that characterized many 
youth and mass movements in the Republican period. 
 The jamboree, like scouting in general, aimed to create a future elite whose 
modern knowledge and sophisticated consumption patterns were more in league with the 
urban middle-class in industrialized societies than the toiling masses of semicolonial 
China. At the same time, the jamboree took seriously the New Life ideal of militarization. 
Contemporary observers, as in earlier years, praised scouting for instilling a “militaristic 
and patriotic (shangwu aiguo) spirit” in young people. What was new in 1936, with 
Japan’s takeover of Manchuria in 1931 and ongoing designs on China proper, was a 
sense of deep crisis over an impending second world war. In a combat situation, scouts 
would be ready to serve as vanguards of mass militias or even patrol the trenches.
60
 
Unwavering subservience to strictly delineated chains of demand thus emerged as a scout 
tradition eminently useful as the Nationalist state demanded unconditional loyalty from 
its subjects. The national jamboree accentuated the military-style discipline demanded in 
scouting through highly choreographed spectacles. The campsite’s location tapped on the 
Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, to which a cemetery for the National Revolutionary Army was 
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added only a year ago, as the locus of nationalistic devotion and revolutionary ritual.
61
 
While the mausoleum evoked the past of the national revolution, the rallying song sung 
by scouts alluded to its future. “We are young soldiers (shaonian bing) of the Three 
People’s Principles!” the lyrics declared; “the blue sky is high and the white sun is 
bright,” participants chanted in homage to the GMD colors beneath the monumental 
cream structure topped with dark blue tiles.
62
 Carnivalesque scenes where cheerful boys 
and girls waved colorful flags, danced around campfire, and reminisced freely with 
fellow provincials living in the capital often gave way to decidedly more solemn 
occasions. Dressed in the same khaki outfit, woolen cap, and black leather shoes, scouts 
found themselves in a National Day military review held at the Central Stadium. They 
woke up in the morning of October 10 to tanks and sentries that dotted the Purple 
Mountain. At nine o’clock, Chiang Kai-shek, in his full regalia as head of the Military 
Affairs Commission (Junshi weiyuanhui), appeared with his deputy He Yingqin (1890-
1987) and other officials to phalanxes of scouts in “Attention” (lezheng) position. The 
review was followed by an aerobatic performance in which smoke trails formed linked 
characters shi, a symbol of the “Double Ten” National Day. Added to the political ritual 
was a nationalistic statement of China’s sovereignty over Manchuria. To thunderous 
applause from the audience, which included foreign diplomats posted in Nanjing, entered 
a twenty-strong delegation from the four provinces which succeeded after the Mukden 
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Incident in 1931 to form the puppet-state of Manchukuo.
63
 While scouts admired the 
modernity and monumentality of the capital, they themselves were enlisted in a spectacle 
that highlighted the military preparedness and seamless unity between the Nationalist 
state and the citizenry. 
 
Figure 2. Scouts at the Central Stadium review ground. (Zou Jian, “Quanguo tongzijun di’er ci da 
jianyue,” Xiandai qingnian 5, no. 1 [1936]: 6.) 
 
 
 The success of GMD mass organizing was demonstrated by public association of 
the party’s flagship youth movement not with partisan interests and ideologies but 
patriotism and a path to personal refinement. Subsuming politics under the broader aims 
of cultivation resonated with participants long after the scouting movement was abolished 
in Communist China. A former scout, recalling a stint in the movement as a primary 
school pupil from 1933 to 1935, noted the increasing adulation for Chiang Kai-shek and 
the Three People’s Principles. But he wondered, reminiscing on his training more than 
half a century later in Mainland China, if there was something to be said about the 
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effectiveness of scouting in imparting skills and moral refinement on children.
64
 Others 
were less circumspect in praising how scouts broadened their horizons and afforded them 
experiences that the average youngster could only dream about, such as traveling beyond 
their hometown. Wei Ming, who joined the 240-strong Henan delegation to the 1936 
jamboree as a twelve-year-old, reckoned that the experience increased his knowledge, 
opened his eyes to the wider world and reinforced his patriotism.
65
 Another former scout, 
from the Wuchang-based school which allegedly founded the Chinese movement, 
remembered being introduced to the “amazing world” of industrial modernity on a tour of 
the United States in 1935, and another, a hiking trip to Italy in 1937. Song Bailian, along 
with a delegation led by Yan Jiaqi, marveled at American factories and schools, 
slaughterhouses in Chicago, and steel bridges in Los Angeles. He vividly recalled an 
incredible moment of internationalism when a pedestrian accosted him in New York 
upon seeing his Scouts of China badge, saying: “Hollo boy! This is a wonderful world, 
eh, you can do anything, if you want to, nobody will bother you.”66 Finally, the public 
identity of scouts – their distinct uniform and high spirits – was a novelty in itself.67 In all 
its excitement generated by scouting as spectacles and travel opportunities, it was easy to 
forget that the mass movement was cultivated and jealously guarded by the GMD to 
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serve specific political purposes, most noticeably to draw youths away from 
Communism. De Grazia observes that Mussolini’s mass organizations appealed to 
younger workers not by overt political indoctrination, let alone militarization, but by 
alluding to a better way of life distinct from that of either radical labor unionism or 
parochial local communities.
68
 The fond memories many former participants shared on 
their experience testified to the extent to which scouting under the GMD served the 
function of building consent among a young populace by co-opting them in a glamorous 
and skill-focused mode of social activism that reaffirmed, rather than disturbed, class 
hierarchy and state power. 
 Despite its partial success, scouting’s career as a state-led mass movement faced 
incredible challenges. Part of the difficulty lay less in the youth movement itself than in 
the limitations of Nationalist political power. In organizational terms, scouting never 
made much inroad into the peasantry. Like the GMD itself, scouting was a mostly urban 
phenomenon. Creative plans for expansion into the impoverished rural hinterland, 
including such radical ideas as doing away with expensive uniform and lowering the 
minimum number of members required to form a patrol from six to two, might have 
helped the movement spread inland.
69
 But increases in enrollment and extended 
geographical reach presented new problems. Like British colonial regimes in Africa, the 
Chinese state found it difficult to monopolize the iconic attire and rallies of scouting.
70
 
During the war of resistance against Japan, when the Nationalist state was struggling to 
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exert power over its new southwestern base, scout leaders reported seeing individuals not 
registered with the GMD-led general association dressed in scout uniform.
71
 In far-flung 
regions, even scout leaders overseen by the provincial education bureau could be 
unreliable. A scout organizer in northwestern Xinjiang province apparently managed to 
smuggle Communist propaganda into nothing less than the county-run primary school. 
Jiang Lianchun remembered singing as a ten-year-old in 1937 a song called “Anti-
Imperialist Scouts Rally,” humming lyrics like “we are soldiers of the New Democracy,” 
alluding to the Communist plea for an inter-party, interclass united front against Japan. 
He and his fellow-students pledged to fight for the nation’s liberation. It took another 
eight years before Jiang realized his scout leader’s not-too-subtle subversion of GMD 
ideological indoctrination by changing the lyrics of the “Scouts of China Rally.”72 
Scouting turned on its head confirmed Dai Jitao’s worst fear – infiltration in a state-
sponsored mass organization by political forces hostile to Nationalist rule. 
 In areas where scouting was more established, organizers struggled to inspire and 
sustain enthusiasm among a movement growing in numbers. Despite the very positive 
memory shared by some former scouts, responses from others were less effusive. After 
all, not many young people secured the opportunity to travel to Nanjing, let alone New 
York or Rome. For most, scouting was a mundane part of school life. Making scouting 
mandatory ensured an exponential growth in membership; enrollment increased almost 
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six folds in seven years from 86,536 in 1934 to a staggering 507,839 in late 1941.
73
 But 
an increase in numbers did not guarantee involvement of enhanced quality. Primary and 
junior high school pupils who did not take the scout promise seriously indulged in 
unworthy behaviors once they took their uniforms off and used every opportunity to 
excuse themselves from training activities or leave their troops altogether. Parents, 
meanwhile, were distrustful of scout leaders and the activities they designed.
74
 In 
addition, that the movement was ensconced firmly within individual schools meant that it 
was difficult for scouts, even if they so wished, to continue affiliation with a troop once 
they graduated. Zhang Xiaoliang claimed that otherwise committed youngsters who 
entered senior secondary schools, where scouting was no longer compulsory, or joined 
the workforce often had to involuntarily end their involvement in the organization. He 
urged his colleagues to broaden Scouts of China’s presence from schools to factories and 
retail shops. Just as teachers appreciated diligent and obedient students, employers would 
embrace the movement for molding “conscientious, improvement-seeking, hardship-
bearing shopkeepers and workers.”75 Rapid growth in the number of scouts across the 
nation was not matched by the movement’s increased and lasting influence in its 
constituents’ way of life.                     
  Aside from organizational weaknesses, ambiguity in goals and missions had both 
favorable and unfavorable consequences for scouting. Ideological vagueness lent room 
for diversity, but it also inspired intra-party contestation. Its missionary origins, military-
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like hierarchy and aesthetics continued to haunt scouting as activists like Zhang 
Xiaoliang edged the movement closer to the conservative revolutionary agenda of 
cultivating a voluntaristic, technically adept, and politically reliable labor force without 
fully jettisoning its apolitical, civilian self-image. Dai Jitao acknowledged Zhang’s 
concern in 1932 when he argued that tongzijun should not be taken literally to mean 
adolescents training to join military (jun) service. Rather than only preparing future 
party-state functionaries, scouting had a broader mandate to groom young people into 
decent, capable and “squeaky clean individuals” (gangan jingjing de ren) so that they 
would become honest officials, valorous soldiers, contented (anfen) peasants or commit 
to any other role in society.
76
 But observations by senior Nationalists did not silence 
those who believed that the goal of producing a nimble and obedient workforce was not 
aligned closely enough with the party-state’s. For some, the missionary background of 
scouting was an original sin that posed an unbridgeable gulf between scouting and the 
national revolution. Accusations flew that Yan Jialin was exploiting a compulsory part of 
the schooling process to proselytize for Christianity.
77
 The bourgeois internationalism of 
scouting, likewise, inspired suspicion. Its image as a “Westernized” (xiyang hua) and 
“patrician” (guizu hua) club lingered, as did doubts that the program worked to further 
foreign or even Anglo-Saxon interests. Amidst new initiatives from rival party factions to 
cultivate pro-GMD activists among students after the Mukden Incident of 1931, scouting 
was admonished to first, firmly serve China’s quest for “freedom and independence,” and 
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second, embrace military values in anticipation of war against Japan.
78
 He Yingqin, 
Chiang’s deputy in both the military and scout hierarchies, stressed in 1936 that moral 
and physical training of individuals helped enhance the entire nation’s organization, 
productivity and self-defense in the face of a foreign enemy. Drawing from German 
philosopher Johann Fichte’s prescriptions for nationalist resistance against French 
occupation, the general likened scouting to the nationalist philosopher’s privileging of 
military training in schools for gearing up popular resolve against an invading force.
79
 
General He’s association of Baden-Powell’s brainchild with German romantic 
nationalism defied the liberal cosmopolitan image scout activities like Zhang Zhongren 
and Zhang Xiaoliang had painted for their program, and spoke to latent disagreements 
within the party on how to incorporate scouting into the GMD’s conservative 
revolutionary project. 
 
Scouting and Total War 
 With the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the momentum 
swung decisively to the side of those who saw scouting as a means to prepare young 
activists for a vanguard role in a war that relied on total mobilization of civilians. 
Wartime service corps (zhanshi fuwu tuan), commissioned by the Scouts of China but 
mobilized outside the regular hierarchy of patrols and troops, sprung up in GMD-
controlled provinces like Sichuan, Yunnan and Shaanxi. Similar initiatives emerged in 
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more precarious locations like Zhejiang province and Shanghai. After the Battle of 
Shanghai of 1937, which resulted in the GMD’s and the Scouts of China’s retreat from 
the metropolis, the First Wartime Service Corps continued to operate out of the 
International Settlement. Its 2,027 members, aged between sixteen and thirty, 
accommodated refugees, serviced frontline troops, performed firefighting and first aid 
duties, and wielded a sophisticated propaganda campaign that targeted not only a 
domestic audience but also expatriate communities and observers abroad. Young men 
and a smaller number of young women took on functions commonly ascribed to militias. 
They delivered warm clothes and food to soldiers, maintained public order, and even 
gathered intelligence on the enemy. They deployed movie and radio to mobilize the 
populace in support of the nation’s resistance and broadcast tips on surviving air raids 
and containing infectious diseases.
80
 Appealing to the international clout of scouting, the 
Shanghai corps invited their foreign counterparts to join them in a “Junior League of 
Nations” and fight against “insensible militarists” and an “enemy of world culture.”81 
They were public diplomats in a time when international support of the Chongqing-based 
GMD state was still lukewarm. They projected the increasingly militant organization as a 
cosmopolitan endeavor on a quest for peace and friendship with foreigners, not a 
nationalistic campaign against particular peoples. After all, as a commissioner (weiyuan) 
of the Shanghai wartime corps observed, scouts in both Britain and Germany were 
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enlisted to play a part in “wartime work” (zhanshi gongzuo) during the Great War. This 
benign image received endorsements from scouts in Britain and India, not to mention the 




Figure 3. Scouts of China expressing camaraderie with its American counterpart. (Zhao 
Bangheng et al., ed., Kangzhan yu tongjun, 276.) 
 
 
 The Great War reference alluded unintentionally to the degree to which the GMD 
state counted upon civilians to run the war machine in China’s first total war. In terms of 
membership, the various wartime services corps were pale shadows of the scouting 
movement now headquartered in Chongqing. But corps members were committed 
volunteers who more resembled militia members than school children, putting to high 
relief the militant streak inherent to scouting. I will discuss the reconsolidation of the 
conservative revolution during the Second Sino-Japanese War in chapter four. For now, it 
suffices to stress that wartime work performed by scouts involved tasks that fell well 
under the purview of the state apparatus. Wartime service corps in Yunnan swept up 
popular outrage against the invading army by recalling “atrocities committed by Japanese 
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devils” in speeches, songs, and drama. They urged the masses to join military service, 
subscribe to war bonds and help finance the cash-strapped National Revolutionary Army. 
More significantly, deliberate efforts were made to deploy scouts in intelligence 
gathering operations. To identity Japanese infiltration into GMD-controlled areas, a select 
group of Yunnan service corps members listened to conversations in public areas, 
observed pedestrians’ demeanor and belongings, surveilled travelers, refugees and “local 
ruffians and itinerant hooligans” (dipi liumang).83 The call for young men and women to 
spy on their neighbors alarmed the Shanghai Municipal Council, which governed the 
embattled International Settlement until 1941. Scouts were arrested for interfering with 
the authority of the foreigner-run police force as the Shanghai wartime service corps, in 
turn, pleaded the enclave to afford its members greater room for maneuver.
84
 
 The coup de grâce that put to rest any illusions in the Scouts of China’s professed 
political neutrality came in 1940, when the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps 
overtook the movement. Founded in the spring of 1938, the Three People’s Principle 
Youth Corps was envisioned by Chiang Kai-shek as a mass organization that appealed to 
politically-minded young people disaffected by the intractable factional struggles within 
the GMD.
85
 It emerged amidst calls within the scouting community for a well-
coordinated hierarchy of bodies modeled on the Komsomol and Young Pioneers in the 
Soviet Union to rally young citizens around the Three People’s Principles.86 At a meeting 
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of the Standing Committee of the GMD Central Executive Committee on November 25, 
1940, the Youth Corps was given the mandate to work with all individuals under twenty 
five. In other words, despite objections from functionaries like Zhang Xiaoliang, scouting 
and the larger youth movement were relegated under a parent organization on which 
future generations of committed revolutionaries was counted.
87
 Three years later, the 
entire Scouts of China General Association was subsumed under the Youth Corps.
88
 Until 
the Youth Corps was disbanded in September 1947, scouts, like other youth activists, 
engaged in espionage and propaganda operations against the GMD’s nemeses during the 
war of resistance against Japan and subsequently the civil war against Communism. 
          From Dai’s musings on a non-materialist minsheng principle in the 1920s to the 
emergence of a total war society in the late 1930s, scouting was symptomatic of a distinct 
GMD approach to mass politics that aimed at weaving state-sanctioned practices into 
mass life. In its quest to secure popular consent, the state capitalized on the methods and 
image of scouting as a progressive training process that served not only the ruling party’s 
narrow ideological agenda but also the desire of the wider, albeit urban middle-class, 
public for self-improvement. The youth movement mediated GMD anti-communism, the 
conservative revolutionary agenda of beautifying and rationalizing everyday life, and 
individual needs. It was an eloquent expression of what Dai defined as the ultimate 
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meaning of the minsheng principle and of the national revolution: providing “beautiful 
and elegant enjoyment.”89 Even as its mission changed to comply with wartime priorities, 
the emphasis on making training an enjoyable experience remained. Activities for 
preparing scouts to conduct intelligence gathering, for example, saw children tracing 
beans “enemy spies” left as markers, making their own markers with tree branches, 
bricks and wire to guide comrades to specific destinations, and participating in 
remarkably realistic war games in which one group acted as the enemy army and the 
other played guerilla force.
90
 Such exercises were packaged as games that both answered 
to the needs of a nation at war and the innate values of scout education – learning by 
doing, teamwork, obeying orders, acquiring new skills, and having fun. This fusion of 
leisure management, moral cultivation, and growing militancy in scouting enjoyed ever 
greater currency as the GMD’s model of mass activism was leveraged to enlist the entire 
society, and not just youths from comfortable middle-class families, to fight a foreign 
enemy. 
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Mobilizing Hearts and Minds 
The Everyday in Revolution During the Resistance War 
 
 
 China’s eight-year resistance against Japanese invasion was the first time that all 
Chinese citizens, instead of just the military, were called upon by the state to defend the 
country against foreign invasion. The total war paradigm had posed tremendous 
challenges for the GMD regime, but had also opened opportunities for its conservative 
revolution. The advancing Japanese forces effectively robbed Chiang’s government of its 
base in the lower Yangzi region, forcing it to abandon Nationalist China’s economic and 
political centers like Shanghai and Nanjing for the interior. Yet, a common external 
enemy lent currency to the GMD’s vision of inter-class cooperation and singular devotion 
to the nation. In Chongqing, the GMD presided over a community of refugees who hailed 
from various regions that had fallen to the Japanese. Displaced from their traditional 
social networks and sympathetic to the nationalist cause, a society at war provided much 
potential for a mobilization program that demanded exclusive political loyalty and active 
participation of the populace. A politics and culture of total war expected citizens, at 
work and at play, to contribute consistently to the resistance. Each individual was 
expected to display the fidelity to authority and promptness to action required of scouts. 
In its further de-legitimization of class politics and micro-management of citizens’ lives, 
the GMD-led resistance program represented a radicalization of the conservative 
revolution. The wartime slogan “nation-building through the war of resistance” 




also harboring grand ambitious to perpetuate its ideological priorities beyond the 
immediate conflict against Japanese imperialism.           
 Barely had the Nationalist state established tenuous control over centrifugal 
provinces outside its coastal stronghold did the Japanese begin a series of military 
offensives against the loosely-knit republic. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 
1931 and invasion of Shanghai of 1932 provided occasions for a re-articulation of 
China’s diplomatic conundrum and justification of the GMD’s exceptional claim to 
ideological and political power over the rest of society. Writing for the GMD-run 
Shanghai Morning Post (Chenbao), Zhang Junmo (1893-1965), a Columbia-trained 
education official who had joined Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Alliance before the fall of 
the Qing, pleaded that the ever more threatening specter of subjugation to a foreign 
power rendered it imperative that the nation’s indigenous philosophical tradition be 
brought to bear in order to put an end to centuries of social decay. A Confucianized 
culture, as revived by Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, would not only deliver China 
from the current crisis with Japan. A traditional yet forward-looking political ethics 
would also cure deep-seated symptoms that had been hollowing out the people’s vitality 
for a long time: from easily observable problems like bureaucratic corruption and 
agrarian crisis to more amorphous trends like the collapse of campus discipline and the 
emergence of various heretical ideas (xieshuo).  Echoing Dai’s formulation on the 
dialectic between knowledge (zhi) and action (xing) and extending his party-as-machine 
metaphor, Zhang observed that the masses were like engineers on whom the smooth 
functioning of the state apparatus depended upon. The key to perfecting the “engineers’ 




moral precepts such as benevolence and a sense of shame. Strengthening Confucianized 
social mores would deflect criticisms of political authority and direct popular energy 
against foreign threats.
1
      
   Deep crises, be they socio-economic or military, were regular boosts for radical 
nationalist politics in twentieth-century China and beyond. At moments of great 
upheaval, the nation became the immanent locus of social meaning that must be defended 
at all costs. In several continents during the interwar period, ascendant regimes rode on 
the tide of populist sentiments to create new political elites who secured unprecedented 
social power. Historian Wolfgang Schivelbusch, in his bold work in comparative history, 
argued that there were many points of convergence between Hitler’s Nazism, Mussolini’s 
Fascism, and Roosevelt’s New Deal. Repressed by war against the Axis powers, and the 
subsequent Cold War tradition of associating fascism with Stalinism, the commonalities 
in motives and operation between the three interwar political projects have not been 
properly accounted for. Reeling from the pain of the Great Depression of 1929, many 
among Western societies – including those in the liberal center and social democratic left 
– placed hope in a post-liberal political order to provide economic stability and social 
coherence to the community. In place of laissez faire capitalism, a non-class specific 
socialism gained traction. The new regimes in Germany, Italy and the United States lent 
an aura of suppleness to nationalism with their monumental public work projects and 
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populist rhetoric that emphasized their nations’ unique identities, providing an illusion of 
equality free of class divisions and economic insecurities.
2
  
 Even though China was only at the periphery of the capitalist world system, it 
equally suffered in the economic crisis, which resulted in hostility towards the “free 
market” on the part of the GMD state and urban entrepreneurs that was no less 
pronounced than that in Western Europe and North America.
3
 Moreover, in China, as in 
Germany and Italy, anguish over frustrated nationalist ambitions fed into a more 
expansive reflection on the political and economic system in dominant world powers 
such as Britain and the United States. In his 1933 book Vitalism (Weisheng lun), 
mineralogist-turned-party theorist Chen Lifu attacked representative democracy as an 
outmoded and enervating form of political organization. He dismissed the congressional 
bickering between Democrats and Republicans in the United States as a gentrified form 
of tribalist warfare, chiding its inefficiency and corrosive effects on social life. He noted 
that the world had come to the realization that liberal economics and politics was 
outdated, and advocated that a conflict-free, cooperative society could only come with the 
enlightened autocracy of single-party state.
4
 Published by the GMD’s Central School of 
Politics, Vitalism, along with Dai Jitao’s The Philosophical Foundation of Sun Yat-
senism, was a core text deployed in training programs catered for cadres and re-education 
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institutions for political prisoners.
5
 China’s economic challenges served only to confirm 
the revolutionary elite’s exclusive grip onto state power as a matter of teleological 
providence.               
 In the Republican period, however, the crisis that put to its highest relief the 
urgency of a new collectivity was not economic but military. The Second Sino-Japanese 
War constituted China’s first total war in which modern industrial warfare entailed mass 
participation in a new form of social and cultural or aesthetic experience. Unlike previous 
conflicts in which combat was confined to frontline military forces, the entire society – 
its population, economy and culture – was mobilized to fight a common enemy. More 
than ever, national unity was sacralized and ideological discourses, particularly class 
warfare, that qualified the nation’s immanent integrity delegitimized. The GMD, 
operating under the doctrine of kangzhan jianguo, or “building the nation through the war 
of resistance,” was fully aware that the contingency of warfare had injected it with fresh 
moral and political capital to construct an efficient, fully sovereign polity in which 
economic production was carried out smoothly by a cohesive, class-free and spiritually 
immaculate population. By focusing on the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement, 
this chapter examines how a destructive war that forced the relocation of the Nationalist 
state and much of its political and intellectual classes to the interior paradoxically lent 
urgency and credence to the conservative revolution’s social vision. I demonstrate that 
the wartime state attempted to materialize in the quotidian the heretofore abstract, state-
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directed national culture, thereby rendering the GMD’s social engineering undertaking 
eminently comparable to the one imposed by the Shôwa fascist regime in Japan and its 
empire.  
 
Total War and Political Modernity                     
 Long before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, which officially marked the 
beginning of the eight-year formal conflict between China and Japan, GMD intellectuals 
had been anticipating a war the scale and scope of which the nation had never seen 
before. As early as 1927, Dai Jitao cited the need for “national mobilization” (guomin 
zong dongyuan) as one prime reason why political dissent must not be tolerated. While 
industrial and scientific prowess would be critical in China’s next international conflict, 
Confucius had ostensibly taught that the state should always prepare the common people 
for war.
6
 A Shanghai Morning Post editorial titled “The Meaning of National 
Mobilization,” published a few days after Zhang Mojun’s 1933 article, predicted boldly 
that the coming showdown against Japan would be a conflict fought mainly not by 
frontline soldiers but by entire populations. The editorial stated that since the Franco-
Prussian War, in which some 400,000 civilians were called upon to fight alongside the 
French army as members of the Garde Mobile, had rendered the concept of battle line 
and protocols of traditional warfare obsolete in a full-scale clash of rival citizenries. 
“Strategically it would be permissible,” the piece continued ominously, “to scorch the 
earth with fire and blast the enemies’ bodies into pieces.” A total war would immediately 
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blanket the entire society under the suffocating air of military maneuverings, relegate 
private economic production and consumption under state dirigisme, and put further 
limits on civil liberties.
7
 The editors’ projection of engagement with the nation’s human 
resources as the subject of combat added a new dimension to Zhang’s plea for spiritual 
construction (jingshen jianshe) under the leadership of a proto-wartime state.
8
 
 Shanghai Morning Post’s identification of the ever closer ties between mass 
politics and modern warfare shows that contributors were well abreast with the latest 
developments in interwar world politics, which saw the rise of dictatorial regimes around 
Europe. For the editorial collective, Hitler’s ascendency vindicated the success of a polity 
dictated by the middle class over representational democracy and proletarian 
internationalism. The Nazi’s rise to power was testament to Germany’s principled refusal 
to remain an “economic colony” of Britain and France, referring to the heavy indemnities 
imposed by the Versailles Treaty. The militancy of German and Italian fascism was a 
welcome expression of the resurgent ethnic spirit in nations emerging anew from the 
ashes of defeat.
9
 This fascination with the productive function of violence was a recurring 
fixture of twentieth-century politics of both the extreme rightwing and revolutionary 
leftwing varieties. The previous century, according to philosopher Alain Badiou, 
“unfolded under the paradigm of war.” Not only was there the belief, cutting across 
ideological divide, that a total or final war was needed to put an end on all other wars and 
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bring about perpetual peace; there was also the sense that epic violence would entail a 
political subject capable of overcoming the old order and creating a brave new world.
10
 
This cult of violence was no less a part of GMD political culture. Commentators and 
writers pondered on the place of homicide, an unmistakable crime according to the 
modern legal apparatus, in the nation’s spiritual essence while cadres toyed with using 
political assassination as a technology to discipline and energize the body politic.
11
 In a 
time of intense social turmoil, economic depression, and nationalistic fear over foreign 
colonization, an authoritarian state offering protection and stability by wielding its 
coercive power seemed to exude more promise than a tired and timid bureaucratic 
establishment detached from mass sentiments.  
The counter-intuitive union between mass violence and society-building brought 
realms of life that were previously considered insignificant personal habits under the 
purview of intellectuals, party cadres and government officials. Taking his cue from 
Talcott Parsons, sociologist Yasushi Yamamouchi argues that the mobilization system 
adopted by various Second World War belligerents created societies in which individuals 
were bound organically in the national community regardless of traditional class, ethnic 
and even family affiliations. Through wartime social policy, individual needs were 
provided for and their consumption practices regulated in an intricate network of power 
relations that Herbert Marcuse identified as totalitarianism. For Yamanouchi, The model 
of Parsons’s society-as-system was not so much Japan as New Deal America.12 In China, 
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the rationalization of routine activities began in 1934 with the New Life Movement, one 
core aim, as historian Margaret Clinton has revealed, was to militarize society in 
anticipation of an inevitable second world war.
13
 While the broad aims of the New Life 
Movement were subsumed under the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement (Guomin 
jingshen zong dongyuan yundong) in 1939, the latter held distinct features incidental to 
the GMD’s lose of its relatively industrialized coastal base and half-hearted reconciliation 
with the CCP as a nationalist ally. In light of Yamanouchi’s observation that the ideal of 
a hierarchal order in which exploitative social relations were disguised by an 
institutionalized illusion of equal citizenry survived the Second World War, the GMD’s 
conviction that the war of resistance was also a time to reinforce its nation-building 
agenda opened the possibility that spiritual mobilization could be made permanent even 
when China did not face an external enemy.
14
 Given the extended period of hostility 
between the Communists and Nationalists after the Second World War, the imprint of 
total war on the Chinese political experience can hardly be underestimated.  
 
Conceptualizing War Mobilization  
 Shanghai Morning Post editors’ interest in total war and spiritual mobilization in 
the early 1930s must not be dismissed as topical speculations of random journalists. The 
daily, led by Pan Gongzhan (1894-1975) and Tao Baichuan (1903-2002), was one of the 
nineteen 1930s publications affiliated with the CC clique, the nomenclature of which was 
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derived from leaders Chen Lifu and his elder brother Guofu (1892-1951).
15
 The powerful 
pro-Chiang faction presided over an elaborate network of clandestine and open 
organizations that exhibited the hue of European-style fascism, mirroring the 
organizational mode and ideological tenor of its more well-known intra-party rival 
Lixingshe/Blue Shirt Society.
16
 According to historian Kikuchi Kazukata, the CC clique 
traced its roots to the GMD radical right and held appeal to the urban petit-bourgeoisie 
based in education institutions, the party bureaucracy, and GMD-controlled labor unions, 
particularly among those who had experienced first-hand the deepening social crises in 
the West as students at European and American universities. The faction, which brought 
together 80% of lower-level state bureaucrats and 50 members of the 180-strong GMD 
central executive committee members in 1936, promoted faith in “one doctrine, one 
party” and promised to realize the substance of Three People’s Principles with fascist 
tools. During the war of resistance, clique members conducted espionage activities in 
Japanese occupied territories, organized pro-China activists in Japan and its colonies, and 
even cooperated with the British intelligence service in Singapore, Burma and India.
17
 
The CC clique was a full-fledged network that enjoyed representation in the security 
apparatus, the civil service and civil society.   
 The faction made an equally important contribution to the ideological praxis of 
the wartime state. Chen Lifu served as education minister from 1938 to 1944, ensuring 
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that the CC clique exert a significant role in spiritual mobilization.
18
 Shanghai Morning 
Post’s Tao took charge of the two major party organs, the Central Weekly (Zhongyang 
zhoukan) in 1941 and the Central Daily (Zhongyang ribao) in 1942. As editor, he 
recruited literary celebrities like Zhu Guangqian, on whom the next chapter will focus, to 
write for the party-run press. Tao’s colleague Pan headed the state’s censorship board 
targeting print materials from 1943 to 1945. The ideological predilections articulated in 
Shanghai Morning Post and the organized political force it represented were inseparable 
from the politically exclusivist and stridently anti-communist tenor of the national 
spiritual mobilization campaign. 
 Inaugurated two years after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, China’s spiritual 
mobilization campaign was the culmination of initiatives aimed at suppressing social 
strife and removing threats to political disunity.  On March 12, 1939, the National 
Military Council announced the Guiding Principles and Implementation Measures for 
National Spiritual Mobilization. The document was first announced, without bothering 
with a proper motion, by Chiang Kai-shek at the Fifth Plenum of the Fifth GMD Central 
Executive Committee in January 1939.
19
 It listed the “common purposes” of the conflict-
ridden nation and the items which made up its “common morality and common 
conviction.” Under the “supremacy of the state and the nation” (guojia zhishang minzu 
zhishang) principle, citizens were exhorted to “revolutionize” and “thoroughly improve” 
their collective consciousness, and maintain steadfast loyalty to the government and the 
Three People’s Principles. The accompanying “Citizen Convention and Pledge” (Guomin 
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gongyue shici), which was to be read out loud at monthly meetings held at individual 
neighborhoods and workplaces, offered allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek himself.  
Exclusive loyalty to the nation, as Shanghai Morning Post had warned, entailed 
curtailment of political freedom. In a thinly veiled reference to communism, the 
document complained that public opinions were still like the messy branches of an 
otherwise strongly rooted tree. There was no place in a healthy “plant” for “political 
fantasizing” (kongxiang lun) that advocated allegiance to anything other than the nation. 
China’s popular will would have to obey the Nationalist state’s diktat. Production and 
consumption routines had to be re-jigged to meet the strenuous demands of the wartime 
economy. In the longer terms, renewed state activism would re-balance private and public 
ownership, keeping China more in tune with the distrust of unregulated capitalism 
inherent to Sun’s principle of people’s livelihood.20 Outlining an expansive program that 
involved the entire cross-section of society from soldiers at the top to rural baojia 
communities at the grassroots, the document envisioned aims that ranged from getting 
people to get up early and eliminating wasteful consumption to unifying cultural 
production, to uprooting corruption. In this sense, Guiding Principles was one definitive 
testament to the immense hope, prevalent in China and beyond, placed on the state that 
promised to rally behind a new, co-operative nation in which hierarchical but harmonious 
relations replaced incessant political and economic strife. 
 The concept of spiritual mobilization, like the New Life Movement, drew 
references from supposedly primordial Chinese values that predated even Confucius. But 
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the crafters of the GMD’s latest social engineering initiative did not shy away from the 
fact that their project was an exercise in shoring up China’s modern nationalism against 
rival nationalist aspirations. Guiding Principles laid claim to loyalty (zhong) and filial 
piety (xiao), values integral to the reproduction of China’s peasant society. Whereas the 
ancestral cult had long been part of imperial state ideology and local culture, Sun Yat-
sen’s revolutionary doctrine required that the modern nation-state, rather than one’s clan, 
be the recipient of patrimonial sentiments expressed by citizen-subjects.
21
 The embattled 
nation was elevated to the apogee of one’s ancestral lineage, a sacralized object of 
devotion equipped with hierarchical social positions, decrees and strict discipline. 
Evoking the history of Han resistance against alien threats – including such “pre-
emptive” expeditions as the subjection of Uyghurs, Tibetans, ethnic groups in the 
southwestern frontier under imperial Chinese suzerainty during the Han and Tang periods 
– Pan Gongzhan observed that a spirit of sacrifice had been the nation’s best guarantor 
against foreign conquest.  
 Yet, the party propagandist was convinced that the exemplary character of such 
heroic figures as the Southern Song general Yue Fei (1103-1142) and Ming loyalist 
Koxinga (1624-1662) was not good enough for a modern nation-state. For ancient 
heroes’ indomitable courage in the face of invading enemies was derived from loyalty 
and fidelity to the ruling house only. A centrally-directed campaign of mass mobilization 
was thus needed to transform this individual chivalric sentiment into popular militaristic 
devotion to the larger nation.
22
 Chiang might have attributed absolute power to himself, 
                                                 
21
 Ibid., 586-587. 
 
22
 Pan Gongzhan, “Guomin jingshen zong dongyuan yu zhongxiao de minzu daode” [National Spiritual 




but he aspired to be a plebiscitary autocrat and not a dynastic ruler. The l’état, c’est moi 
principle of Louis XIV, Chen Lifu quipped in 1940, no longer held in a twentieth-century 
republic.
23
 The Generalissimo was, to read Chen’s analogy against its grain, a Louis 
Bonaparte, the “patriarchal benefactor of all classes.”24 The state was not an imposed 
power from which the masses was alienated but the highest embodiment of popular 
sovereignty. Rather than a machine to maintain social order, the state was an idea, the 
“realization of our loyalty to the nation.”25  
 In a rhetorical move that spanned across millennia, Chen warned that if China was 
to avoid the fate of the vanquished Ming court in the seventeenth century or occupied 
Czechoslovakia today, it needed to transform the spiritual certitude of such mythical 
figures as Yu the Great and Tang of Shang (circa 1675-1646 BCE) into a sentiment 
compelling the entire national collective into action. To drive home his plea for action, 
Chen the scientist added a new spin to Newton’s second law of motion, which states that 
force is a function of mass and acceleration. A mass organization’s prowess thus 
depended directly on the correlation between its size and its propensity to pursue unified 
purposes.
26
 Inasmuch as the GMD’s spiritual mobilization initiative was premised on a 
curious mishmash of mythology, history and science, it belied the regime’s investment in 
the nation-building project as a hedge against being overwhelmed by a conflict that 
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placed as much emphasis on cutting-edge military hardware as on the technology of 
propaganda and mass organization.  
 The melding of military priorities and the state’s enhanced role in social life with 
the nationalist investment in a homogenous people explained why the supposedly 
destructive war against Japan was paradoxically construed as a step towards national 
reconstruction. In fact, with the New Life Movement incorporated into a fresh campaign, 
party ideologues suggested that spiritual mobilization was more than an unfortunate 
short-term measure introduced under extraordinary circumstances. Speaking as director-
general of the women’s organization, Wartime Child Welfare Protection Association, in 
1941, Chiang’s wife Song Meiling compared the involvement of Chinese women in the 
War of Resistance to the extensive mobilization of American women during the First 
World War. China’s ongoing total war, which Madame Chiang glossed as quanneng 
zhanzheng, offered an opportunity for female citizens to hone their “spiritual prowess” 
(jingshen liliang) and join the resistance effort shoulders to shoulders with their male 
compatriots as laborers, producers, and fighters. The emergence of a home front, 
shattering the sequestered domestic life of women into pieces, had advanced the feminist 
cause and China’s modernization process.  
 While Song thought that wartime mobilization was a timely boost to China’s 
evolving modernity, others were already looking forward to a future postwar order in 
which control and militarization of citizen’s everyday life would continue unabated. Ru 
Chunpu, a Lixingshe member, argued that the common purposes as stated in the Guiding 
Principles – supremacy of the state and the nation, prioritization of the military and 




(yizhi jizhong liliang jizhong) – formed the basis of national sovereignty that ought to be 
retained after the war. Commitment to national unity was not a matter of transient 
alliance between disparate forces and agendas but a principle immanent to collective life. 
As international relations was based on the presumed equality between states acting as 
the agents of their respective peoples or nations, any political ideology that challenged 
this arrangement or posited transition to a world without nation-states would remain 
illegitimate after the war. In a world where even the Soviet Union was embracing 
nationalism and national defense, blind faith in internationalism could only result in 
capitulation to foreign invaders. Conflating communist internationalism with rightwing 
Pan-Asianism, Ru illustrated the danger of inadequate nationalist commitment by citing 
the currency Japan’s Pan-Asianist ideology enjoyed among Chinese collaborationists, 
most notably the recently disgraced former premier Wang Jingwei. A formidable military 
force and a mobilized population must be constantly prepared to counter ideological 
heresies threatening the polity’s coherence.27 A permanent military-first policy might not 
have appealed to Chen Lifu and the CC clique, whose influence was felt primarily within 
the civilian bureaucracy. But he definitely did not object to drilling a militarist sense of 
discipline and honor to the wider populace. In fact, while military mobilization was 
expected to serve only the needs of war, spiritual mobilization should be pursued with 
determination beyond victory over Japan.
28
 The suspension of normal life, thanks to the 
                                                 
27
 Ru Chunpu, “Chedi jiuzheng guanyu jingshen zong dongyuan gongtong mubiao de wujie” [Fully rectify 
misconceptions concerning the common purposes of spiritual general mobilization], Zhongyang zhoukan 1, 
nos. 39-40 (n.d.): 15-16.   
 
28





Second Sino-Japanese War, was a blessing in disguise since it lent credence to the radical 
conservative claim to the nation’s future.                
 Another way in which the resistance war worked to Chongqing’s favor was the 
universal, if grudging, acceptance within China of GMD rule. One critical difference 
between the Nationalist state at total war and its rightwing counterparts in other countries 
was that the former had to reconcile with the CCP’s stubborn presence. As a result of the 
Xi’an Incident in late 1936, Chiang was forced into a common front with his internal 
nemesis against further intrusion by advancing Japanese militarists. The Second United 
Front, which technically lasted until 1946, was extremely volatile and filled with political 
intrigues and clashes between Nationalist forces and the Yan’an-based Communist 
movement. Yet, the half-hearted alliance accorded Chiang for the first time unquestioned 
legitimacy as the rightful successor of the national revolution. Even as frictions between 
the two parties began as early as 1938, the CCP had prized patriotism and national unity 
under Mao Zedong’s New Democracy doctrine. Instead of calling for class warfare and 
an end to GMD rule, the Communists carried out electoral reforms along liberal 
democratic lines, rationalized the bureaucracy by adopting meritocratic principles, and 
actively courted the local landed elite. Rather than Marxism, the CCP traced the 
ideological roots of their program to the Three People’s Principles, implicitly challenging 
Chiang’s claim as the true successor of Sun Yat-sen’s national revolution.29 The CCP’s 
political flexibility and willingness to privilege the nationalist agenda defined its 
qualified support for general spiritual mobilization. An October 1940 list revealed that 
Communists Zhou Enlai (1898-1976) and Guo Moruo (1892-1978), as officials at the 
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political training board of the all-powerful Military Affairs Commission, served as 
members of the spiritual mobilization campaign association planning committee. Their 
colleagues included such GMD stalwarts as Pan Gongzhan and activists from minor 
political parties like Zhang Junmai (1886-1969). They list also included non-partisan 
figures who were nonetheless sympathetic to the Nationalist cause such as Buddhist 




 The Communists, reflecting their overall relationship with their senior partner, 
maintained a delicate distance from the GMD’s monopoly on mass mobilization. They 
had to thread a thin line between challenging the Nationalist plea for exclusive devotion 
to the Leader and playing into the claim that Communists valued partisan over national 
interests. One result of the CCP’s precarious position within the body politic was a 
decisive shift away from class politics. Chen Boda (1904-1989), Mao Zedong’s secretary, 
wrote in 1939 that the laboring masses made up over 90% of the Chinese nation, a 
government that claimed to uphold the supremacy of the state and the nation must not act 
against the interests of their agent, the Communist Party. Citing Chiang’s speech at the 
launching ceremony of the spiritual mobilization campaign, Chen adeptly fused the 
Generalissimo’s call for the creation of a new zeitgeist cleansed of old selfish habits and 
Lenin’s faith in Third World nationalism, observing that China was set to emerge from 
the current crisis as an advanced civilization.
31
 Yet, while asserting the politically 
                                                 
30
 “Guomin jingshen zong dongyuan hui sheji weiyuan yilan” [List of planning committee members at the 
National Spiritual Mobilization Association], Jingshen dongyuan, no. 3 (1940): 183. 
 
31
 Chiang’s speech, delivered in Chongqing on the May Day of 1939, was “Chujiu buxin gemian xixin” 






advanced nature of the Chinese proletariat, the Communist theorist was adamant that 
class struggle had no place in a time when national survival was at stake. Echoing the 
GMD’s definition of military resistance as a total war and policy of prioritizing the 
military, Chen implored his compatriots to sacrifice their own political and economic 
interests and contribute to the nation’s defense. Any action that intensified tensions 
among the people, including class warfare, was undesirable under the paramount goal of 
military victory. Instead of pushing for traditional communist policies, Yan’an undertook 
a social democratic reform program to ensure that workers were employed and peasants 
had land to till without jeopardizing the institution of private property. The Communists 
advocated national independence and promised greater civil and political liberties. At one 
point, Chen endorsed the coordinating role of a corporatist state, stating, as did many 
GMD cadres, that the vision of universal harmony (datong) sought an end to the anarchy 
of capitalist economics by rationalizing production under central planning.
32
 The 
proletariat was denied its vanguard position in the defeat of bourgeois rule and capitalist 
social relations. Instead, the working class was subsumed under a homogenous “people,” 
its political subjectivity bound to the sometimes incompatible agenda of nationalism. The 
scaling back of the Communists’ core ideological appeals lent legitimacy to the 
Nationalist demand for absolute loyalty to the nation-state, even as neither party was 
willing to cede too much ground to its competitor. Indeed, just as the spiritual 
mobilization campaign entered its final stage of planning in early 1939, the GMD’s 
Central Executive Committee had once again defined the CCP as an alien or heretical 
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party (yidang) and adopted measures that restricted the latter’s activities in areas 
controlled by Chongqing.
33
      
 
Spiritual Mobilization in Action 
 Deeply ingrained anti-communism and an assumed mandate to lead the entire 
nation toward victory over foreign invasion conditioned the GMD’s centralized, 
commandeering approach to spiritual mobilization. Not unlike the New Life Movement, 
the wartime state sought to assert full command over the nation’s human and material 
resources by restricting political expression, limiting conspicuous consumption, and 
rationalizing citizens’ daily routines. Given the similarities between the spiritual 
mobilization campaign and the movement it incorporated, party officials had to rebuke 
views that the two campaigns were essentially the same. GMD propaganda chief Ye 
Chucang (1887-1946) explained at a seminar for intellectuals a few days after the 
Guiding Principles was proclaimed in March 1939 that wartime mobilization implied a 
different dynamic between state and society than the New Life Movement. National 
spiritual mobilization, he argued, 
will be executed from the top down and, simultaneously, initiated by the people 
from the ground up. The movement is launched by the Nationalist government for 
the purpose of nation-building through the resistance war and is inherently 
interventionist. The New Life Movement, on the other hand, was launched by a 
civil organization (jituan), namely the New Life Movement Promotion 
Association headed by Generalissimo Chiang. The New Life Movement is more 
exhortative than coercive, while spiritual mobilization will rely as much on 
exhortation as on coercion.
34
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The suggestion that the state played an auxiliary role in the New Life Movement was at 
best an understatement. The New Life Movement, which began in 1934 as a means to 
win over the rural population in the formerly Communist-controlled Jiangxi province, 
proliferated across the country thanks to aggressive promotion by provincial officials and 
the coordinated efforts of military police, police and the Scouts of China.
35
 Ye’s remark 
was illuminating nonetheless for it indicated what the GMD had long identified as its 
core weakness in managing social movements, i.e. the failure to exert top-down control. 
Indeed, the tendency to favor party-state coordination over limited autonomy was 
obvious in how scouting was gradually incorporated into the Three People’s Principles 
Youth Corps in 1940.         
 Wartime contingency presented the GMD the opportunity to reassert total 
command over the masses, even as measures introduced in the mid-1930s were carried 
forward to the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement. The preference for state 
coercion was well displayed in Chiang’s speech on the new year’s day of 1940. “National 
spiritual mobilization,” the Generalissimo observed, “should as a matter of course be a 
spontaneous movement.” But had the nation, Chiang demanded of his audience, 
genuinely uphold the Three People’s Principles as a faith that unified the people? Was 
everyone in society committed to national salvation? Had the common purposes as listed 
in the Guiding Principles pervaded the entire populace?
36
 As long as the ideological 
allegiances and everyday commitments of the people had yet to converge exclusively on 
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the GMD’s military campaign, a mass movement of unprecedented scope and scale could 
not be led by anyone other than the state. Spiritual mobilization, commensurate with its 
ambiguous nomenclature, was envisioned as an umbrella movement branching out to 
include drives to ban frivolous entertainment, restrict import of luxury products, enhance 
productive capacity, strengthen internal propaganda, fight corruption, encourage 
donations of possessions to the country, eradicate media opinions hostile to the state, and 
promote hygienic practices and physical training.
37
 
 In organizational terms, spiritual mobilization was coordinated by a body that 
derived its authority from the GMD’s Supreme National Defense Council (Guofang 
zuigao weiyuanhui), a top party organ that operated from 1939 to 1947 with a view to 
concentrating military and government power in the party’s hands. The appendix to the 
Guiding Principles provided for a National Spiritual Mobilization Association headed by 
Chiang. The new national body gathered together the Executive Yuan president, the 
GMD general secretary, the general secretary of the Supreme National Defense Council, 
the director general of the New Life Movement Association, the ministers of education 
and economic affairs, the chairman of the Military Affairs Commission political training 
board, and heads of the ruling party’s organization, social affairs, propaganda, economics 
and education departments. At the sub-national level, spiritual mobilization was to be 
conducted through a multitude of GMD-supervised organizations. Provinces were 
instructed to set up regional associations led by local notables and current New Life 
Movement officials within one month, with the party secretary, magistrate, and high 
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school principals of each county in attendance at their inaugural meetings.
38
 Both state 
and party apparatuses were assigned specific tasks in the larger scheme of spiritual 
mobilization. The interior ministry and the police were responsible for clamping down 
improper entertainment; the economic affairs ministry took charge of resource saving, 
enhancement of production efficiency, and promotion of national goods; the education 
ministry, working with the recently founded Three People’s Principle Youth Corps, was 
to make sure that teachers and students form the vanguard of mobilization.
39
  
 Party cadres, as custodians of the national revolution, were to take as much of a 
leading role in the movement as government and military officials.
40
 The GMD social 
affairs department, for example, was tasked with rallying leaders from the various sectors 
and initiating “concrete campaigns” (shiji yundong). Even the overseas affairs department 
was enlisted to engage diasporic Chinese communities in supporting their Nationalist 
homeland.
41
 The Chinese consulate in New York, along with the Chinese Consolidated 
Benevolent Association (Zhonghua gongsuo), held mass rallies in June 1939 where 
participants bowed in front of Sun Yat-sen’s portrait and pledged support for the 
Nationalists’ resistance war. Overseas GMD branches, like their domestic counterparts, 
held regular assemblies in Penang and Singapore.
42
 As far as Brazil, where the rightwing 
regime under Getúlio Vargas professed neutrality vis-à-vis the Axis powers, spiritual 
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mobilization activities were reported in October 1939 to be taking place underground.
43
 
Both domestically and abroad, through a combination of persuasion and raw coercion, the 
party-state would work to foster seamless synergy among communities and classes in 
creating a lifestyle which befitted the total war ideals of political homogeneity and an 
altruistic, dynamic people. 
               
Towards a New Wartime Culture 
 The heavy-handed execution of spiritual mobilization coupled with the fear that 
national cohesion would be perverted by ideological strife and debauch popular habits 
defined the movement’s emphasis on tackling everyday aesthetic experiences such as 
physical culture, hygiene practices, consumption behaviors and vernacular artistic 
expressions. The determination to command not only institutions and enterprises but also 
the mundane but mercurial habits of a war-stressed, diverse population put China in 
league with other societies working to rally their entire peoples behind grand military 
strategies. Apparently insignificant everyday matters from food and fashion to shopping 
and sports were, as historian Maureen Healy put it, “refracted” under the lens of total war 
and parachuted within the purview of public authority.
44
 The Guiding Principles made 
the connection between national strength and everyday life succinctly thus: “Life is the 
root (genben) of spirit; if life lacks rationality, spirit lacks vitality and wholesomeness.”45 
Meticulous attention on the quotidian was reminiscent of the importance Dai Jitao and Li 
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Shizeng attached to the transformation of popular social life, rather than the simple 
usurpation of state power, as the ultimate revolutionary goal back in the late 1920s. But 
there is no doubt that Japanese invasion had provided a new layer of meaning and 
urgency to the GMD’s attempt at regulating the minutiae details of personal routines. If 
more extreme elements in the GMD conceived the New Life Movement as preparation 
for a yet-to-happen second world war, wartime spiritual mobilization codified the ideal of 
militarized citizenry as the unassailable means for China to overcome Japan.
46
  
 Despite the conflicting military interests and putative ideological differences 
between Western-supported China and the Axis powers, there were striking parallels 
between these societies in the ways they carried out wartime mobilization.  Rather than 
looking to the United States for models on how to engage the masses, Nationalist 
officials and intellectuals were more likely to turn to enemies like Germany and 
particularly Japan. Nationalist intellectuals cited Erich Ludendorff, a decorated Second 
Reich general who helped engineer Adolf Hitler’s abortive 1923 coup against the Weimer 
Republic, as an important inspiration for the spiritual mobilization movement. Aside 
from Ludendorff’s pronouncements on the supremacy of military in the body politic and 
the use of posters and radio broadcast to encourage energetic participation in mass 
warfare, bureaucrat Hu Menghua (1903-1983), who led an earlier career as a conservative 
literary critic, was fascinated by the esoteric, anti-Christian strategist’s musings on deity 
and the German national psyche. Germans, as per Hu’s reading of Ludendorff, were 
graced with a material sense of God which lent the nation a concrete basis for spiritual 
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 Hu observed that like China through much of its history, religious and moral 
values in Germany did not constitute an abstract sphere of occult spirituality, but in fact 
pervaded the secular life of the Nordic people. They inspired healthy animosity against 
foreign enemies, bolstered popular concern for the nation’s fragile existence, and 
sustained a willed vigor and the emphasis of bodily strength among the population. The 
Nationalist state must reclaim the “materiality” of traditional virtues by undertaking 
“spiritual transformation” (jingshen de gaizao) and intervening in the quotidian morals, 
habits, thoughts and aspirations of its subjects.
48
  
 The identification of indomitable mass will as the only weapon that China could 
hope to wield in order to compensate for its backward military hardware also explained 
why Nationalist leaders continued to hold their arch-enemy Japan in such high regard. To 
the party elite, many of whom had experienced the country first-hand as students, the 
Japanese people encapsulated the ideals of order, hierarchy and chivalry that seemed to 
forever elude poverty-stricken China. In mid-March 1940, impoverished urbanites, 
dissatisfied with the rocketing price of the grain, looted rice merchants and banks in the 
southwestern city of Chengdu.
49
 Rather than attributing the incident to natural disasters or 
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economic mismanagement, Chiang pointed his finger at China’s weak nationalistic 
education in comparison with Japan’s. In a banquet the Generalissimo hosted for 
educators in March 1940, Chiang opined that Japan had taken to heart ancient holistic 
ideals that put equal emphasis on moral rectitude, bodily strength and aesthetic creativity, 
thus producing citizens that were more virile than the Chinese. He called for an education 
experience that resonated with students’ everyday life (richang shenghuo) and cultivated 
a “benevolent concern for all things” (ren’ai xiwu), including animals and plants.50 What 
Chiang characterized as Japan’s creative adaptation of “Six Arts” (liuyi) education was in 
fact of much more recent vintage than the Confucianism from which it supposedly 
originated. Japan’s focus on proper manners, calisthenics and martial arts in the schooling 
process was inseparable from the tenet that citizens, constituting the human resources of 
the state, had the responsibility to maintain good physical and mental health. Introduced 
in Japan and its colonies in earnest after the Mukden (1931) and Marco Polo Bridge 
(1937) incidents, these more subtle strategies of home front management was often the 
overlooked side of the dirigist, politically repressive turn of the Shôwa state.
51
                        
 While Chiang was merely making an observation on Japan’s strength and 
couched it in terms of an indigenous social engineering tradition waiting to be 
resurrected, his party colleagues were more particular in their admiration for Japan’s 
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mobilization of its people’s physical and spiritual capacities since the outbreak of the 
Sino-Japanese War. Ju Zheng (1876-1951), who headed the Nationalist government’s 
judicial branch, suggested plainly that China should adopt Japan’s extensive system of 
fitness tests and medical examinations to disqualify effete citizens from government 
employment, secondary and higher education and even marriages. Making the eugenicist 
connection between individual citizens’ health and the nation’s, Ju argued those who 
were deemed physically unfit or, worse, contracted venereal diseases, should be 
eliminated (taotai). The Judicial Yuan president felt that wartime mobilization “would 
become no more than a scrap of paper” (chengwei juwen) if unfit party cadres, 
government officials, university and high school students were allowed to remain in their 
positions.
52
 The Japanese-educated jurist was no doubt following with interest Tokyo’s 
effort at stepping up its hygienic regime that, beginning from May 1938, brought together 
prefectural and municipal governments, the police, and the newly established, army-
initiated Ministry of Welfare. Through annual week-long campaigns of sports carnivals, 
public talks, film screenings, and award programs, the state drove home the importance 
of regular exercises, nutrition, public morality, and preventing tuberculosis and sexually 
transmitted diseases. Personal health came to be touted as a patriotic duty, and those who 
suffered from illnesses and disabilities could be stripped of their citizenship rights. These 
public health campaigns constituted part of Japan’s own National Spiritual Mobilization 
Movement (kokumin seishin sôdôin undô), which, launched in August 1937, shared the 
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 Across East Asia, aesthetic sensibilities, political organization, and social mores 
were remolded under the total war paradigm. Chinese spiritual mobilization thus shared 
more than nomenclature with its Japanese counterpart. The Second Sino-Japanese War 
spurred both China and Japan, including the latter’s colonies and puppet states, to step up 
transforming industries, marshaling social resources, and mobilizing national identities.
54
  
More than control over enterprises and social organizations, a new regime of affective 
and visual experiences took shape. Military uniformity and clockwork efficiency now 
pervaded state management of human bodies and what used to be regarded as citizens’ 
free time, particularly that of young people who formed the backbone of the two warring 
nation-states. In Japanese colonies like Korea and Taiwan, spiritual mobilization entailed 
promoting mass calisthenics, hiking, youth corps and a strict work-and-rest regiment in 
schools and workplaces. Imperial subjects were expected to participate in anthem-singing 
and Emperor-worshipping, speak only Japanese, accumulate savings and restrain from 
indulging in cosmetics, alcohol and even white rice.
55
 Ju’s proposal for a certification 
system to ensure that newly-weds and high school students were healthy was not adopted. 
Yet, his conviction that the state needed to micro-manage citizens’ routines struck a 
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chord with cadres whose cult of productivity forged an indissoluble link between physical 
prowess, ideological conformity and singular devotion to the war cause.  
 These combined imperatives were well articulated at the National Spiritual 
Mobilization movement’s launching ceremony, which took place in Chongqing on May 
Day evening. Party cadres, government officials, military officers, workers, peasants, 
merchants, youths, and women participated in what the popular pictorial Young 
Companion (Liangyou huabao) described as an unprecedented torch parade (kongqian zhi 
huoju da youxing). Reported numbers of participants ranged from 3,000 to several 
hundred thousand.
56
 Before the mass performance, President Lin Sen (1868-1943) urged 
workers to avoid labor disputes and understand the “true meaning” of May Day – 
cooperation between capitalists and workers in the common cause of furthering 
productivity. Chiang, set against the monumental spectacle of light, music and precise 
procession, lambasted the decadent, unruly aesthetics of dancing bodies. Referring 
specifically to the foreign concessions of Shanghai, Tianjin and Hankou, he urged young 
people to stop loitering around in cabaret halls and devote their energy to labor, a 
depoliticized category under which Lin relegated both workers and their employers.
57
 
Speech after speech delivered at mandated citizens’ monthly assemblies (guomin yuehui) 
held across “free” China extolled the virtues of an austere, disciplined factory-floor 
lifestyle stripped of Western, consumerist indulgences.  
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Figure 4. Pictures of the National Spiritual Mobilization Campaign launching ceremony on May 
1, 1939 and pledge-taking ceremonies where participants affirmed their loyalty towards Chiang 
Kai-shek. Ceremonies took place in Chongqing, Xi’an, Guangdong province and Hong Kong. 
(Liangyou huabao, no. 143 [1939]: 4.) 
 
 
 At the June 1939 assembly for cadres from the GMD social affairs department, 
associate director Ma Chaojun (1886-1977) observed that China’s average life 
expectancy had fallen from 34 to 32 years of age. He attributed this alarming 
development to how the people’s vitality was being drained by unproductive 
entertainment like card games and mahjong. If instead every citizen was to rise up at six 
in the morning and spend two extra hours on productive labor, the benefit to the nation 




after offering his own spiritually rejuvenating routine for emulation: get up at 5:30 in the 
morning, drink a cup of plain water or water with salt to cleanse the digestive system, and 
then empty one’s bowel in the washroom.58 Frivolous use of one’s free time, especially 
when combined with habits associated with treaty-port cosmopolitanism, was now seen 
as a disease that literally threatened the nation’s health and hence the resistance effort. 
 With the dislocation and the inland migration of refugees from the Japanese-
occupied northern and eastern regions, state officials found to their dismay that maligned 
urban indulgences were spreading to Chongqing. A woman who spent her high school 
years in the wartime capital was fascinated by how the city was transformed from a 
remote backwater in the early 1930s to a “cultured” place of ballroom dancing, revealing 
cheongsam and stylish pantyhose thanks to better transport connections, relocated 
universities, and refugees who fled from the coast.
59
 For cadres involved in spiritual 
mobilization, the arrival of consumer modernity was not a salutary development. Zhang 
Qun (1889-1990), the Military Affairs Commission general secretary, complained in the 
official organ of the spiritual mobilization movement that “even though Chongqing had 
yet to sport amenities typical of modern urban life, it had already been infested with 
subpar urban habits like opium-smoking, gambling, non-observance of punctuality and 
hygienic prescriptions.” He warned that if peasants in the vicinities were to adopt a 
similarly lax attitude towards time, they could fail to heed nature’s rhythm and miss 
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farming seasons, putting into jeopardy the already strained food supply.
60
 As a testament 
to the premium the state put in punctuality, a clock tower named the Spiritual Fortress 
(Jingshen baolei) was erected in March 1940 overlooking Chongqing’s rapidly evolving 
urban space.
61
 Citizens were told that “saving” meant calibrating the use of not only 
material sources but also time, as labor time was simultaneously a source of value as 
realized in production and an immanent feature of the nation’s collective strength.  
 The Guiding Principles committed the state to redressing China’s debauch life of 
intoxicated reveries (zuisheng mengsi).
62
 In the southern province of Guangdong, month-
long “get up early” and punctuality movements were planned in 1940 alongside 
campaigns devoted to anti-corruption, improving literacy, promoting hygienic habits, 
conserving scare resources and planting trees.
63
 Extravagant and bohemian indulgences 
like gambling, dancing, smoking, drinking, and outlandish fashion (qizhuang yifu) 
became anathema and citizens were encouraged to take part, and then only in moderation, 
in salubrious entertainment. Conspicuous consumption, including sleeping and getting up 
late, put into waste precious labor time and sapped the people’s vigor and vitality 
(zhaoqi). Young people, in particular, were warned not to spend too much time on social 
engagement, less that they became lethargic and forgot about work and study.
64
 In 
Xichang, a city in the frontier province of Xikang, officials went as far as to deploy a 
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morning-call brigade in late June 1939 to make sure that residents maintain the optimal 
work-rest pattern.
65
 Other places like Guangxi province in the south, put up placards 
outside eateries and theaters to inspire guilt among consumers and warn them away from 
hedonist pleasures. Printed on these placards were eye-catching slogans like “Those who 
arrive to dinners on limousines make an enslaved people!” and “Those who arrive to 
movies on limousines make an enslaved people!”66 The efficacy of these harrowing 
messages in delivering the public from “intoxicated reveries” cannot be assessed, but 
they eloquently expressed how the entangled web between rationalization of everyday 
routines, the quest for economic productivity and a nationalist reaction against 
cosmopolitan urban life was put to ever sharper relief by total war mobilization. 
 Aside from threatening people into action, spiritual mobilization included more 
positive measures with a view to encouraging citizens to participate in reforms on the 
quotidian. In September 1939, the social affairs ministry launched a series of contests 
that, if extensively held, would at least create the appearance of an enthusiastic and 
healthy citizenry. The contests, some of which were first held under the New Life 
Movement, would involve citizens of varying education attainments across the country. 
Urbanites worked to improve the general appearance of their cities; peasants participated 
in the creation of a new rural lifestyle. While students and the educated could submit their 
entries for essay competitions on eradicating unsavory habits and promoting “proper” 
entertainment, the illiterate could join sports competitions, maintain cleanliness at home, 
and follow instructions on ridding off superstitious customs in family weddings and 
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funerals. Activities were also designed specifically for public services workers, 
merchants, students, and educators.
67
 By the beginning of 1941, Guangdong, the eastern 
province of Zhejiang, Chongqing and its neighboring provinces Hunan and Shaanxi had 
all reported holding competitions in the social sectors and counties under their 
jurisdiction with the support of the police and the New Life Movement Association.
68
 
 Curiously, while senior GMD cadres often lambasted the consumerist pleasures of 
petit-bourgeois youth epitomized by treaty-port cabaret halls, their idea of wholesome 
leisure betrayed their own urban bourgeois background. Cadres at the GMD social affairs 
department were entreated to hiking trips, traditional martial arts or wushu sessions, and 
basketball games.
69
 Instead of indulging in sex, opium and dancing, citizens should play 
sports, take up photography, or join choirs and operatic groups.
70
 Just how a peasant in 
the impoverished rural hinterland could get regular hold of an expensive camera did not 
appear as an issue for spiritual mobilization advocates. The obsession with the distinction 
between hygienic and unhygienic practices, especially in domestic spaces, was likewise 
an unmistakable class maker, traceable to the bourgeois fascination with colonial 
modernity in treaty ports like Tianjin in the early twentieth century.
71
 Despite the 
movement’s aspiration to being inclusive in geographical and social reach, spiritual 
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mobilization remained an undertaking centered on urban areas and the social elite. As a 
case in point, while civil servants, as well as teachers and students, were reminded that all 
monthly assemblies were compulsory, rural households could send just one 
representative to attend these meetings. In the impoverished Gansu province, officials 
conceded that assemblies were not regularly held in rural areas due to illiteracy, busy 
farming routine, and a lack of qualified personnel.
72
 China’s chronic fragmentation, 
thanks to the country’s disparate socioeconomic landscape and the GMD’s limited 
sovereignty, meant that war mobilization was never going to be as “total” and “general” 
as it was intended. 
 The GMD attempted to attenuate the movement’s regional and class biases by 
deploying both modern and traditional media forms, creating a diverse repertoire of 
wartime aesthetics that appealed to various cultural communities and social groups. 
Sitting in the interstices between popular pastime, modern propaganda, and national 
culture, aesthetics formed a layer of everyday life that was eminently susceptible to 
unified production. Having been displaced from its traditional stronghold on the 
relatively prosperous east coast, the party-state was tasked with rallying behind a diverse 
population which included many poor peasants with little or no education and could only 
speak their local dialects. Visual and oral media thus played a particularly crucial role in 
energizing a culturally disparate people for whom written words were much less familiar 
than vocal and operatic modes of expression. GMD cadres were remarkably flexible to 
choose from multiple artistic traditions in which they couched the spiritual mobilization 
message. A participant at the movement’s Chongqing launch ceremony remembered 
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singing the “Citizen Pledge Song,” the score of which was adapted from a Christmas 
hymn.
73
 While Chongqing-based officials were inspired by Western music, cadres in 
Fujian province were busy rewriting a section of the Guiding Principles into the local 
vernaculars and incorporating it into songs so that opera troupes of both traditional and 
modern varieties could perform them to different audiences in the province.
74
 Zhejiang 
province reported a similar undertaking.
75
 The national government had likewise taken an 
interest in transforming local cultural forms into vehicles for spiritual mobilization. An 
education ministry directive mandated that all state-run schools and universities establish 
singing and opera troupes with the purpose of educating the masses. Aided by four 
traveling drama education teams dispatched across the country, students were to devote 
their time out of classes to learning the art. The goal, the directive declared, was to create 
a drama education network that linked together campuses from different provinces.
76
  
 By 1941, the prestigious National Central University had registered five singing 
and drama troupes with at least twenty-eight members. The largest among them, Boxi 
Theatrical Troupe, claimed a membership of seventy-seven, not including instructors who 
otherwise taught music at the Chongqing-based university. It performed modern spoken 
drama (huaju) to raise funds for the commission of the military glider Qingnian (Youth) 
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and had plans to stage regular propaganda drama (xuanchuan huaju) sessions for the 
masses, traveling to counties outside Chongqing during the summer recess.
77
 These 
troupes performed plays approved by the Central Commission for the Censorship of 
Books and Periodicals. Headed by Pan Gongzhan, editor of the now defunct Shanghai 
Morning Post, the body kept a tight grip on even innocuous nationalistic propaganda 
plays produced by politically suspicious figures. For example, the faintly left-leaning 
playwright Cao Yu’s Metamorphosis (Tuibian), published in 1940, was purged of lurid 
colloquialisms and its protagonist Commissioner Liang was hailed as “an official 
refreshingly true to the Three People’s Principles” instead of the less partisan 
“refreshingly true to China.”78 The result of these efforts was on display at the festivities 
associated Chongqing’s elevation to official alternate capital (peidu) status on October 1, 
1940. Urbanites were entreated to Sichuan, Beijing, Hubei, and modern-style spoken 
dramas alongside Beijing-style crosstalk (xiansheng), various forms of storytelling, and 
magic shows. These performances were set against a spectacular light display and lantern 
parade crafted by the state-run production house, film studio and broadcaster, betraying 
the state’s co-option of the urban fascination with electric lights and the industrialized 
nature of aesthetic experiences under a formidable propaganda machine.
79
 The education 
ministry’s drama initiative reflected the state’s identification of students and teachers as 
the vanguard of the total war society. Teachers and students were expected to go beyond 
the classroom on Sundays and semester recesses and play a supervisory role in the 
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implementation of spiritual mobilization. Students who joined the Three People’s 
Principles Youth Corps were to serve as speakers at monthly assemblies.
80
 In rural areas, 
where educated cadres and officials were in short supply, students spending holiday in 
their hometowns were even asked to assist baojia heads in clamping down on “improper 
entertainment,” “irrational habits,” and “indulgences like gambling and smoking.”81 It 
was incumbent upon students, as the nation’s future elite, to participate not only as 
consumers but also as producers of a centrally-coordinated wartime culture that pervaded 
the people’s working and leisure hours. 
 Mandating students to dedicate their school breaks to social mobilization was just 
one way of embedding the total war in citizens’ leisure routine. While GMD’s spiritual 
mobilization was intent on wrenching the populace from monotonous urban 
entertainment found in places like cabaret halls, it served to perpetuate rather than redress 
the vacuity and banality of citizens’ everyday life under capitalism. The party operated its 
own culture industry and was adept in promoting what Theodor Adorno called “pseudo-
activities” by affording an illusionary sense of leisure and satisfaction for nimble and 
subservient workers who needed to re-create their expended labor after many hours at 
work.
82
 Children games, like camping and sports, were no longer idle play or even 
rebellious acts against the monotony of capitalist society but were tools that molded 
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future workers and soldiers. The magazine Young Soldiers (Shaonian bing) was one fine 
example of how the nation’s youngest citizens were not spared from total war 
mobilization. Launched in 1943, the Jiangxi-based publication was affiliated with the 
China Cultural Services Association (Zhongguo wenhua fuwu she), a CC clique 
publishing house. It provided readers, mostly older primary school students in non-
Japanese occupied areas of the southern province, materials for leisure reading while 
socializing young citizens in the current state-led resistance objectives. The first three 
issues, distributed for free, offered illustrations, contributions by primary school students, 
and introductions to historical and current events like Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary career 
and the recent signing of “friendship treaties” with Britain and the United States. Like 
any other party-run publications, it published speeches by major officials and followed 
closely the GMD’s social initiatives. The editor duly admonished his young readers to 
maintain a disciplined and healthy work-and-rest schedule, adding that good health was 
the foundation of resilient spirit and the basic requirement for making future 
contributions to the nation.
83
  
 Distinct from publications that catered mainly to adults, however, Young Soldiers 
placed emphasis on contents that proffered amusement to its readers. It enjoined children 
to sing songs with perversely tongue-in-cheek lyrics like “Little precious ones (xiao 
baobao), stay healthy. Hop on your rocking horses, pick up your bamboo spears, charge 
ahead and heroically kill the devil Japanese!”84 Readers were urged to spend their time 
                                                 
83
 Zeng Yizhi, “Jiankang diyi” [Health first], Shaonian bing, no. 3 (1943): 18.  
 
84





outside classes making “aerial bombers” with glass, nails, spindle and bamboo.85 
Children playing in group got a taste of military camaraderie in a game called 
“Recovering Lost Territories,” whereby players divided themselves into teams, lined up, 
and raced to “reclaim” flags marked with names of Japanese-occupied areas on the 
opposite side.
86
   Such conflation of amusement and military training reached its climax 
in an article which encouraged children in battle zone to trick Japanese soldiers by 
igniting matches in enclosed bottles through a convex lens, thereby producing a 
thunderous sound that resembled gunshots. After detailing the scientific principles behind 
the stun, the article ended with an enticing invitation: “Little friends, this small trick 
(wanyir) is really fun. Give it a try!”87  
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Previous page: Figure 5. Children taught to make “aerial bombers.” (Deng Chongdi, “Hongzha 
ji,” Shaonian bing, no. 1 [1943]: 14-15.) 
 
 
 The chillingly nonchalant tone in which children were enticed to risk their lives 
playing “small tricks” indicated how total war pervaded the people’s psyche, including 
the young generation’s. The militarization of leisure in Young Soldiers underscored how, 
much more than just a series of army combats, total war was a highly mediated 
experience orchestrated under the GMD’s monopoly. A sense that the entire Chinese 
people – from the very old to the very young, from urban workers to peasants – was 
bound by a common fate enveloped workplaces and domestic spaces alike as much 
through political propaganda, assembly speeches, alarming slogans as through laws and 
decrees. Wartime nationalism was moreover a mass aesthetics, a concrete way of life 
experienced through dramas, magazines, games, rallies, a hygienic lifestyle, and the 
occasional bright lights that garnished embattled Chongqing. Spiritual mobilization 
aspired to a creating a people unified under the political and cultural authority of 
nationalist rather than class struggle, devotion to the conservative rather than socialist 
revolution. As we have seen, under the imperative of survival, the CCP had no choice but 
to at least pledge symbolic loyalty to the now sacralized nationalist cause, downplaying 
its own ideological commitment to overthrowing capitalist social relations until after the 
establishment of the People’s Republic.88         
 
Limits and Persistence of Spiritual Mobilization 
                                                 
88
 Until 1955, the People’s Republic implemented economic reforms akin to the Soviet New Economic 
Policy, putting the abolition of private ownership on hold in favor of modernizing production forces. 
Another inspiration for early Communist China, as economic historian Chris Bramall highlights, was the 
GMD’s German-informed state capitalist strategy of devising five-year objectives and nationalizing major 





 It is difficult to gauge how enthusiastic popular response to the grand political and 
social experiment of “building the nation through the war of resistance” was. If we, 
however, were to take Chiang Kai-shek’s own assessment as a cue, the state’s call to 
overhaul everyday habits had been falling on deaf ears. Reflecting on the upcoming fifth 
anniversary of the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement, the Generalissimo 
observed in March 1944 that society was still lacking self-discipline, that overall morale 
was flagging day by day, and that the nation as a whole, including party-state cadres and 
military officers, was ill-prepared for the most demanding stage of the war against 
Japan.
89
 Chiang’s complaint, particularly insofar as it concerned government officials, 
was not without precedent. As early as September 1939, there were signs that civil 
servants were abusing their power by exempting their families and themselves from 
attending mandatory monthly assemblies.
90
 Local officials, in response to a nation-wide 
review ordered by Chiang before the spiritual movement’s fifth anniversary, blamed the 
stagnating rural economy and uneducated and uncouth (wenhua shuizhun taidi) citizens 
for the campaign’s limitations.91 The fact that three different divisions of the party-state 
had successively hold rein of the National Spiritual General Mobilization Association – 
the Supreme National Defense Council in 1939, the GMD social affairs department in 
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1940, and the National Mobilization Conference in 1942 – in less than four years testified 
to the confusion the movement generated at the top.
92
  
 Indeed, even as the Guiding Principles and monthly assembly speakers promised 
draconian measures against wasteful consumption habits that could deplete the nation’s 
material and human resources, officials were somewhat less resolute in bringing the 
state’s coercive tendency to bear. In 1940, Xie Tianmin, the magistrate of Hechuan 
county in  Sichuan province, petitioned the Executive Yuan to ban the import of 
cigarettes and transform all domestic cigarette factories into enterprises that “benefitted 
the people’s livelihood” and “supported the war of resistance.”93 The local chief stated 
that his county squandered more than 120,000 yuan-worth of cigarettes each month. The 
central authorities, while acknowledging that banning cigarettes conformed to the 
wartime objective of resource saving, were surprisingly unimpressed by Xie’s 
determination to stamp out unhealthy indulgences. The brief written reply by a 
Chongqing bureaucrat, as attached to the petition, argued that the New Life Movement 
and the imperative to conserve resources had to be implemented patiently through 
persuasion and that Xie’s heavy-handed measures could only result in confusion 
(fenrao).
94
 More telling was the joint response drafted by four ministries in dismissal of 
the Henan provincial government’s 1941 call to put a total ban on alcohol and tobacco 
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consumption. Observing that drinking and smoking had long become common social 
customs, the finance, economic affairs, interior, and agriculture and forestry ministries 
reckoned that heavier taxes on these baleful products, particularly those imported from 
abroad, was more effective than an outright ban. “The people,” the reply continued, 
“should be persuaded to practice thrift out of volition and not forced into doing so.”95 The 
ministries’ relatively relaxed approach hinted that some GMD cadres did not share the 
urgency displayed in the Guiding Principles, which prioritized “complete redresses” 
(chedi de gaizheng) to an intoxicated, senseless lifestyle of dancing, sex, material 
consumption, and private gains (shengse huoli zhi zuisheng mengsi de shenghuo).
96
 At 
times, as the next chapter discusses, the strong moralizing bent of wartime mobilization 
operated more coherently at the discursive level, assimilating liberal intellectual scorn for 
mass culture.                 
 Despite these inconsistencies, and Chiang’s own admission of the movement’s 
inadequacies, China’s eventual victory had allowed spiritual general mobilization to be 
remembered as a successful undertaking rather than being condemned as a fascist relic as 
in postwar Japan. Less than a decade after the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War, 
Taiwan-based GMD officials were calling for a new spiritual mobilization campaign 
against Soviet Russia and its Chinese ally instead of Japan. Commentators lauded 
spiritual mobilization as a viable military strategy, as well as an effective way to create an 
anti-communist, modern national culture. The total war social experiment became 
canonized as a climax of an unfinished quest to rediscover China’s cultural essence first 
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buried by the invading Mongolian army in the thirteenth century. Just as how Sun fought 
against warlords in the 1920s by rallying ignorant masses behind the call for action, a 
doctrine well elaborated by Dai Jitao during “party purification” in 1927, Chiang had 
thwarted off Japanese invaders in the 1940s by elevating the spiritual coherence of the 
nation. It now rested upon the people in Taiwan to continue this anti-communist 
enterprise by harnessing the Chinese people’s innate proclivity for loyalty, fidelity, 
clearly demarcated social hierarchy and mutual assistance.
97
 The legacy of spiritual 
mobilization, and the conservative revolution which the April 12 coup inaugurated, in 
postwar “free” China will be the subject of the conclusion. 
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Liberal Support for the Conservative Revolution 
The Case of Zhu Guangqian 
 
   
 Not unlike how the GMD strived to secure hegemony over the masses and urban 
youths, the party-state was keen on appealing to the intellectual elite, a core section of the 
civil society with which it had a fraught relationship. By the time Chiang Kai-shek 
launched his vicious attacks on Communists and labor unionists in April 1927, the 
intellectual class that rose to center-stage in national life during the anti-traditionalist 
New Culture Movement had already been divided along fault lines that paralleled those 
in the political sphere. While many on the left professed sympathy for the embattled CCP, 
if not joining the party altogether, broad segments of China’s modern intelligentsia 
struggled to find political cognates for their literary or critical agendas. Some intellectuals 
decided to side with the new government; others resorted to quiet university campuses, 
particularly those operating from the deposed imperial capital Beijing. Liberal writers and 
thinkers wavered between conscious distancing and equivocal cooperation in their 
interaction with the political center. On one hand, subscribers to European Enlightenment 
ideals like reason and liberty were naturally uncomfortable with the GMD state’s 
authoritarian tendencies and intolerance towards intellectual dissent. On the other hand, 
prominent liberal writers and thinkers’ non-alignment often gave way to reluctant 
endorsement of the conservative revolution at crucial moments during the Nationalist 
reign. 
 In this part of the dissertation, we turn our attention from the mass movements 
that furthered Nationalist social engineering priorities onto the curious ties conservative 
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revolutionaries forged with intellectual elites at home and in Asia. The current chapter 
highlights features of the Nationalist program that resonated with an exemplary Chinese 
liberal writer whose natural sympathies did not lay with a rightwing vanguard party that 
demanded from the people unthinking and unconditional loyalty. Chapter 5 then 
examines how Nationalist China earned the sympathies of fellow Asians, particularly 
Indians who were fighting against British colonialism and imagining a united Asia freed 
from Western domination. In both instances, figures who might have otherwise objected 
to the GMD’s violent tendency and political intolerance ended up seeing the regime as 
the guarantor of China’s – and even Asia’s – cultural and ethical rebirth that transcended 
sectarian political interests.  
 Insofar as Chinese liberal intellectuals were concerned, expanding state power 
was often a threat to creative freedom. At the same time, however, the state was also 
relied upon to create a bulwark separating a hostile mass culture from autonomous elite 
culture. The GMD’s reluctance to share power with the general populace was compatible 
with elitist wariness over a political and cultural scene where the common people played 
an increasingly visible and vocal role, influenced as they were by the forces of the market 
and radical ideologies. The conviction that most Chinese people had to be guided in their 
everyday deportment instead of treated as citizens with legitimate political demands was 
shared by both the party-state and intellectuals who did not harbor leftwing sympathies. 
Especially in times when national unity was paramount, measures that claimed to 
transform destructive mob wrath into a productive force serving common purposes found 
receptive eyes among an otherwise skeptical New Culture intelligentsia.  
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 A case in point is Zhu Guangqian (1897-1986), a liberal aesthetician who 
championed the broad aims of the conservative revolution in GMD-run publications 
during the latter half of the eight-year resistance war. The British and French-educated 
academic, known as much for his scholarship on aesthetic theory as for his writings for 
the mass media, has been celebrated in Chinese-speaking societies as a public intellectual 
of impeccable idealism and wisdom. His widely read columns in newspapers and popular 
magazines reinforced Zhu’s reputation as a purveyor of artistic refinement and moral 
accomplishment. Compilations like Twelve Letters to Youths (Gei qingnian de shi’er 
fengxin) and On Cultivation (Tan xiuyang) were sought after by generations of students 
for advices on how to negotiate the transition to adulthood in a society beset by unstable 
politics, external threats, and widespread corruption. Yet, the links between Zhu’s 
cultural criticism and his political involvements have rarely been examined. His 
indictments against student involvement in oppositional politics are typically downplayed 
as being peripheral to his illustrious academic career. In the People’s Republic, where the 
aesthetician remained after the Communist Revolution in 1949, Zhu’s transformation 
from a liberal-leaning idealist philosopher into a celebrated advocate of Marxian 
aesthetics overshadowed, if not completely offset, his involvement in Nationalist 
propaganda projects during the Second Sino-Japanese War.          
 In this chapter, I reread Zhu’s prolific output on aesthetics and cultivation during 
the Nationalist period in light of his short stint as a contributor to the party organ Central 
Weekly (Zhongyang zhoukan). I argue that the manner in which a famed liberal New 
Culture intellectual was co-opted into the conservative revolution deserves closer scrutiny, 
despite claims that Zhu’s role in the GMD was no more than an aside to his social and 
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cultural criticism. The purpose of this discussion goes beyond filling unsavory lacunae in 
the biography of a canonical intellectual figure. It is to interrogate the liberal ideals of 
non-partisanship and artistic freedom against the choices intellectuals made as the 
political space between revolutionary socialism and radical conservatism furthered 
narrowed during the course of the Republican era. I propose that while the conservative 
revolution might have inspired much less intellectual enthusiasm than the Communist 
movement, the GMD managed to tap into China’s version of the Enlightenment for 
legitimacy. Despite their self-fashioning as the voice of reason and transcendence amidst 
the bitterly polarized political milieu in the 1930s and 1940s, intellectuals’ disdain for 
mass society in both its capitalist consumerist and politically radicalized forms often 
threw the otherwise non-aligned New Culture elite into the fold of the Nationalist state. 
Particularly in periods of emergency like the resistance war against Japan, liberals often 
found themselves throwing their weight behind the political force most capable of 
maintaining social order even if they remained disturbed by the state’s undemocratic and 
illiberal excesses.  
 Wielding little political influence on their own, intellectuals like Zhu Guangqian 
hedged the cultural visions they developed during the heady days of the 1920s on the 
regime that promised to put an end to the nihilistic infighting between political camps and 
hedonistic habits among the populace. As a liberal, Zhu’s endorsement of GMD rule in 
the 1940s echoed an earlier generation of anarchists who counter-intuitively sided with 
Chiang Kai-shek in the late 1920s against the Communists in a bid to secure a stable 
political environment for non-violent social change.
1
 In both cases, an intellectual’s 
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decision to support the Nationalists involved substantial compromises in both intellectual 
and pragmatic terms. Not only ideological convictions were at stake but also one’s 
teaching or government position. Lacking concrete investment in the conservative 
revolution, liberal support for the GMD was as opportunistic as it was ephemeral, as 





Zhu Guangqian as a Liberal 
 The following pages are as much about Zhu as the intellectual cohort to which he 
belonged. They focus equally on the individual’s little examined travails in the 1940s and 
the aporias that plagued his creeds. Zhu Guangqian was born in 1897 in Tongcheng, 
Anhui province. Like many who grew up at the turn of the twentieth century, Zhu was 
initially educated in the Confucian classics before joining Western-style institutions. 
Failing to make the trip to the capital for the Peking University (Beida) admission 
examination, he went to Hong Kong in 1918 to study education on Beiyang government 
sponsorship after finishing high school and spending two years at a normal college. Zhu 
might have missed out on the intellectual excitement following the Beijing-centered 
student movement in May 1919, but his career in the Republican period would become 
interwoven with the institutions and figures that contributed to the city’s distinct 
intellectual milieu. Shortly after earning his bachelor’s degree in 1922, Zhu quitted his 
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teaching job and set up a high school and a publisher with up-and-coming writers like 
Feng Zikai (1898-1975), Xia Mianzun (1886-1946), Xia Yan (1900-1995), Ye Shengtao 
(1894-1988) and Hu Yuzhi (1896-1986) in Shanghai. The Kaiming, or literally 
Enlightened, Publishing House gave Zhu the first taste of celebrity status in Shanghai’s 
increasingly commodified print market. During his eight-year sojourn from 1925 to 1933 
as a student in Britain and France where he completed graduate work in English literature, 
philosophy and psychology, Zhu gained popularity among young readers for his columns 
in Kaiming-owned magazines In General (Yiban) and High School Students (Zhongxue 
sheng). In 1929, a compilation of his magazine writings were published under Twelve 
Letters for Youths (Gei qingnian de shi’er fengxin), which sold over 50,000 copies by 
1936.
3
 The same publisher also brought to the market Zhu’s academic treatises on 
psychoanalysis, Kantian philosophy and literary criticism, including a translation of 
Benedotto Croce’s Breviario di esticata (Essence of Aesthetic). After earning a master’s 
and a doctoral degree at Edinburgh and Strasbourg universities respectively, the admirer 
of Italy’s most celebrated liberal philosopher in the twentieth century was recruited by 
another respected liberal intellectual Hu Shi to teach Western literature at Beida.  
 As a public intellectual, Zhu’s long life was ridden with contradictions. Zhu 
earned popular acclaim and financed his graduate studies by being a savvy operator in 
Shanghai’s exuberant print capitalism. But his critical and creative habitus was centered 
not in the bustling commercial city but Beiping (renamed from Beijing in 1928 by the 
victorious GMD state). Scrapped of its political preeminence and well-off bureaucratic 
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community, the deposed capital played host to a distinct coterie of liberal-leaning 
intellectuals known paradoxically as Jingpai or the “Capital School.” For what it was 
worth, the Capital School was not a school of thought defined by clearly articulated 
creeds; it existed in opposition to Haipai or the “Shanghai School,” which thrived on 
leftwing politics and the crass commercialism for which the vibrant treaty-port was 
famous. The closely-knit group of prominent writers that operated around literary 
journals and shared aesthetic dispositions did not have a common program. If anything, 
Zhu Guangqian, Xia Mianzun and such New Culture intellectuals as Shen Congwen 
(1902-1988), Zhu Ziqing (1898-1948) and Zhou Zuoren (1885-1967) detested ideological 
uniformity. The southern shift of political power after the Beiyang regime’s demise 
rendered Beiping an ideal sanctuary for those who saw themselves as constitutive of a 
third force independent from both the GMD and the CCP. Tucked away from the center 
of authoritarian Nationalist power in Nanjing, Zhu and his friends from the southern 
provinces found in the deposed capital a way to sustain an everyday milieu – classrooms, 
studios, aligned publishers, salons, teahouses, etc. – that underwrote the cultural, if not 
political, integrity of the modern bourgeois individual.
4
  
 The liberalism espoused by Chinese intellectuals in the 1930s was a reaction to 
the ideological straitjacket demanded by revolutionary politics of both the right and left 
varieties. In this sense, Zhu was a consistent liberal. On the eve of the Marco Polo Bridge 
Incident, as GMD ideologues were demanding ever more vehemently complete devotion 
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to the party-state and its revolutionary doctrine, Zhu urged young people to avoid 
“following blindly a faction or a so-called ‘leader’.” He called for more active “thinking 
habit” and less concrete “thought,” arguing that there are always multiple sides to each 
issue. Both left-wingers and right-wingers, however, tended to internalize propaganda 
“without having diligently worked through the facts and their logical connections.”5 
Zhu’s independent thinking and non-partisanship led him to express views that were 
apparently at odds with one-party rule even in his writings for party-run publications 
during the resistance war. In 1942, he called for a greater participatory role for citizens in 
political decision-making at the local level. Democratic governance in villages or districts 
would lay the basis for a vibrant representative democracy at the national level.
6
  He 
challenged the state not to impede freedom of speech. While curbs on free expression 
might be understandable during war mobilization, Zhu argued in a 1944 op-ed piece, 
alluding to a slogan of the National Spiritual Mobilization Campaign, that only when the 
“people had the opportunity to think collectively and discuss matters even-handedly” that 
the public could spontaneously rally behind one common purpose (yizhi jizhong).
7
 Unlike 
mainstream GMD theoreticians, Zhu did not see ideological diversity as a threat. Nor did 
he believe, as Dai Jitao did, that the masses should submit themselves to the political elite 
without thinking through the implication.      
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 Yet, Zhu’s liberalism was not free of elitist biases. His advocacy of representative 
democracy was accompanied by the caveat that “the common people, until they had 
received proper education in politics” should have less sway over the election system 
than the “well-educated and trustworthy.”8 More critically, Chinese liberalism in the 
1930s was fundamentally a philosophical position than assumed, without much basis in 
social reality, the universality of the urban bourgeois subject. It stemmed from the 
European Enlightenment vision whereby individuals, liberated from the shackles of 
ecclesiastical and plutocratic power, would develop their full potential as human beings. 
Such celebration of the “free human” (ziyou ren) sidestepped the vexing class tensions 
China’s semicolonial modernity engendered.9 Zhu’s autonomous citizenry was more an 
aesthetic than a political ideal. He likened the Chinese people collectively to an artist and 
found them woefully inadequate. Aesthetic gratification, Zhu posited in 1936, derived 
from “an order and a form” that an artist endowed on an essay, a painting or sculpture. 
He criticized the common people (xiao baixing), particularly the youth, for shirking their 
duty as “artists” by blaming the government for social chaos. If China were to become a 
democratic (minzhi) country like Britain, France or the United States, the people must 
first stop making demands on the state and worked actively to create social order. 
Unfortunately, the masses were too cowardly (nuoruo) to rein in their own excesses.
10
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The liberal proposition that an individual should take charge of their own development 
inspired Zhu to indict his lower class compatriots rather than to push for egalitarian social 
arrangements that would help “free” men and women realize their potential.       
 The allegedly ill-disciplined, morally suspicious attributes of the masses were 
themes to which Zhu regularly returned. As late as February 1948, Zhu remarked that 
“madness, impetuous hatred and cowardice” motivated anti-government protests in urban 
centers.
11
 Impeding the self-realization of the modern cosmopolitan individual was thus 
not only state tyranny but also the unruly beast that was mass society. The New Culture 
enlightenment project, as Lydia Liu demonstrates, stemmed from intellectual zeal that set 
the cosmopolitan educated class in a didactic relationship with the debased masses.
12
 
Inasmuch as Zhu inherited the New Culture commitment to reforming the moral 
constitution of the Chinese mind, he shared with conservative revolutionaries the belief 
that changing social habits and customs were more fundamental than tackling socio-
political structures in nation-and-society building. Wedged between an oppressive state 
and a hostile mass culture, Zhu placed his hope of collective rejuvenation on individual 




Zhu’s liberalism was further complicated by his reluctant collaboration with the 
GMD as a regular contributor to the Central Weekly since 1942. His writings for the 
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premier party mouthpiece formed the core of On Cultivation (Tan xiuyang) and parts of 
On Literature (Tan wenxue), published respectively by the Central Weekly Press and 
Kaiming in 1943 and 1946. Zhu’s own 1980 reminiscences attributed his involvement in 
GMD propaganda work during the Second Sino-Japanese War to a humble desire to keep 
his academic position amidst the on-going struggle between rival political parties for 
support among liberal intellectuals. Zhu recalled how the GMD, knowing that he was 
courted by the Marxist philosopher Zhou Yang (1908-1989) to join the CCP in Yan’an, 
marshaled old acquaintances like [Wuhan University president] Wang Xinggong 
and [dean of liberal arts] Chen Yuan of the [Capital School-affiliated literary 
magazine] Modern Review to take me to Wuhan and appoint me a professor at the 
foreign literatures department. …Established GMD practice dictated that faculty 
members who held senior administrative positions join the party. [As the registrar 
of Wuhan University,] I turned from being an opponent of the GMD to a close 
associate of the regime.  
       
He further admitted that the two wartime essay collections On Cultivation and On 
Literature were works of him serving as Chiang Kai-shek’s “hired scribbler” (yuyong 
wenren).
14
 One might be inclined to take the confession of an intellectual who renounced 
his liberalism for communism after 1949 with a grain of salt. Curiously, however, Zhu 
cited almost the same material concerns forty-two years ago to defend his friend and 
Capital School ally Zhou Zuoren’s apparent collaboration with the Japanese. In 1938, 
Zhou, who shared Zhu’s fear that state overreach and mass politics could put intellectual 
freedom into jeopardy, appeared at the “Renewal of Chinese Culture” conference in 
Japanese-occupied Beiping. Zhu, having followed the Nationalists to Sichuan, dismissed 
accusations that his former Beida colleague was a traitor (Hanjian). Aside from 
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regurgitating the liberal mantle that writers were above politics, he offered “the desire for 
comfort and dread of relocation” as explanations for Zhou’s scandal.15 Personal safety, 
not ideological motivations, was the primary pursuit for a writer under precarious 
circumstances, whether it meant turning one’s back against the nation or joining hands 
with an unsavory regime.  
 Zhu’s compromised non-partisan position bespoke the tensions inherent to liberal 
cultural politics. There is no doubt some truth to his claim that intellectuals acted against 
their will out of desperation. It was not rare for erstwhile critics of the regime to join the 
GMD to secure a slightly more comfortable existence as the entire Nationalist political, 
social and cultural edifice was forced out by the Japanese from cities like Beiping. At the 
Southwestern Associated University, a wartime merger of North China’s three premier 
institutions including Beida, as many as forty percent of faculty members had joined the 
party. Most of them were recent recruits who joined the party for reasons other than 
political beliefs. Some wished to advance their careers, more than a few succumbed to 
peer pressure, and others decided to acquire party membership out of pure nationalism.
16
 
But what was particularly intriguing about Zhu’s conversion to the GMD was how little 
he needed to rethink his views on culture, society and politics. The only instance where 
Zhu discernibly toed the party line on Communism was in an internal essay he wrote in 
November 1943 during a training seminar at the GMD party school, seven months after 
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the university registrar was admitted as a Nationalist and member of the Three People’s 
Principles Youth Corps.  Zhu confessed he joined the party because he realized the need 
for focusing the nation’s will and strength and that it was imperative on teachers to set an 
example for the younger generation. When the nation’s survival was at stake, ideological 
diversity was not an option. “Those loyal to the nation,” the professor exhorted, “should 
rally behind the Nationalist banner in the struggle for its defense.” Zhu added that 
“unorthodox parties and factions (yidang yipai) had no reason to exist in society.”17 
While Zhu did not specify what these unorthodox organizations were, cadres at the 
Central Training Corps (Zhongyang xunlian tuan) would understand that he meant the 
CCP. The derogatory term yidang was evoked, for one among multiple examples, in a 
classified April 1939 instruction circulated among local GMD branches. The instruction 
called on local party branches and government authorities to treat the “unorthodox party,” 
formally an ally in Nationalist China’s struggle against foreign Japan, as a grave threat to 
an unwieldy GMD establishment. It further urged local branches to organize students, 
workers, peasants and women under GMD-controlled mass organizations, with a view to 
undermining Communist dominance in civil society.
18
 The unpublished essay was the 
closest among Zhu’s expansive corpus to displaying the feigned passion in party 
orthodoxy one might expect from a recent convert seeking to overcompensate for his 
erstwhile defiance. 
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 Zhu’s collaboration with the GMD was therefore far more complicated than a 
case of simple opportunism, for the “hired scribbler” was less a radical break with than a 
logical outgrowth of the cultural critic’s earlier career as a non-conformist independent 
writer. In both guises, the aesthete explored the interstices between culture, morality and 
the individual, with a particular focus on how the experience of growing up amidst 
China’s tortuous modern transformation. Zhu was himself keen to emphasize continuity 
in his critical enterprise. The prologue of On Cultivation suggested that the 1943 
publication was a sequel to Twelve Letters to Youth. Both combined a disarming aura of 
informality, flowing vernacular prose, and self-help solutions to everyday concerns that 
were the formulae of the latter’s popularity among urban young readers. Zhu recalled 
with deep ambivalence the mass market success his essays enjoyed. On one hand, he 
remembered with relish how pirated copies of Twelve Letters appeared in Shanghai and 
Guangzhou while unscrupulous plagiarizers attempted to rip gullible readers off by 
writing Thirteen Letters to Youth under dubious non de plumes like Zhu Guangshan.
19
 On 
the other hand, the new GMD recruit dismissed his graduate student writings as maudlin 
chats between imaginary friends proffered by a profit-seeking publisher.
20
 In this sense, 
Twelve Letters immortalized the symptoms – over-sentimentality and shallow 
consumerism – that pervaded among Chinese youths and which Zhu had long wanted to 
redress. No longer the lonely and emotionally immature young man that he was in the 
                                                          
19
 In another indication of Zhu Guangqian’s facility with the competitive publishing market, the celebrity 
writer turned those who appropriated his fame on their heads, making them objects of ridicule in his own 
columns. A tongue-in-cheek “letter” to Zhu Guangshan published in the Shanghai newspaper Shenbao in 
1936 chided the plagiarizer for being as complicit in profiteering from commodified literary writings as the 
renowned writer himself. [“Zhu Guangqian gei Zhu Guangshan – wei Gei qingnian de shisan feng xin” 
(Zhu Guangqian to Zhu Guangshan – on Thirteen Letters to Youths), in ZGQQJ, 8: 418-422].   
 
20




late 1920s, the literature professor found himself even better positioned to further the 
moral transformation that aesthetic experiences could deliver to ill-disciplined youths 
who indulged in frivolous pleasures, deviant sexual behaviors, and mass politics.  
 
Aestheticization of Life     
 Insofar as his musings on aesthetics bore on the everyday social life of excitable 
youngsters, Zhu’s claim to rise above partisan frays was a highly political stance, tying in 
with the GMD’s dilemma from the late 1920s until the resistance war to sustain social 
activism while detaching it from political ideologies. The professor exhibited the paradox, 
displayed among liberal intellectuals since the early days of student activism before the 
1919 May Fourth Movement, that simultaneously hailed and feared mass political 
awakening. Cai Yuanpei, a liberal with anarchist sympathies, struggled to reconcile his 
celebration of civic consciousness on one hand and active containment of the student 
movement as Beida president on the other. After the 1927 coup, Cai worked actively with 
Dai Jitao in de-radicalizing students who might pose a threat to the Nationalist order.
21
 
The idea that youths were impulsive and immature, along with anxiety over the 
engulfment of university campuses by damaging political struggles, swayed liberals 
against student activists. Chinese Enlightenment intellectuals like Cai and Zhu were in 
full agreement with the GMD state that young people, and the Chinese populace in 
general, were citizens-in-training ill-equipped for autonomous political action. For Zhu, 
student protesters were signs of a larger social pathology, not harbingers of political 
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awakening. Zhu’s critical career, which began during his student days and continued into 
his stint at Central Weekly, was therefore an extended exercise in moral uplift for a 
politically restive population who lacked the self-discipline and emotional stability best 
exemplified by those engaged in artistic creation. Edifying the masses through aesthetic 
experience defined Zhu’s intervention in politics and the supposedly non-existent 
ideological motivations for the his collaboration with the Nationalist regime.  
 At one level, aesthetic pleasure was proffered to the masses by Zhu’s own witty, 
elegant prose. Since the mid-1920s, Zhu writings had taken on the elitist mission to bring 
reason and good taste to his uncouth and overly excitable brethren. Skillfully navigating 
Shanghai’s competitive print capitalism, the highly learned academic knew how to 
connect with the urban reading public. His most well-received popular writings were 
lucid pieces written in simple modern Chinese. Shunning pedantic language, Twelve 
Letters to Youths presented the European-trained aesthetician as a personable companion 
who concluded every entry with the endearment “your friend Mengshi.” He asked his 
imaginary reader if his prose was too long-winded, promising not to burden “you” (ni) 
with anything too onerous.
22
 Yet, affecting amicability did not mean that Zhu ever 
considered his readers, particularly students, as equals. Nor did he think they were 
capable of independent political decisions. One entry, “On Middle School Students and 
Social Movements” (Tan zhongxue sheng yu shehui yundong), accused student activists 
of corruption, arrogance and hypocrisy, symptoms typically attributed to politicians in the 
republic. “How many ordinary students,” Zhu angrily demanded, 
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are worthy of any revolutionary chatter? How many representatives to national 
student conferences squandered donations, gambled, or fiddled with prostitutes? 
Were there people who championed the sanctity of education only to band up 
with patrician politicians and disrupt the functioning of schools? How about those 
who penned vows of gratitude to the Japanese government or received Boxer 




The affable friend became a high priest of ethics, urging students to clean up their own 
moral mess before practicing revolution. While Zhu also criticized Nanjing’s total ban on 
students’ involvement in protests, the popular essayist shared the impatience of such 
GMD-friendly liberals as Cai Yuanpei and Hu Shi with radical youths who took their 
concern for society out from the classroom onto the street. The problem with social 
activists for Zhu was that they harbored grandiose designs but were short on solutions for 
the common people. For him, concrete community work was always more important than 
theatrical politics. It was better, for example, to just humbly teach rather than to get 
organized and push for universal education. Opening a factory on the countryside, for 
example, was preferable to pushing for national goods. One could make small 
contributions but would do better to avoid all talks of revolution. His advice to readers? 
“Go to the people!”24 Study hard, do good to society, and don’t disturb the peace. 
 Notwithstanding the half-hearted populism, Zhu’s unease with radicalized 
students shared the same tenets as Dai Jitao’s critique of student and labor politics 
discussed in chapter 2. Immature students and workers were irrational, too gullible to 
distinguish between deceptive rhetorical flourishes and politicians’ self-serving behaviors, 
and the demands they put forth were impractical and did not address the people’s well-
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being in any case. Zhu’s anxiety was rooted in a moment when urban China witnessed 
the rise of masses not only in political life but as a subject of a new consumer culture of 
which print capitalism was a part. As a beneficiary of this novel phenomenon, Zhu was 
deeply ambivalent about the challenges with which advanced industrial societies had long 
struggled. Having barely admonished his readers to “go to the people,” Zhu bemoaned 
that philosophy and literature, once chased out from the ivory tower, could only lead to 
vulgarization (which he glossed for suhua). Curiously, he associated the marketization of 
culture with democracy, which was glossed in the Chinese phonetic transliteration 
demokelaxi.
25
 Given the commodification of intellectual production, Zhu sided with 
artists and officials who claimed a privileged social sphere for the intelligentsia secluded 
from the hustle and bustle of the metaphorical crossroad where most Chinese dwelled.
26
 
The perception that China was home to an ever expanding gang of demagogic scholars 
and social activists reinforced Zhu’s suspicion. He dismissed British artist William 
Morris and Russian writer Leo Tolstoy’s call for the popularization of art as a recipe for 
turning intellectuals into profane objects of “market idols” (shichang ouxiang). Yet, it 
was not only consumerism that threatened Zhu’s Christian-inspired heroism. Fashions 
from New Culture literary experimentations to Shanghai’s high-street chic fueled a form 
of modern tyranny which he likened to papal persecution of Galileo Galilei in the 
seventeenth century or popular scorn for pacifists during the Great War. With his typical 
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poetic flourishes, Zhu vowed to overturn the tide of plebeian philistinism by being 
China’s Percy Byssche Shelley or Rabindranath Tagore, both Romantic poets with whom 
he identified. It was not clear what role the standard-bearer of Chinese high culture 
assigned for his readers in his heroic quest. On one hand, Zhu rallied his “friends” to 
mobilize their young valor and “smash the idols.” On the other hand, as eager consumers 
fueling China’s culture industry, readers were precisely the ones who denied Zhu the 
intellectual freedom to resist tasteless fads.
27
 Literary historian Bonnie McDougall 
characterizes Zhu’s contradiction between desire for social change and elitist disdain for 
the generation most inclined to it as indecisive and defeatist, undercutting the influence 
his popular works might have otherwise exerted among the educated youth.
28
  
 Defeatist or not, reason and freedom for Zhu were the preserve of the cloistered 
intellectual community that must be protected from the hoi polloi. While Zhu often 
reserved the harshest comments for his compatriots in China, his fear of mob rule was 
shaped by first-hand experience of the dystopia that was Europe’s consumer society. The 
Edinburgh-based graduate student, as he recounted in 1926, was horrified by the tawdry, 
commercialized entertainment of the British urban underclass – men and women 
indulging in alcohol in public, welfare beneficiaries skipping meals to pay for horrid 
thrillers and romances on cinema, young factory workers squandering Saturday 
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afternoons filling dancehalls with the foul combination of sweat and cosmetics.
29
 The 
inclusion of unproductive, uneducated men and women who survived on handouts from 
the nascent welfare state in a country’s political processes was a terrifying prospect. He 
quoted in 1927 with approval Matthew Arnold’s attack on the growing philistinism in 
modern Anglo-American societies, highlighting how the conservative cultural critic 
provided key insights for understanding the shallow plebeian tendencies in his own 
country.
30
 Indeed, the author of Culture and Anarchy (1869) became an inspiration for a 
conservative humanist reaction in the 1920s against the iconoclasm, mass protests and 
increasingly radicalism unleashed by the May Fourth Movement in 1919. Zhu’s embrace 
of culture – taken narrowly to mean humane values untainted by wealth and material 
obsessions – against such “anarchic” evils as tabloids, street protesters, and unscrupulous 
politicians certainly evoked Arnold.
31
 As a self-appointed guardian of culture, Zhu 
hedged his hope for an alternative social order on its proselytization and ability to 
transform rowdy protesters and philistine consumers into self-regulating and well-bred 
citizens. Both Arnold and Zhu, as we shall see later, would count upon the state to realize 
their vision of ideal citizenry. 
 For now, it suffices to state that China’s project of modern citizenry, traceable to 
the late Qing reformer Liang Qichao, was as much about remaking (elite male) 
individuals as searching for a viable polity. The tensions between its populist pretensions 
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and despair in dehumanizing massification were reconciled by singling out aesthetic 
experience in which the autonomous, self-regulating subject of the European bourgeois 
mode would reside.
32
 Yet, the hope that aesthetics would carve out an independent 
existence from the politically and intellectually suffocating milieu of Nationalist China 
was a misplaced one. Setting aside the problematic premise that aesthetics constituted a 
distinct sphere of social life, Zhu shared with GMD ideologues the Arnoldian dichotomy 
that pitched humane values and good taste against unscrupulous protesters preoccupied 
by base material desires. Western conservative cultural criticism reinforced lingering 
Confucian ideals that opposed masculine enterprise and virtues to feminine sensuality 
and excesses. Like good Confucians, modern Chinese intellectuals prized gratification 
from art, poetry and music but feared that unseemly emotions and bodily pleasures would 
pollute the gentlemen’s moral character.33  
 As pursuits charged with ethical significance, aesthetic experiences covered the 
entire cross-section of public and private life. They included not just habits like reading 
Zhu’s essays, but also any endeavor that added pleasure to human life. Aesthetic 
edification was therefore a check on disruptive political activism or unseemly 
indulgences like sex and alcohol. Zhu called in his 1932 volume On Beauty (Tan mei) for 
the aestheticization of life (rensheng de yishuhua) as a strategy for taming the crass 
rebellion of the crowd. Recognizing that “life in the broad sense is art” would equip one 
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with a productive means to alleviating everyday angst living in an unequal and 
oppressive society. Moreover, modernist European philosophers like Friedrich Nietzsche 
and Arthur Schopenhauer convinced Zhu that in a secularizing world, life-as-art stood 
uniquely at the forefront of boundless experimentation. Alluding again to the Bible, Zhu 
observed that instead of pious devotion to the commandments, the Creator had 
empowered modern humankind to chart their own lives unencumbered by slavish fidelity 
to rules and scruples. Yet, claiming untrammeled creative freedom entailed relinquishing 
attachment to one’s material existence. “Disinterested contemplation” (rendered by Zhu 
as wusuowei erwei de wansuo) allowed the severance of personal realization from the 
frustrations brought about by modern society. It ennobled life as an art form through 
which individuals could, to paraphrase Walter Benjamin, express themselves without 
targeting the political and social system.
34
  
 Yet, Zhu’s argument that aesthetics transcended worldly motive or interest 
differed from the dictum of pure, amoral art as espoused by his spiritual mentor 
Benedetto Croce. The Italian doyen of idealist philosophy and liberal political theorist 
conceived art as distinct from the search for virtues or true knowledge. Beauty (mei), as 
Zhu pithily summarized Croce, was not related to truth (zhen) and benevolence (shan).
35
 
While Zhu credited Croce for relieving literature of the traditional Confucian mandate to 
convey the truth (wenyi zaidao), he departed from the idealist aesthetician by endowing 
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art with an ennobling quality in regard to life.
36
 Moreover, whereas Croce consigned 
beauty neatly to its own independent realm the communication of which depended on 
elite artists, Zhu injected into art a pseudo-egalitarian and fuzzy totalistic dimension: “A 
person’s life history is his or her work. … A person who masters living (zhidao shenghuo) 
is an artist and his or her life a piece of art.”37 He further compared one’s lifetime venture 
to writing or painting, where an “artist’s” everyday demeanors and major moral decisions 
were weaved together with technical adeptness to form one organic body (youjiti). 
Inasmuch as aesthetics infused even the most routine behaviors of every individual, Zhu 
saw artistic creation as a sublimely religious experience available to anyone who willed a 
leisurely, playful twist to their otherwise mundane, difficult existence. His revelation for 
the poverty-stricken, war-ridden people of China was derived from a signpost Zhu 
encountered while touring the Alps – slow down and enjoy (manman zou, xinshang a)!38 
It is as if China’s many problems would be solved if the country’s denizens would 
imagine the brutalities of “actual life” (shiji rensheng) away to embrace a richer and 
beautified being.   
 If the dialectics between aesthetics and social morality in Zhu departed from 
Crocean idealism, it edged ever closer to the latest GMD theoretical innovations on the 
meaning of beauty in historical evolution. Zhu saw the edifying function of aesthetic 
pursuits free from political and economic concerns as having great social potential 
beyond individual character-building. Disinterested contemplation was the path to the 
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Highest Good (zhigao de shan), a Christian and Kantian concept that attributed intrinsic 
worth to a righteous life. In a society filled with calculations and mercenary hypocrites, 
art purified (zhenghua) the populace and relieved them from vulgar animal urges. China’s 
quagmire was not “entirely a result of system or structure, but of putrefied hearts (renxin 
taihuai).”39 Zhu’s statement on the intertwinement of aesthetic and ethical cultivation 
coincided with the publication of Chen Lifu’s philosophical treatise Vitalism, the Central 
Political School textbook we encountered in the previous chapter. The CC clique leader, 
whose colleagues championed unifying the nation’s spirit as a priority in national defense, 
identified beauty as the apotheosis of human achievement where conflicts over material 
interests would be sublated.  
 Vitalism presented a three-stage theory – veracity, benevolence and beauty – 
prognosticating the supersession of human rivalries over political and economic power by 
a utopia of “beauty” (mei). Betraying the inflection of French philosopher Henri Bergson, 
Chen saw life as constituted by anarchic elements (shengyuan) pulled against different 
directions by both good and evil forces. Through sincere devotion (chengyi) and 
purification of hearts and minds (zhengxin), humans learned to harness their desires and 
productive capacities for a glorious and beautiful existence.
40
 In practical terms, the path 
to beauty dictated a period of “benevolence” (shan) when the less privileged in society 
put their material self-interest aside and submitted themselves willingly to the 
enlightened leadership of the well-endowed. Instead of being manipulated by crafty 
politicians, weaker citizens turned their backs on debilitating rivalries between political 
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parties of both the liberal and revolutionary variants to contribute to one-party, interclass 
dictatorships like the GMD. A new form of social organization, i.e. national capitalism, 
ensured peace, efficiency and improved livelihood for the ignorant masses in lieu of 
political entitlement. This new order would usher in a realm of beauty whereby the well-
being of all social elements was harmonized and valorized.
41
 That beauty meant 
overcoming the fixation on material interests in modern politics informed Zhu’s as well 
Chen’s (mis)recognition of the messiness and excesses in mass politics as moral 
depravation. 
 China was hardly the exception insofar as moral edification provided the missing 
link between idealist theories of aesthetics and political formation. Far from perverse 
appropriation of an innocent quest for refinement, aesthetics had been intertwined with 
state power since the European Enlightenment. During Victorian Britain, the literature of 
which provided much intellectual stimulation for Zhu, the liberal state saw itself as the 
ethical, as well as political, embodiment of the disparate and fragmented interests 
represented in the body politic. Culture provided the state the supposedly common and 
neutral bond of humanity as it confronted antagonistic social demands. In the second half 
of the nineteenth century, as the ascendant liberal hegemony in Britain was challenged by 
an emerging working class, figures as diverse as Matthew Arnold, Romantic poet Samuel 
Coleridge and liberal philosopher John Stuart Mill believed that the educational state 
apparatus needed to induct raucous and politicized citizens into the “common sense” and 
ethical judgments of a liberal capitalist society. The apparently universal and neutral 
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experiences of aesthetics were counted upon to mold popular will so that it served the 
bourgeoisie and dissuaded class-oriented analyses.
42
  
 In Nationalist China, the convergence of state and liberal humanism was at the 
core of the new regime’s cultural policy. Since the earliest days of Chiang Kai-shek’s 
regime, longtime aesthetic education advocate Cai Yuanpei and distinguished painter Lin 
Fengmian (1900-1991) headed state agencies, led new art academies, and promoted their 
agendas in government newspapers and state-sponsored exhibitions. For liberal 
humanists in government, a new paradigm in art education and expression that 
emphasized social amelioration was to replace radical tendencies within the larger New 
Culture Movement that threatened to derail the fragile Nationalist order. However, before 
social edification could run its course, a reformist aesthetic vision had to wield the 
repressive state apparatus to suppress student dissenters, bring protesters off the streets 
and expel Communist sympathizers.
43
 Zhu’s participation in the wartime state in the 
1940s followed on the heels of illustrious liberals who came to see the Nationalist state as 
the only hope, if an incredibly flawed one, for a social and cultural peace safeguarded 
from class struggle and mob rule. 
 
Autonomy, Discipline and Sublimation 
 From the GMD’s perspective, securing the cooperation of a high-profile non-
partisan writer like Zhu was a way to show that the wartime state, even as it demanded 
unconditional loyalty from citizens, was an inclusive body that nurtured creative and 
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academic freedom. Practicing censorship against leftwing writers and appealing to 
liberals were for the Chongqing-based regime complementary agendas.
44
 Here again, 
China was not alone. The Fascist state in Italy adopted a dual strategy of discipline and 
patronage through the 1930s. Instead of asking authors to produce overtly propagandist 
works, the state took pains to support a variety of creative forms and incorporate latest 
debates on the relationship between art and social life. It worked to co-opt rather than 
suppress authors and critics who were not card-carrying supports of the regime. The 
Fascist investment in art of a transformative function on popular behaviors was put in 
sync with intellectuals’ collective desire to give voice to a new cultural order that 
replaced reactionary tendencies like individualism, middle-class banality, and excessive 
foreign influences. A more subtle system of co-option, particularly compared to Stalinist 
Russia’s heavy-handed approach, allowed Italian artists and critics who worked under 




 A similar dynamic existed between Zhu and the Nationalist state. Aside from the 
offer of senior academic appointments, Nationalist leaders lured the aesthetician to 
continue his writing career with state-funded publications. Zhu was recruited, along with 
five other scholars including historian Qian Mu (1895-1990) and philosopher He Lin 
(1902-1992), in June 1941 to launch with funding from Chiang Kai-shek an academic 
journal exploring topics related to the Three People’s Principles. Thoughts and Epochs 
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(Sixiang yu shidai) inspired mixed feelings among non-partisan intellectuals who admired 
its high quality but dreaded the state’s involvement in intellectual production.46 A few 
months later, the Wuhan University professor began writing for Central Weekly as a 
politically independent academic. Zhu’s first article “On Making Resolutions” (Tan lizhi), 
which appeared on New Year’s Day in 1942, mimicked the form and substance of the 
“letters” that propelled the young writer to celebrity status in the late 1920s.  
 The new Central Weekly contributor stressed the continuity between the latest 
evolution of his literary career and his time with Kaiming. Like his entries thirteen years 
ago, Zhu’s newest pieces were of bite-size length and bore titles that began with the 
character for “to talk” (tan), retaining the illusion of direct communication with readers. 
His installments in the party-state publication revisited the themes that Twelve Letters of 
Youth first broached. They discussed issues that occupied the everyday life of educated 
youths through generations, i.e. romantic love, sports, learning and reading, job hunting, 
searching for self-worth in society. The intertextual ties Zhu forged between his two 
personae lent credence to the critic’s political impartiality, even as he was heaping praise 
on the “sagacious leader” Chiang Kai-shek and hailed the GMD’s “nation-building 
through the resistance war” program.47 Zhu was aware that he was walking on tightrope 
between convincing state officials of his ideological reliability and sacrificing his 
reputation as a non-partisan public intellectual. The preface to On Cultivation denied that 
the author’s collaboration with Central Weekly had any political implications. The 
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columns were “causal and idle talk” (suibian xiantan) that contained no systematic 
thought or agenda. They contained not dry and hackneyed slogans of a doctrinaire, but 
the authentic and more mature admonishments from one of China’s most endearing 
writer. They were the works of the same man who remained steadfast to such treasured 
sentiments as cool-headedness, sobriety, determination and approaching social affairs 
with a spirit of detachment.
 48
 In other words, Zhu’s partnership with the GMD was not a 
matter of ideological conversion but natural evolution of a stellar literary career. 
 To drive home his pretension to creative autonomy, Zhu was not afraid to 
occasionally criticize the wartime state in his Central Weekly articles. Here again, he 
treaded a fine line between being acquiescent and testing Chiang’s limits. Potentially 
subversive views on the shape of the embattled republic were sheepishly ensconced in 
Zhu’s continual intervention in the spiritual malaise that afflicted China’s public culture. 
Civil servants, he asserted, behaved like local tyrants and evil gentry (tuhao lieshen) from 
a bygone autocratic era (zhuanzhi shidai). They denied the public a role in local 
governance, impeding the evolution of Chinese people into mature contributors to 
communal life (qunchu). While accusing state bureaucrats of stifling popular 
deliberations, Zhu touted baojia as an ideal form of local government, despite the rural 
institution’s notorious role in monitoring political expression and policing against dissent. 
He went as far as to compare the democratic potential of baojia to local councils in 
Britain.
49
 The writer also made sure to embed his otherwise blunt critique of GMD 
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authoritarianism in a wider discussion on the lack of civic-mindedness among the 
populace. A bad government, he suggested, was part of a social pathology that testified to 
China’s difficult transition to modernity.50 Thus, the object of Zhu’s critique switched 
abruptly from repressive political arrangements to the spiritual crisis that tormented his 
compatriots. Specifically, Zhu identified at the crux of China’s non-functioning polity a 
psychological perversion (xinli biantai) – a malaise attributed to students grappling with 
both the dislocation of war and conflicts, on one hand, and deformed capitalist ethos and 
lingering feudal social structures, on the other. Fathers seeing their children’s university 
education as no more than an investment for handsome returns, chronic bureaucratic 
corruption, and a dysfunctional schooling process compounded the inhospitable material 
circumstances under which refugees from the richer, more urbanized coastal regions 
found themselves in the hinterland. The results were such deleterious responses as apathy, 
despair, ennui, and seeking comfort in careerist and materialist pursuits.
51
 A cynical 
young generation indifferent to the world beyond its own narrow interests hardly boded 
well for a nation that counted on a voluntaristic citizenry for resistance and rebuilding 
efforts. 
Low popular morale was a particularly worrying trend as Zhu saw the war against 
Japan as a showdown of will power. Betraying his fascination with heroic grandeur and 
self-affirming action, Zhu lent a muscular, sublime quality to the resistance war.
52
 The 
Chinese people’s long quest to defeat Japan was compared to Jesus’ valiant rejection of 
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the devil’s temptations in the Judean Desert to renege on God and embrace worldly 
power. Like Jesus, the Chinese nation was confronted with the stark choice between God 
and the devil.
53
 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s iron-willed determination to resist 
foreign encroachment was the only true path of God. Yet, the likes of Wang Jingwei and 
others who surrendered to the satanic Japan demonstrated that China was still weak in its 
fighting spirit. The existence of traitors suggested that the Chinese were still lacking in 
the moral fiber to resist evil temptations. 
As far as Zhu was concerned, the key to successfully overcome a powerful enemy 
was not military strategy, prudent economic management or effective diplomacy but the 
spiritual strength of citizens. The resistance war, like China’s many historical struggles 
with foreigners since the founding of the unified Qin state two millennia ago, was just the 
latest instance in which the nation’s inherent vital force (minzu de shenghuoli) was 
brought to trial. The critical importance Zhu attached to the human will allowed him to 
generalize the Second Sino-Japanese War into an exercise in overcoming life’s hurdles. 
Defeating an invading army was like poets perfecting the craft of writing, both 
tremendous challenges that commanded “superhumanly will” (chaoren de yizhi). Zhu 
wanted young Chinese to brave “the force of greatest resistance” and emulate the great 
Roman Empire in its toughness, severe discipline, and adventurism.
54
 That the fate of the 
nation now rested solely on the people’s collective will focused attention on the everyday 
life of individuals – their psychological and physical makeup – as the preeminent site of 
                                                          
53
 Zhu, “Chao dikangli zuida de lujing zou” [Follow the path of greatest resistance], in ZGQQJ, 4:22. 
 
54




reform. The Nationalist power hierarchy, even if somewhat autocratic, was the only agent 
capable of unifying the national will.    
Thus, even as Zhu saw the toll China’s social crisis was taking on his students, 
going as far as blaming state repression of free speech and creative freedom as a factor 
contributing to a sense of hopelessness prevalent on university campuses, he laid the 
responsibility for redressing this predicament squarely on youths themselves.
55
 Zhu 
called on young people to provide their own cure and salvation by changing the ways 
they thought, instead of being obsessed with the difficulties social hierarchies presented 
them. Solving psychological perversion, after all, required re-tuning the mind. Courage, a 
sense of responsibility and acceptance of difficult circumstances were to substitute 
despair, lack of purpose and passion-driven desires. Echoing his suspicion of political 
activism in his earlier writings, Zhu deemed it more important for individual citizens to 
examine their own selves than to challenge socio-political arrangements. To rein in 
volatile and nihilistic thoughts, Zhu recommended the autosuggestion method 
popularized by the French psychotherapist Emile Coué whereby young people would 
constantly occupy their mind with the idea that the situation was improving until they 
genuinely believed circumstances were getting better.
56
 Nationalist China’s structural 
problems that weighed down the ambitions of young people were therefore the greatest 
resistance that Zhu’s readers had to overcome in their willed imagination before they 
could assume full subjectivity as modern social subjects.  
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Zhu’s concern for the nation’s élan vital encompassed body and mind. The 
French psychotherapeutic techniques he identified as keys to relieving the pathology of 
despair and apathy were equally effective in transforming unhealthy bodies. As physical 
and spiritual health were interrelated, sports complemented aesthetic pleasures in 
managing a discontented population. Zhu dovetailed with the GMD state’s efforts in 
rationalizing daily routines – hygiene, leisure, entrenched customs, interpersonal 
interactions – as parts of the wartime National Spiritual Mobilization Movement. His 
diagnosis began with the uncontroversial observation that inadequate food and disregard 
for sports rendered adolescents into a pallid and emaciated lot, stunting growth and 
contributing to psychological agonies.
57
 Remarkably, the social anomalies plaguing 
Chinese youths were the same as those that Zhu recognized as pervading the working 
class in Edinburgh seventeen years ago: consumerist indulgences and sexual 
licentiousness. Young men and women avidly consumed erotic romances and racy 
movies, took part in debauch pleasures like prostitution, and succumbed to sexual urges 
by indulging in masturbation and homosexuality.
58
 Even desire for romantic love among 
university students was condemned as hedonism unworthy of a nation at war. The 
unleashing of libidinal desires through deleterious channels dealt a further blow to the 
collective social body, filling the space vacated by productive employment and healthy 
recreational activities like art and sports that should have fully preoccupied (longduan) 
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young people’s creative energy.59 Physical education not only helped maintain strong 
bodies, but also instilled such values as “fair play” and “sportsmanship,” as Zhu glossed 
in English, to counter dysfunctional social relationships among China’s educated youth.60 
These British liberal ideals, which also influenced GMD initiatives like scouting, were 
hailed as mitigating forces on anti-social behaviors.  
Aside from sports, the literature professor prescribed aesthetic enjoyment as a 
way to turn a war-weary, overworked masses into a stoic, fit and devoted force loyal to 
the nation. Citing Sigmund Freud, Zhu asserted that modernity repressed human impulses 
and created complexes waiting to implode. Rather than interrogating the social relations 
that created psychoses, however, individuals would have to learn to catharsize or liberate 
(jiefang) frustrated desires through aesthetics, an idealist realm free of violence, injustices, 
and gaudy entertainments.
61
 Enjoying the outdoor on a Sunday or playing proper music 
after work, common in Euro-American societies, helped one recuperate after a 
suffocating work routine. Without a healthy leisure culture, the Chinese endured 
prolonged backbreaking labor at the expense of the nation’s long-term vitality.62 More 
importantly, aesthetic pursuits that added variety to a monotony of factory production 
soothed workers’ discontents. Writing something like Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s 
loosely autographical The Sorrows of Young Werther (Die Leiden des jungen Werthers), 
a popular novel among young readers since the New Culture Movement, would make 
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great therapeutic placebo against one’s emotional agonies created by wartime China’s 
dystopian political modernity.
63
 Ironically, the arts in Zhu’s psychoanalytic take on 
Republican China served a function strangely similar to that allocated to permissive 
sexuality and consumerism in postwar capitalist societies, i.e. providing immediate and 
short-term pleasure to diffuse discontents over the hegemonic order in real society.
64
 The 
right “liberation” of human impulses, far from softening the edges of an oppressive 
political order, served to further subsume individuals under Chiang’s spiritual 
mobilization project.  
 But for our liberal cultural critic, self-implemented psychotherapy alone was not 
enough to tame individual complexes that supposedly gave rise to all forms of social and 
political deviance. The state must lead the reproduction of a wholesome social order, 
cultivating strong bodies and good moral taste. Zhu endorsed the GMD state’s fascination 
with eugenics as a strategy to revamp the strength of a population fighting a total war. 
Ideally, citizens would avoid marrying when they were too young, choose sturdy men or 
women over pretty faces when they were ready to get married, and refrain from having 
too many children. But the state should not hesitate to exert its authority if the people 
failed to oblige.
65
 Shanghai urban culture was, again, blamed for promoting the idea that 
marriage was a matter between individuals, not an institution that concerned society and 
state. Writers fetishized romantic love as something to be worshiped in its own right, 
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leftists wanted to impose Soviet Communism that allegedly forfeited the state’s 
mentorship role in the formation of new families.
66
 The maintenance of society as a 
wholesome organism required the state to be much more than a proverbial 
nightwatchman. The state might be faulted for suppressing the voice of deserving 
intellectuals, but it was definitely correct to discipline delinquent citizens who did not 
have their own and society’s interests in mind.  
 
Dictator as Embodiment of Moral Perfection   
 Disturbingly, but perhaps unsurprisingly, Zhu hedged his hope for a solid moral-
cultural foundation in society not only on the GMD’s bureaucratic structure but also its 
political myth-making enterprise. He argued that a cult of personality might provide just 
the right ingredients for national cohesion. Despite its association with the formidable 
political dictatorships of Hitler and Stalin, personality cult should occupy a prominent 
place in democratic China. “The essence of politics,” the new GMD recruit claimed in 
October 1942,  
lies in fine organization, the building and maintenance of which necessarily rest 
on a leader. A political organization of which the leader can call the shots and 
convince others must be an enlightened one. There is no doubt that totalitarian 
countries need dictators (ducai zhe). Democratic countries, too, need dictators, no 
matter what name or title you want to call them. 
67
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If the Hebrews needed their Old Testament heroes and modern educators worshiped 
Confucius and Plato, there is no reason why a political community should not pay 
homage to a dictator on whom order could rely. After all, religion, education and politics 
were all integral to culture (wenhua). Revisiting his earlier formulation on the 
entwinement of beauty and moral perfection, Zhu argued that pious devotion to a heroic 
leader was a quintessentially aesthetic gesture that lent “a sense of the sublime 
experience” (which he glossed for chonggao xiongwei zhi gan) to social life. Despite the 
inherent danger of superstition and emotionality, hero-worship was commendable for it 
inspired awe, put individuals in communion with the social whole, and lifted humans 
above their mundane existence. It helped overcome cynicism, selfishness and materialism 
in an individual.
68
 Here, Zhu’s apolitical impulse came full circle, but with one important 
twist. If the writer’s aim before the war was to keep dirty politics out of art, the wartime 
Central Weekly contributor treated politics like sanctified art. The hero, in all his 
religious and superhumanly elements, was set apart in a near-divine position from the 
political party and class interests he represented. Inasmuch as human life is a work of art, 
the dictator evoked the imagery (yixiang) of aesthetic perfection, affirming in flesh and 
blood highest moral accomplishments.
69
 He tamed the spiritually inadequate masses, 
beautified them, and gave them a coherent form. Zhu’s lyrical paean to hero worship as 
sublimation of mass will sounded particularly ominous considering that the GMD was 
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intensifying efforts to build a cult around Chiang the Leader (lingxiu) as part of wartime 
spiritual mobilization. 
 On Zhu’s intellectual hero Matthew Arnold, literary critic Raymond Williams had 
the following to say about his liberalism: “Excellence and human values on the one hand; 
discipline and where necessary repression on the other.”70 Just as Arnold maligned 
protestors congregating in London’s Hyde Park as enemies of culture in 1866, Zhu 
remained hostile towards street politics through the late 1940s. At the conclusion of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War, Zhu returned to Beiping and resumed his teaching position at 
Beida. One of his students remembered the connoisseur of Romantic poetry as a secluded 
scholar devoted to teaching, uninterested in political gatherings organized by U.S. 
ambassador John Leighton Stuart (1876-1962) for liberal intellectuals. Yet, the professor 
and his progressive, anti-Nationalist students remained on opposite sides of the widening 
political divide.
71
 Zhu railed against university students, workers and even cabaret 
dancers who took “direct action” (zhijie xingdong) against rocketing inflation, official 
corruption, and the civil war between the GMD and CCP in major cities. A frenzied mob, 
he wrote in a 1948 article tellingly titled “On the Spread of Cowardice and Cruelty 
Among the Masses,” was stirred up by a few delinquents who harbored ulterior motives 
under lofty principles like liberty, democracy and human rights. Unruly and excitable 
protesters in Beiping and Shanghai were compared to the bloodthirsty crowd who 
condemned great men like Socrates and Jesus to death or the Hindu fundamentalist who 
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killed Mahatma Gandhi in India just a few months ago.
72
 Liberty and freedom were 
desirable as long as they remained in the hands of the cultured and that the rowdy masses 
were kept at bay.  
 For reasons that remain obscure, Zhu chose not to accept the GMD’s invitation to 
leave Beiping when the Communists captured the city in early 1949. Taking into account 
his vicissitudes dealing with the troubled Nationalists, it might well be that Zhu, like 
many liberal politicians by the end of 1948, had lost faith in Chiang’s ability to restore 
peace and bring forth a stable, inclusive polity.
73
 In the 1950s and through the 1960s, the 
idealist thinker came under attack by Communist intellectuals for his aesthetic theory and 
was made to repudiate Croce. Adopting a Marxian framework, Zhu modified but 
continued his search for an autonomous aesthetic subjectivity against the mechanical 
concept of beauty as an objective given. The persistent fixation on valor, muscular 




 Whatever influence he exerted on Maoist China and beyond, it was obvious that 
Zhu represented the converging cultural logic of New Culture liberalism and radical 
conservatism in the Republican period. The liberal wing of the New Culture elite took the 
cultural transformation of the Chinese people to heart, seeing it as the only way to bring 
fundamental changes to the nation. They hailed the creative will of individuals and 
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shunned political orthodoxy, Nationalist or otherwise. Yet, their fear of being 
overwhelmed by the masses trumped the desire to remain aloof of China’s poisoned 
political scene. That liberal humanism never found expression in an independent political 
bloc rendered it parasitic on the Nationalist state. Confronted with vulgar consumerism, 
permissive sexuality and destabilizing street protests, Zhu desired a solid ethical order to 
sustain the autonomy and creative freedom of the elite aesthetic subject. The only buffer 
between individual sanctity and mob tyranny was the GMD establishment, whose own 
relationship with the masses was equally strained. Conservative revolutionaries and 
liberal intellectuals further agreed that the political and intellectual elite occupied a 
unique didactic role in reversing the hedonism of the urban-based young generation, 
arresting the terminal decline in society’s moral standards, and boosting the physical 
virility of the national body. 
 Aesthetic creation in Zhu was simultaneously an affirmation of individual 
prowess against material, social constraints and a tool for constraining mass revolt. It 
proffered liberation not by heeding popular demands, but by asking the wronged to 
diffuse their own discontent. In this sense, Zhu’s was nothing less than a depoliticized 
solution to the political and economic dilemmas of uneven capitalist development in 
China. Yet, in such national crises as the resistance war against Japan, aesthetic uplift 
became a matter as much for individuals as for the political establishment. The 
charismatic political leader ennobled and gave coherence to the people’s feelings and 
sentiments, elevating them to a higher form of life whereby the banalities of consumerism, 
craftiness of political organizers, and the general baseness of the Chinese masses would 
be purged. As the custodian of this utopian order, the state was thus rendered as a purely 
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ethical entity that embodied the union between aesthetic sublimation and moral 
perfection. The liberal claim on an individual’s full creative autonomy over his or her 
own life was also laid for the state’s stewardship of national well-being. The apolitical, 
transcendental image attributed to the GMD, in contradistinction to its manipulative, 
unscrupulous enemies, benefitted the party not only in its effort to garner domestic 
support. It was also a core component of the party-state’s outreach to political forces in 







The Revolution and the World 
Pan-Asianism, India and the Guomindang 
 
 
 In December 1940, as China concluded another difficult year confronting 
Japanese military advances, Chiang Kai-shek received an encouraging letter from the 
frail Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941). In the letter, the renowned Bengali poet reflected 
enthusiastically on Dai Jitao’s recent visit to India. “I believe,” Tagore declared, “that 
China has a special mission to fulfill in our Age.” Long disillusioned with modern 
civilization as exemplified by Euro-America, Tagore touted Nationalist China for 
providing a potentially better alternative. The distinguished aesthete, both celebrated and 
pilloried for his skepticism of industrialization, told Chiang that  
Your country can show us in different fields of national planning in industrial 
development, in agricultural progress and in the new building-up of civic 
existence in your great land how we can escape the danger of fatal cleavage 
between science and humanity that has proved the doom of the Western as well as 
the Eastern nations of our day.
1
        
 
Tagore’s laudatory assessment of the wartime Nationalist regime was most striking given 
how the author of The Home and the World (1916) was known for his humanist disdain 
for political mobilization, even one that involved such discipline and concessionary 
tendencies as Mahatma Gandhi’s swadeshi movement that advocated the boycott of 
British goods. Tagore, and key figures in the Indian National Congress (of whom the 
literary giant was sympathetic but not uncritically supportive), seemed oblivious to how 
state violence was an integral part of GMD’s ongoing mobilization of society, or that the 
party-state had always committed itself to building a modern industrial economy, even as 
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factions differed vigorously on its composition.
2
 On appearance, there was little in 
common between the Nationalist regime’s anti-liberal conservative revolution and a 
political movement which, according to an authoritative account, was resolutely 
committed to non-violence, parliamentary democracy, and egalitarian social reforms.
3
  
 Affection for the GMD among followers of Indian leaders like Mahatma Gandhi 
(1869-1948) and Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) was as counter-intuitive as Chinese 
liberal writers rallying behind the fiercely rightwing party. Yet, the two nationalist parties 
were indeed allies, if half-hearted ones, during the Second Sino-Japanese War, and 
interactions between the organized nationalisms stretched back to as late as the 1920s. 
Senior GMD cadres, notably Dai Jitao and educator-cum-government minister Zhu 
Jiahua (1893-1963), actively promoted collaboration between the Nationalist state and 
the Indian nationalist movement throughout the 1930s and 40s. By actively contributing 
to institutional and cultural ties between the two societies, particularly those forged by the 
India-based Buddhist scholar Tan Yunshan (1898-1983), the GMD promoted Sino-Indian 
collaboration under a discourse of civilizational affinity, idealist commitment to world 
peace, and romantic pleas for Pan-Asianist solidarity. What seemed to have struck a 
particular chord with Tagore, and hammered home most vigorously by GMD associates, 
was a promise of how Asian peoples’ traditional virtues and ways of relating to one 
another could overcome the human mistrust, social reification, and violent exploitation 
inherent to industrial modernity.  
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 Tying Chinese and foreign humanists like Zhu Guangqian and Rabindranath 
Tagore together in support of Chiang was the way they projected on the Nationalist state 
an idealized, non-existent community unblemished by political conflicts and 
machinations. While Zhu saw Chiang as a larger-than-life figure that exemplified moral 
perfection, Tagore understood China as the idealized space where Eastern philosophical 
wisdom and cultural essence were preserved and reinvented. Alliance between China and 
an India struggling to free itself from the British would not only be a challenge to 
entrenched colonial interests in the two societies but also a cultural reaction against the 
“West,” a signifier for both capitalist globalization and its communist alternative. 
Paradoxically, the sentiments that inspired Chinese and Indian activists’ 
commitment to a union against European colonialism had roots in Japan’s transformation 
into an imperialist power in the late nineteenth century. No account of the ideological 
justifications for solidarity between China and India or the trajectories by which the 
GMD found in Congress a valuable partner would be complete without considering 
Japan’s contradictory role as both an inspiration for and impediment of nationalist 
aspirations across the continent. Before becoming disillusioned by Japan’s expansionist 
behaviors leading up to the Mukden and particularly the Marco Polo Bridge incidents, 
many activists in China and India saw Japan as a more worthy ally in a common 
continent-wide anti-colonial enterprise.
4
 GMD functionaries, Tan and Tagore partook in a 
discourse that saw the revival of an authentic, spiritual Asia as a revolt against the 
homogeneity of mass culture, instrumental reason, bourgeois modernity, and even the 
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tyranny of state bureaucracy. This desire for a revived Asia, usually expressed in 
romantic and avowedly apolitical terms, echoed Japanese philosophers’ justification for 
their country’s “war against all wars.” Prominent Japanese intellectuals believed 
confrontation with Anglo-American power would once and for all put an end to Western 
hegemony and allow East Asia to reclaim its spiritual essence.
5
 Yet, as Japan and China 
became locked in military conflicts, the dream of common Eastern resistance against 
imperialism gave rise to two rival Pan-Asianist projects, each wrestling for India’s 
loyalty.  Sharing many of its nemesis’s ideological assumptions, the GMD’s claim to 
leadership a Pan-Asianist alliance against Japan added an international dimension to its 
conservative revolution. That such radical conservative desires seemed to have captivated 
Tagore and gained traction within the Congress put to relief the dilemmas faced by 
nationalist movements in the Third World as they went about fighting for political 
independence and fashioning an economic and cultural subjectivity independent from 
imperialism-driven capitalist globalization. 
 
The Dynamics of Pan-Asianism: Ideology and Shifting Alliances 
 Exchanges between nationalist activists from India and China began at the dawn 
of the twentieth century, when exiled anti-Qing revolutionaries collaborated with Indian 
anti-colonialists and Japanese socialists in 1907 to form the Asiatic Humanitarian 
Brotherhood (Yazhou heqin hui or, in Japanese, Ashû washinkai).
6
 For activists informed 
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by new radical ideas such as feminism, anarchism and socialism, Asia, then free of the 
strictly demarcated and heavily guarded boundaries of modern nation-states, was a 
platform for revolutionary experimentations and regional alliances based not on the 
commonality of culture and religion but the urgency of modern imperialism. Yet, at that 
stage, there was considerable ambiguity and indeterminacy in the ideological import of 
Pan-Asianism. Chinese revolutionaries and activities drew from Japanese Pan-Asianists, 
while disavowing their assumption that the imperial Japanese state, fresh from military 
triumph over Russia in 1905, would lead the continent against the West and towards 
revival.
7
 Indeed, according to intellectual historian Wang Hui, the twentieth century saw 
the rise of two conflicting Pan-Asianisms. There was a radical tradition, to which 
revolutionaries like Vladimir I. Lenin and Sun Yat-sen belonged, which treated “Asia” as 
a set of dynamic political forces and an internationalist category centered on social 
revolutions and national liberation projects that were based in the region. Competing with 
this tendency were constructions of Asia based on culturalism, statism, and theories of 
essentialized, monolithic civilizations. Of particular interest to Wang were Japanese Pan-
Asianists like Miyazaki Toten and Kita Ikki who, as one-time participants of China’s 
national revolution, eventually came to believe that the resurgence of Asia rested 
ultimately on the military supremacy of the Japanese state over the continent. What 
defined their transformation from supporters of China’s independence into cheerleaders 
of Japanese expansionism, Wang argues, was their substitution of uncritical belief in 
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notions such as “state” and “race” for concrete socio-political analysis.8 Once political 
reason was banished, by utopian investment in either the state or projection of cultural 
essence, Pan-Asianism ceased to have emancipatory potential and quickly degenerated 
into a guise for Japanese imperialism.                
 Wang’s formulation provides us with a powerful cognitive tool to map out the 
circulation of Pan-Asianist thoughts from Imperial Japan to Republican China and 
through British India. The abstraction of transnational relations from geopolitical 
competition and social processes in Pan-Asianist discourses was central to how GMD 
presented Chinese nationalism to sympathetic Indian nationalists after the April 12 coup, 
after the party cut ties with the Comintern. Indian activists and intellectuals, including 
Tagore, were encouraged to see China’s nationalist project as aligned with their own 
spiritual quest to overcome social contradictions, colonial cultural hegemony and the 
anomie of modern life. It was the idealist language of negating spiritual malaise under 
Western-dominated industrial civilization that facilitated the convergence of the Chinese 
and Indian nation-building projects and concealed their clashing priorities. Yet, harsh 
geopolitical realities in the years leading up to the Cold War, embodying contending 
visions of society and economics, eventually drew the two nationalist parties away from 
one another. Lacking an analytical edge on social power and relations, a Pan-Asianism 
and, for that matter, nationalism based on culturalism and civilizational attributes 
ultimately became a mere appendage to the shifting constellation between competing 
ideologies, nation-states and social forces that shaped the world in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. 
                                                 
8
 Wang Hui, “The Politics of Imagining Asia: A Genealogical Analysis,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 8:1 





 As far as China’s national context is concerned, the internationalist impulses that 
informed earlier strands of Pan-Asianism, articulated by such revolutionaries as Zhang 
Taiyan and Sun Yat-sen, waxed and waned with the ideological composition of the 
country’s nationalist movement itself. The permutation of Pan-Asianist thoughts mirrored 
other intellectual and political developments in the country since the May Fourth 
Movement. Under the united front with the fledging Chinese Communist Party, the GMD 
participated actively in Comintern-sponsored anti-colonial activities. With the Soviet 
Union hailed as a patron of the Chinese national revolution, the GMD formulated its 
international engagement around the Third International’s agenda of supporting national 
liberation movements in Asia and the rest of the colonized world.
9
 Even future radical 
conservatives who had always been suspicious of the Soviet Union’s ambitions were in 
broad agreement with leftwing internationalist principles. Hu Hanmin and Dai Jitao, for 
example, submitted two separate proposals to Sun Yat-sen in early 1924 for a People’s 
International (Minzu guoji). Although it was conceived to undercut Moscow’s influence 
over the Chinese revolution, a hypothetical Guangzhou-led international would still join 
Soviet Russia and oppressed peoples including Indians together in a truly multinational 
fight against the colonizer-dominated League of Nations.
10
 In February 1927, the GMD 
funded and sent the largest delegation to Brussels to attend the inaugural congress of the 
League Against Imperialism, an international anti-colonialist body influenced but by no 
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means monopolized by the Soviet Union.
11
 In return, the association of communist, 
socialist and radical nationalist organizations from Asia, Africa, Latin America and 
Europe celebrated the GMD’s recent triumph over foreign-supported warlords in the 
Northern expedition. Asian nationalists, in particular, touted Nationalist China as an 
inspiration for their own struggles. Among these enthusiastic delegations from Asia was 
the Indian National Congress, headed by Nehru.
12
  
 Yet, barely two months after the conference, power struggle between the GMD’s 
radical conservative and left-leaning wings culminated in Chiang’s bloody purge of 
Shanghai-based Communists and trade unionists. The Nationalist movement under 
Chiang repudiated the world revolution it used to endorse. Instead of siding with all 
colonized and semi-colonized nations, it pledged solidarity exclusively with Asian 
peoples who were fighting against Western domination in global affairs. Nationalist 
China’s putative allies included Japan, a country that had adopted imperialist tendencies 
typical of Euro-American powers. Among the prominent advocates of this policy shift 
was Dai and the New Asia Society. The party theoretician declared in the journal New 
Asia (Xin Yaxiya) that “the world’s fundamental trend” was that only “Eastern nations” 
(Dongfang minzu) would ever have amicable relationships with China. Attributing Qing 
China’s immunity from full European colonization to the rise of Meiji Japan, Dai urged 
his compatriots to win back the respect of Japan and other Asian nations by building a 
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prosperous and culturally refined republic. “Once China became strong again, Japan 
would be our friend.” To the contrary, “Russia would forever be China’s foe.”13     
Founded by Dai Jitao and his associate Zhang Zhenzhi (1906-1931) in March 
1931 on the premises of the Examination Yuan in Nanjing, the New Asia Society was, 
for all aims and purposes, the ruling party’s front organization tasked with devising 
strategies in cultivating China’s ties with “Eastern nations” and claiming control over 
frontier regions like Tibet, Manchuria and Mongolia where Chinese sovereignty was 
being challenged.
14
 While European imperialism was still identified as a condition for 
intra-Asian collaboration, Dai’s invitation to the Japanese empire to join his enterprise, 
along with his obscurantist language of national awakening (juewu) and confidence 
(zixin), suggests that the GMD’s Pan-Asianism was no longer a call to arms for nations to 
unite against all forms of colonial control. It was instead a nostalgic allusion to Asia’s 
historical centrality and vague promise of the continent’s revolt against “Western” 
dominance – both Anglo-American capitalist imperialism and Soviet influence among 
Asian radical nationalists. Japan, supposed to be sharing a similar cultural heritage with 
China, re-emerged as a potential champion of Asia’s revival and independence. Many in 
the GMD considered the Japanese political establishment to be bifurcated, and that 
Nanjing could somehow form an alliance with Japanese activists sympathetic to China.  
Thus, even as military conflicts between China and Japan escalated through the 
late 1920s and 1930s, the GMD continued to hope that China and Japan would form the 
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core of an anti-Western, anti-Soviet alliance. Nothing was more symptomatic of the 
delusionary nature of the GMD’s investment in Japan than the regime’s decade-long 
dealings with rightwing Pan-Asianists like Miyazaki Ryûsuke (1892-1971), whose 
animosity towards both communism and some variants of capitalism led him to 
eventually made peace with Japanese continental adventurism. Evoking Sun Yat-sen’s 
“Great Asianism” and Confucian-sounding ideal of universal harmony (shijie datong), 
slogans repeated over and over again in GMD diplomatic discourses, Chiang Kai-shek, 
Dai Jitao and Hu Hanmin welcomed Miyazaki to Nanjing in May 1927. The son of 
Miyazaki Tôten, a celebrated sponsor of Sun Yat-sen’s anti-Qing revolution, visited 
China as a representative of the fledging Social Democratic Party (Shakai minshû tô, or 
Social People’s Party), one of the many anti-communist “proletarian parties” permitted to 
operate in pre-war Japan.
15
 In his speech delivered in Nanjing, he castigated “capitalist 
imperialists” in Japan for supporting warlords against whom the GMD was still fighting. 
Miyazaki expressed his party’s admiration for the Three People’s Principle, and enthused 
that the Social Democratic and Nationalist parties would mobilize the masses of Japan 
and China and liberate the weaker nations of the world. He added that while world 
revolution was commendable, a communist-inspired one was to be avoided at all costs.
16
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In the 1930s, Miyazaki moved further to the right and well wishes for Sino-
Japanese solidarity were quickly subsumed under the belief that Japan was the guardian 
of Asian revival. Yet, the GMD continued to see him as a potential ally sympathetic to 
China’s agenda. The Nationalist leadership was seemingly unnerved when Miyazaki 
urged in 1933 that Chiang relieve the American-educated finance minister T. V. Soong 
(Song Ziwen, 1891-1971) of his post, in case Japan came to the view that China was 
drawing its economy too close to those of the dreaded Great Britain and the United 
States.
17
 In a 1935 letter addressed to Chiang, Miyazaki even suggested that Japan’s 
continental adventurism was only to thwart off Anglo-American imperialism and Soviet 
expansion, and urged China to cooperate with the Japanese military.
18
 As late as the 
summer of 1937, after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Chiang was still ready to receive 
Miyazaki to China as the personal envoy of Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro. Konoe 
“wanted cooperation, not [Chinese] territories,” the military attaché at the Chinese 
embassy in Tokyo advised.
19
 Discussions between the two former comrades-in-arm never 
took place, as Miyazaki was arrested by Japanese military police under suspicious 
circumstances as he was about to leave for China. It would be impossible to tell if the 
course of history would have changed if Miyazaki managed to return to Nanjing ten years 
after he first visited the Chinese capital. What is obvious is the extent to which the 
GMD’s aversion to communism and investment in the culturalist construct of Asia put 
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the party in line with ultranationalist thinking that fused Japan’s own imperialist 
ambitions. 
 
The Politics of a Depoliticized Asia 
Nationalist China’s dealings with India, similarly infused with ideals of cultural 
commonality and nostalgia for a time when the presence of Europe in Asia was less 
domineering, was more successful and no less historically significant. The purported 
civilizational and particularly religious unity between the two societies was most vocally 
articulated by critics unnerved by the radicalization of the Chinese political and 
intellectual scene, including the GMD, in the 1920s during the New Cultural Movement.  
In the wake of the orgy of mechanized violence during the First World War, otherwise 
known in China as the more suggestive “European War” (Ou zhan, 1914-1918), many 
Chinese intellectuals became disillusioned with the liberal ideology of linear progress, the 
superiority of scientific rationality, and the social alienation that resulted from industrial 
capitalism. Some of these disillusioned activists, both New Culture intellectuals and 
GMD cadres, pursued alternative models of social organization through the globalizing 
language of socialisms.
20
 Others, like social reformer Liang Qichao (1873-1929) and 
constitutionalist Zhang Junmai (1886-1969), partook of an equally global dialogue and 
joined such conservative critics of the European Enlightenment as Oswald Spengler and 
Irving Babbitt in the aesthetic construction of a “humanistic” future free from the 
strictures of industrial society, violence of political mobilization and rivalries, and the 
challenge to elite high culture by an ascendant mass society.  A renewed interest in 
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Eastern spirituality drew Liang and his associates not only to influential anti-rationalist 
thinkers in Europe and North America but also to Rabindranath Tagore, who as an 
unrelenting critic of modern technologies and politics was himself an admirer of 
Spengler’s condemnation of modernity. Citing Spengler and pithily labeling Europeans’ 
fervent pursuit for material wealth as a “modern form of barbarism,” Tagore dismissed 
the argument that there was any advantage to be gained in combining Asia’s “spirit of 




The convergence of Chinese and Indian advocacy for Asian spirituality to 
overcome the excesses of capitalist globalization reached its first climax in 1923, when 
Liang invited Tagore to give a series of lectures in China. In his speech welcoming 
Tagore to Beijing in 1924, Liang asserted that the literary giant personified India. While 
Europeans and Americans’ adoration for the Nobel laureate was superficial hero-
worshipping, most Chinese held deep affection for Tagore as a representative of a 
country that was China’s brother. “Before most of the civilised races became active,” 
Liang spoke on behalf of China in its entirety, “we two brothers had already begun to 
study the great problems which concern the whole of mankind. We had already 
accomplished much in the interests of humanity.”22 The rekindled exchange of people 
and ideas between China and India reaffirmed the two nations’ role as beacons of 
civilization surrounded by shallow Euro-Americans, like how China in the past had to 
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hold on to its noble philosophical traditions despite being surrounded by uncivilized 
frontier peoples.  
The world-historical significance Liang attached to Tagore’s China tour was 
shared by some Chinese young intellectuals. One of them was the twenty-six-year-old 
Tan Yunshan, who would become the GMD’s most important contact in the Indian 
nationalist community in the 1930s. A lay Buddhist who spent his earlier career as a 
teacher and journalist with the Malayan Chinese community, Tan was not in China 
during Tagore’s lecture tour but retrospectively hailed it for having “awakened the 
dormant conscience of the Chinese nation” in his 1942 eulogy of the poet.23 The 
“awakening” to which Tan referred was diametrically opposed to the political 
mobilization by disciplined mass parties that formed the core of the “awakening” 
enterprise in the 1920s.
24
 What constituted awakening for Tan was not a new 
determination to achieve national liberation and fundamental transformation of society 
but deliverance from being “intoxicated and doped by the modern splendours and glories 
of materialistic west.”25 The result of the awakening process was thus not a political 
position or agenda but moralistic repulsion and disdain for consumerist hedonism, a sign 
of modern European decadence and decline. Asia-wide awakening, Tagore argued 
repeatedly in Hangzhou and Beijing, meant refashioning the ways in which societies 
interacted with each other, basing relationships not on geopolitical calculations or 
                                                 
23
 Tan Yunshan, “Rabindranath, the Gurudeva,” in Professor Tan Yun-shan and Cultural Relations between 
India and China, ed. V. G. Nair (Madras: Indo-Asian Publication, 1958), 15.     
 
24
 Fitzgerald, Awakening China, 330-332. 
 
25





economic interests but “the fruit of love and peace and friendship.”26 Addressing his 
young Chinese audience as a self-appointed representative of the vast continent, the 
celebrated poet announced that Asians would not follow the West, which was “becoming 
demoralized through being the exploiter, through tasting the fruits of exploitation.” Once 
Asians rediscovered their “own birthright” and “undying worth” from their own 




Tagore’s association with Liang Qichao and admiration for conservative critics of 
Enlightenment modernity in Europe did not pass unnoticed by leftwing critics in China 
and elsewhere. Detractors complained that Tagore’s aversion to mass mobilization, 
including that of such disciplined nationalist campaign as Gandhi’s swadeshi movement, 
combined with his romantic idealization of entrenched cultural norms meant a 
prescription of aesthetic withdrawal from confronting modern power relations, be it 
imperialism or the exploitation of labor.
28
 The fear that Tagore’s elitist cosmopolitanism 
could result in dubious political judgments was not ungrounded. Tagore’s espousal of 
Asian civilization and fascination with an aestheticized Japan untainted by industrial 
modernity meant that he was not always forthcoming in condemning the militaristic 
tendencies of the Japanese state. Indeed, while Tagore loathed the violence of modern 
political mobilization and military conflicts, he seemed to be concerned more with the 
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means by which violence was perpetuated than with violence itself. In the midst of the 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), he congratulated Japanese soldiers for refusing to be 
“mere cogs in the wheel” and repudiating Western mechanized warfare through their 
willingness to sacrifice for their emperor.
29
 Even in his renowned 1938 debate with the 
Japanese modernist poet Yone Noguchi on Japan’s full-scale invasion of China, Tagore’s 
categorical denunciation of Japanese aggression was juxtaposed with the striking lament 
that “the land of Bushido, of great Art and traditions of noble heroism” was being 
conquered by the “scientific savagery” of modern mechanical warfare.30  
The violence that appalled Tagore so deeply was inseparable from what he saw as 
the fundamental flaw of capitalist modernity: the reduction of valiant humanity into the 
standardized average masses deployed in not only mechanical warfare but also political 
mobilization of both the left and the right. As far as the Bengali writer was concerned, it 
was as much Japan’s submission to Western modernity as the devastation it brought upon 
the rest of Asia that rendered Noguchi’s vision of a Pan-Asianist alliance against Western 
imperialism disingenuous. Refusing to interrogate how anti-modernist celebration of 
Asian spiritual purity and vitality might have been an integral part of Japanese militarism, 
Tagore simply shifted his Pan-Asianist longing from “the land of Bushido” to Chiang 
Kai-shek’s “unconquerable” China.31 Tagore was, of course, no closet ultranationalist. 
What seemed obvious, however, was that Tagore’s poetic imagination of a heroic Asian 
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spirituality had blinded him to immediate, historically-specific forces that led to clashes 
between competing imperialist powers, nation-states and classes. His sublime idea of 
Asia was blissfully oblivious to geopolitics. If anything, an opaque and intensely 
internalized set of attributes rendered Tagore’s “Asia” radically detached from any form 
of social praxis and open to cooption by the hegemonic political agendas of the day.           
It was the very mysticism of Tagore’s Pan-Asianism that appealed to the 
custodians of the GMD’s diplomatic enterprise, which prized the revival of an ideal 
ethical order over transformative political action in its approach to imperialist capitalism. 
If Tagore’s depoliticized construction of national culture, as historian Andrew Sartori 
argues, represented a liberal politics disillusioned with its own praxis under imperialism, 
the GMD’s partaking of this utopian Asia was inseparable from the party’s exorcism of 
the ghost of its recent history under Comintern influence.
32
 Dai argued as early as 1925 
that Chinese nationalism was the basis of universal harmony (datong zhuyi) and that both 
goals had to be pursued by appealing to China’s traditional moral values. Treating 
capitalism, imperialism and class struggle as distinctly European malaises that were 
spreading across the world, a united front of oppressed peoples in Asia and ultimately the 
true liberation of humanity would be delivered not by social revolution but the quality of 
benevolence (ren’ai) and Sun Yat-sen’s compassion (ai) for the sufferings of the world’s 
colonized nations.
33
 After the Nanjing regime consolidated its grip on power, institutional 
steps were taken to realize this utopian vision of Asia’s moral renaissance. While the 
New Asia Society mostly served as a think-tank on all aspects of life in Asia and China’s 
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frontier, the Sino-Indian Cultural Society, founded in 1933, had a more specific mandate 
of fostering relationship between the GMD and the Congress in a time when “civil 
society” was the only arena in which interactions between the two nationalist movements 




A Modern Xuanzang 
 One key figure in the Sino-Indian Cultural Society and the GMD’s dealings with 
India at large was Tan Yunshan, the Tagore enthusiast. A Hunan native, Tan graduated 
from the First Provincial Normal College, in which he made friends with Mao Zedong 
and a number of prominent Communist revolutionaries. During his sojourn in British 
Malaya from 1924 to 1927, Tan was active among reformist Chinese Malayan 
intellectuals. Star Light (Xingguang), a literary supplement of the Singaporean Chinese-
language daily Lat Pau (Lebao) Tan launched in October 1925, exhibited features typical 
of New Culture periodicals in China. Contributors promoted new ideas, attacked old 
customs, and pushed for a modern written vernacular. They berated the traditional 
attachment to native-place associations among the diaspora, calling instead for a unified 
Chinese identity and an end to schools and hospitals that served descendents who hailed 
from particular counties or provinces.
35
 Yet, Tan was equally scathing of Chinese people 
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who blindly followed new trends, particularly consumerist fads from Europe.
36
 Like 
Liang Qichao, Tan did not see the West as providing the solutions to the cultural and 
social debauchery that plagued Chinese societies.  
 Although his sojourn in Southeast Asia prevented Tan from seeing Tagore in 
China in 1924, the young teacher’s admiration for Tagore was reciprocated by the latter 
when the two men met three years later in Singapore, during which the Indian poet 
persuaded Tan to join Visva-Bharati as a Chinese studies professor. Located in the 
Bengali town of Santiniketan, Visva-Bharati was no ordinary academic institution. The 
college was run by Tagore and exemplified his quest for a pedagogy distinct from the 
elitist and highly rationalized education experience the British introduced to its colony. In 
the two decades since his relocation to Santiniketan in 1928, Tan worked successfully to 
bridge the Pan-Asianisms of Tagore and the GMD, mediating between the Chinese 
nationalist movement with its Indian counterpart. In spite of his prominent role in 
Chinese diplomacy, the devout Buddhist actively fashioned himself as a modern-day 
pilgrim contributing to Sino-Indian “cultural intercourse” who had “nothing to do with 
any kind of politics,” even as he was urging Indian nationalists in 1942 to wholeheartedly 
join the Allies’ war effort against Japan.37  
 Being physically absent from China for most of his life and detached from the 
day-to-day operation of Republican society, Tan retained an impressionistic and aloof 
view of his native country and the political and ideological battles that attested to China’s 
polarized political and cultural scene. Lack of functional command did not mean the 
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Visva-Bharati academic had no clear views on developments back in his native country. 
Tan suggested to students and academics at Andhra University in 1938, for example, that 
captured Communist insurgents from Jiangxi were “very generously treated by the 
national government” and that GMD authority was “well established all over the country” 
and commanded “the allegiance of the entire Chinese nation.” Seemingly unaware of 
widespread popular discontent with Nanjing and the challenge posed by regional military 
strongmen to the central government, Tan singled out as threats to China’s unity 
“communist trouble and Japanese invasion.”38At times, his portrait of contemporary 
China verged on the exotic. Having criticized foreigners’ excessive interest in Chinese 
culinary culture at the expense of his country’s high culture and religious traditions, Tan 
went on nonetheless to document, since they were “so relished by foreigners,” the sixteen 
rules on hygienic food preparation as part of the New Life Movement.
39
 His non-partisan 
affiliation and apolitical persona regardless, there was no question which side of the 
political divide Tan was on.   
 Tan’s involvement in the GMD’s Pan-Asianist project began not long after his 
initial appointment at Visva-Bharati in 1927. In 1930, he joined a delegation of 
Nationalist state representatives on a mission to Lhasa. Fresh from the victory of the 
Northern Expedition, Nanjing were anxious to assert claim over the financially-
impoverished but independently-governed Tibet.
40
 The dramatic trip saw Tan played for 
the first time the role of unofficial diplomat as Nanjing’s envoy, Xie Guoliang, 
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unexpectedly died from illness before setting foot on Tibetan territory. Aside from 
delivering Chiang Kai-shek’s messages to the thirteenth Dalai Lama, Tan helped deliver 
a letter from the Tibetan leader to Gandhi on his return journey. After returning to 
Nanjing through British India, Tan wrote a letter to the Dalai Lama urging his 
government to rally behind the Nationalist government and support a union between 
Tibet and China. Demonstrating a shrewd understanding of the geopolitics of 
imperialism, Tan argued further in an open letter to the head of the theocratic regime, 
published in New Asia, that offers of independence and autonomy by imperialist powers 
were just precursors to outright colonization, citing as examples Korea, Vietnam, Bhutan 
and Sikkim. He urged Lhasa to accept autonomy as a part of Nationalist China, adding 
that the spirit of human salvation (jiushi jingshen) in Buddhist thought was in sync with 
the Three People’s Principles.41 Tan might have been a diplomat by accident, but it was 
obvious he took the interests of the Nanjing-based regime seriously. 
 Yet, the fact that Tan had never been a member of the Nationalist government 
until 1948, when he was appointed Nanjing’s cultural representative in India, allowed the 
idealistic academic to project his travels between India and China through the heavily 
contested geopolitical space of Tibet as instances of pure civilizational dialogue.
42
 Tan 
offered the same mix of religious solemnity and ethnographic curiosities in an account of 
his remarkable trip, focusing on his extended journey conveying the Dalai Lama’s 
message to Gandhi. Published by the New Asia Society, and adorned with calligraphies 
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of key GMD officials including Dai Jitao, Yu Youren (1879-1964) and Zhang Ji (1882-
1947), India Travelogue (Yindu zhouyou ji) portrayed the author’s increasingly active 
role in India as a pilgrimage and pure-minded quest for spiritual truth and revival of 
historical ties, reminding readers repeatedly of the fabled Tang Buddhist pilgrim 
Xuanzang (circa 602-664).
43
 Tan’s highly symbolic tour, which took place from March to 
May 1931, retraced the religious interaction between India and China by visiting 
Buddhist structures along the Ganges, including a structure reputedly commissioned by 
the eleventh-century Song emperor Renzong.
44
 He quenched his thirst with simple brown 
sugar syrup served by a local monk in the rustic pilgrimage site of Kushinagar, declaring 
its superiority to the fancy tea and coffee consumed by well-heeled urbanites.
45
  
 In spite of claims to the contrary, Tan did not completely disguise the intricate ties 
between religious or cultural exchanges and the politics of Asian nationalisms. Instead, 
he actively sought to seek commonalities between the nationalist movements of China 
and India. In Calcutta, Tan toured testaments to British imperial might like the Imperial 
Library, the Indian Museum, and the Victoria Memorial. He ruminated how Queen 
Victoria’s ascension to the Indian throne in 1876 was a humiliating episode in the history 
of a glorious civilization that no self-respecting Indian would forget and lamented how 
China suffered a similar fate under Western imperialism with the cession of Hong 
Kong.
46
 Tan’s visit to Gandhi, undoubtedly the climax of the trip, entailed discussion 
over the Congress’s tortuous negotiation with London over India’s political status and a 
                                                 
43
 Tan Yunshan, Yindu zhouyou ji [Travelogue to India] (Nanjing: Xin Yaxiya xuehui, 1933), 1, 45. 
 
44
 Ibid., 41-42. 
 
45
 Ibid., 80. 
 
46





common pledge to revive the spiritual bonds between the two nations.
47
 Like many of 
those captivated by Gandhi’s formidable charisma, Tan saw the Indian nationalist as a 
philosopher king leading a struggle for not only Indian or Asian, but also universal 
salvation. He called on the Mahatma in an outfit consisting of Gandhi cap and khadi or 
Indian homespun cloth, a telling symbol of devotion to an independent Indian nation.
48
 
Tan characterized the non-cooperation movement, the non-violence doctrine and the civil 
disobedience movement as embodiments of sincerity (cheng), compassion (ai) and 
harmony (he) respectively.
49
 Drawing on Sun Yat-sen’s eight traditional virtues (ba de), a 
key ideological component of GMD radical conservatives and their vision for a 
rejuvenated citizenry, in conceptualizing Gandhi’s anti-colonial program, Tan ensured 




Figure 6. Tan Yunshan in Gandhian cap and khadi, 1931. (Yindu zhouyou ji, fig. 34.) 
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 The immediate effect of the convergence of Chinese and Indian nationalisms as 
the alternative core of Pan-Asianism at Japan’s expense was a boost to Tan’s academic 
activities in India. Tasked by Tagore to raise fund for a Chinese studies institute that was 
eventually named Cheena Bhavana (Chinese Hall, Zhongguo xueyuan), Tan expressed in 
India Travelogue his disappointment that promised donations from Singaporean Chinese 
entrepreneur Aw Boon Haw (1882-1954) were not to materialize.
51
 Disappointment with 
the Southeast Asian Chinese diaspora, however, soon gave way to success in the 
homeland. After returning to China from Tibet and India in September 1931, Tan 
overcame his initial reluctance deriving from “the self-respecting character of a Chinese 
scholar,” took advantage of his connections with the political, religious and academic 
establishments of Nationalist society, and transformed himself into an effective 
fundraiser. Responses from such luminaries as Academia Sinica president Cai Yuanpei, 
Buddhist leader and philosopher Taixu (1890-1947), and Dai Jitao were “unexpectedly 
favourable.”52 A result of Tan’s efforts was the initiation of the Sino-Indian Cultural 
Society, with one chapter in Nanjing in 1933 and another at Visva-Bharati in 1934. With 
honorary presidents that included nationalist leaders of no less stature than Gandhi, 
Nehru, Chiang and his wife, the India chapter immediately worked towards the 
inauguration of Cheena Bhavana.
53
       
Both Sino-Indian Cultural Society and Cheena Bhavana were infused with the 
idealist politics of Asian cosmopolitanism as conceived by Tagore and Tan, even as the 
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two institutions were, from their conception, deeply embedded in the political 
machineries of organized nationalisms in both countries.
54
 Tagore’s 1937 speech marking 
the opening of Cheena Bhavana amounted to nothing less than a proposal for an 
alternative world order to the capitalist system of competing nation-states. The poet told 
the assembled audience – of which the young Indira Nehru (1917-1984), then a student at 
Visva-Bharati, was a member representing her ailing father –  that Sino-Indian relations 
would not be beset by conflicting interests because the Indians, as a colonized people, did 
not have a state. India’s lack, however, would prove to be an advantage since “not 
know[ing] how to help you or injure you materially,” Tagore and his compatriots could 
be nothing other than “your guests, your hosts, your brothers and your friends.” He 
categorically condemned capitalist globalization and its attendant system of nation-states, 
decrying that “in a world so closely knit by railways, steamships and air lines,” a “wrong 
kind of nearness” brought about a “terrorised world” of blunder, oppression and invasion 
at the expense of “peaceful races.”55 He hailed what he saw as the first step towards 
revitalizing India and China’s “exchange of gifts” as “noble friends” as an antidote to the 
alienation and violence of industrial modernity. “The moral force which has given quality 
to our civilization” – cooperation and love, mutual trust and mutual aid – would empower 
humans to “assimilate” twentieth-century scientific advances. Otherwise, Tagore warned 
in apocalyptic terms, science would “dominate and enslave them.”56 As a manifestation 
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of the increasingly close relationship between India and China, energized not least by 
Japan’s full-scale continental invasion, Cheena Bhavana was for Tagore a realization of 
his vision of a cosmopolitan utopia that would overcome the violent divisions in modern 
mass politics engendered by rival nation-states and political movements. The sinological 
institute was the first step towards a politics of idealist transcendence that consciously 
detached itself from the everyday social processes of a conflict-ridden world.  
 
Apolitical Utopia and Wartime Diplomacy 
 Barely three months had passed since the inauguration of Cheena Bhavana, which 
now hosted the Sino-Cultural Society in India, when the Second Sino-Japanese War 
broke out. Tagore compared Japan’s “murderous attack” on China to Fascist Italy’s 
invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, recognizing – if rather belatedly – that the “land of 
Bushido” had capitulated to the temptations of imperialist grandeur.57 Braving the 
volatile situation in coastal China, Tan traveled to Nanjing, working to bridge ties 
between not only cultures but political parties. Yet, as director of Cheena Bhavana, Tan 
made sure his wish for cultural and religious synergy untainted by political considerations 
was reflected in the institute’s research and training programs on Sino-Indian 
interactions. The high cultures of China and India, including languages, literatures, 
history, religions and philosophical innovations all fell under the purview of the institute. 
In particular, Buddhism formed “the nucleus of all such studies.”58 One highlight of 
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Cheena Bhavana’s publication program was the “restoration” into Indian languages of 
lost Sanskrit works that were translated into Chinese or Tibetan since the seventh 
century.
59
 Aside from scholars of Indian, Chinese, and Tibetan Buddhism, faculty 
members had expertise in the languages, philosophy and art of the three cultures. 
Compared to classical studies and religion, modern topics received much less attention. 
Except for one specialist who worked on modern Chinese literature, nobody at Cheena 
Bhavana wrote anything substantial on modern topics. The only scholar who wrote 
regularly on modern China and its relations with India was Tan Yunshan himself.
60
 The 
day-to-day functioning of Cheena Bhavana conformed to Tan’s romantic determination 
to retrace the trail blazed by Xuanzang.         
Historical religious exchanges underscored desires for solidarity between China 
and India in a time when a rival Pan-Asianism backed by the Japanese army was 
rampaging the continent. Unlike the violence and self-interested nature of Japan’s offer to 
liberate Asia from colonialism, cooperation between the Chinese and Indian nationalist 
parties was supposed to be altruistic, peaceful and morally superior. Tan played an 
instrumental role in forging interactions between Nationalist leaders and their Congress 
counterparts. The Sino-Indian Cultural Society arranged Nehru’s visit to China in August 
1939. Just months later, senior Buddhist monk Taixu led a delegation to India. The 
religious leader, who baptized Tan in the early 1920s and enjoyed close ties with the 
GMD, shared views on strengthening wartime Sino-Indian cooperation with Congress 
president Subhas Chandra Bose (1897-1945) and Nehru. Nehru, a moderate socialist and 
                                                 
59
 The Rules Regarding Studies in Cheena-Bhavana (1937), cited in Tan Yunshan, Twenty Years of The 
Visva-Bharati Cheena-Bhavana, 20. 
 
60





admirer of the Soviet Union, reportedly endorsed Taixu’s critique of Western civilization, 
the gist of which strongly echoed Dai Jitao’s diatribe against Marxism in the 1920s. The 
deepening military crisis, Taixu argued, was a result of the unfettered valorization of the 
material dimension of human existence. A union of China and India (Zhong Yin liangguo 
lianhe), with their strengths in furthering harmonious human relationships and cultivating 




In late 1940, it was Dai’s turn to visit India, becoming the first and only senior 
Nationalist official to have met with the regime’s unlikely admirer Tagore. Accompanied 
throughout his trip by Tan, Chiang Kai-shek’s trusted theoretician was advertised by the 
Congress as a “distinguished Buddhist scholar” on “a cultural goodwill mission.”62 Not 
unlike Tan’s tour of India almost a decade ago, Dai travelled “to see the historical places 
of the Buddhist faith.”63 Behind the scene, however, it was obvious to those in positions 
of authority that Dai represented the embattled GMD state. Chiang wrote to Gandhi and 
told him in no uncertain terms that Dai was a “representative of the Nationalist Party” on 
a mission to persuade Indian nationalists to join China in “frustrating the chief aggressor 
[Japan] and protecting Asian civilization.” Leo Amery, the British Secretary of State for 
India and Burma, advised Dai to meet with representatives of the Muslim community and 
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the princely states, reminding Guo Taiqi (1888-1952), the Chinese ambassador to Britain, 
that “Indian sympathy for China was not confined to the Congress.”64  
The subtle diplomatic tensions between Chongqing and London looked petty 
when set against the grandiose musings of the Congress on China-India interactions as 
Dai was welcomed to Swaraj Bhavan, the residence of the Nehrus in Allahabad: “We are 
familiar with the exploitation that results from the contact of our country with another. 
But our ancient relations [with China] have always been of a peaceful and brotherly 
nature.” Alluding to Dai’s Buddhist pilgrim persona, the Congress’s speech hailed India 
as the historic birthplace of the faith. It assured the Chinese guest that while most Indians 
were Hindus not Buddhists, their Hinduism incorporated the principles of the pan-Asian 
religion.
65
 Reciprocating Dai’s professed admiration for the non-violence movement, 
Congress officials introduced the visitor as “one who preaches the same doctrine of the 
supremacy of the law of love” as Gandhi.66 The fact that the GMD routinely deployed 
terroristic tactics against political opponents did not seem to have registered among Dai’s 
Indian hosts. Bringing the doctrine of love to bear in a world suffering from the worst 
excesses of the capitalist nation-state system, the speech concluded by calling on India 
and China to “establish in the east a bloc of free nations and thus bring about a new order, 
based upon equity … and human brotherlyness [sic].”67  
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India-China amity was presented not just as political maneuvering or a marriage 
of convenience under precarious global circumstances but also as part of an epic struggle 
against the debased, materialist “West.” The solution to modern alienation, exploitation 
and violence was to be found in philosophical outlooks but not in a new set of social and 
international relations. As a political practice steeped in its own share of mysticism and 
deference to Hindu religious knowledge, sections of Gandhi’s Congress Party had few 
qualms endorsing the Nationalist valorization of Asia as a moralistic but politically 
ambiguous will to overcome modernity.
68
 Alarmingly, a variant of the drive to transcend 
“materialism” was couched in terms of Japan’s quest to replace mass consumer society 
with a new “East Asia cultural sphere.”69 Of course, unlike Gandhi’s musings on Eastern 
spiritual superiority, Japan’s endeavor took the form of direct military confrontation with 
Anglo-American powers. 
 
Tenuous Alliance  
 Despite goodwill and a great deal of idealism on leaders’ part, the amity between 
GMD and Congress was tenuous. Divergent national interests and contesting visions of 
transnational solidarity greatly complicated the two parties’ shared anti-imperialism and 
history of religious exchange. In the mid-1920s, reflective of their participation in the 
                                                 
68
 Domestically, the Congress was just as likely to share the agendas of conservative, restorationist 
nationalism. Gandhi’s own faith in Varnashramadharma, the Hindu inspiration of the caste system, as a 
congenial force for constructing a society of order, responsibility and peace rendered his program for 
uplifting the untouchables to be one of reform within the system. Like Hindu militants, the Congress was 
deeply skeptical of political initiatives, such as strikes, on the part of the dalits and reluctant to question the 
social basis of untouchability itself. See, for example, Vijay Prashad, Untouchable Freedom: A Social 









Brussels League Against Imperialism conference, the two movements were bound 
together by the common aspiration towards national liberation. They signed a joint 
declaration that would have committed the parties to the exchange of intelligence, 
personnel, and information offices.
70
 After the April 12 anti-communist purge in 1927, 
there was a split within the Congress on how to understand the radical conservative coup 
that now defined the newly established Nationalist government in Nanjing. Nehru 
complained in a 1929 letter to Song Qingling, the left-leaning widow of Sun Yat-sen, that 
many of his colleagues believed the party-state delivered China from the shackles of 
imperialism. “A resolution congratulating China was passed by the National Congress,” 
he added, “although some of us pointed out the true facts and opposed the resolution.”71 
Others expressed fascination with Nationalist social engineering experiments. Vadilal L. 
Mehta, a prominent industrialist who participated actively in Gandhi’s rural 
reconstruction program, enthused that the strategy of compulsion deployed in the New 
Life Movement yielded better results than the decentralized voluntarism that was 
supposed to fuse India’s rural economy.72   
 As the prospect of war became imminent, Nehru overcame his initial distrust of 
the GMD and argued in 1938 that Nationalist China was an ally in the fight against global 
fascism of which Japan was a part.
73
 In August 1939, Nehru visited Chongqing and held 
talks with Chiang Kai-shek, whom the former now saw as the personification of “the 
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unity of China and her determination to free herself.”74 The nationalist leaders of the two 
societies agreed to enhance cooperation between the GMD and the Congress. Evoking 
the Brussels resolution, the two organizations promised again to send representatives to 
each others’ annual meeting, share information, and develop a “common outlook and 
policy” on foreign affairs.75 Given the sensitive nature of a political relationship between 
China's governing party and an Indian movement whose ultimate goal was the demise of 
the British Raj, the Sino-Indian Cultural Society was identified as a front organization by 
which agendas formulated by the two parties could be relayed through seemingly benign 
religious, academic and educational exchanges.
76
 There should be no doubt that the 
“religious” visits of Taixu and Dai to India were highly politicized contacts conceived 
and actively planned between senior figures of the two nationalist movements.     
 The renewed alliance between the GMD and Congress was shaky even at its 
conception.  Not all members of the Congress were willing to support Britain’s war 
efforts against Japan, especially when the colonizers, under Winston Churchill, showed 
no signs that they were willing to grant India any form of independence. Some Indian 
nationalists were unsurprisingly receptive to, or at least not actively opposed to, Japan’s 
version of Pan-Asianism, to which Tagore and Dai were once attracted. Former Congress 
president Subhas Chandra Bose’s abrupt switch in 1941 to allying with Japan and 
mobilization of militant Indians attracted to Japan’s call for an anti-imperialist Asian 
alliance was no doubt the most scandalous case of Indian nationalism’s vicissitudes vis-à-
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vis Japanese imperialism. But even Gandhi, who was hardly a Pan-Asianist, expressed as 
late as April 1942 that he was willing to negotiate with the Japanese empire as long as it 
would bring about immediate independence to India. Gandhi, who rallied behind him the 
more conservative and anti-socialist wing of his party, was under pressure from 
industrialists who feared destruction of their properties during fighting between Allied 
forces and the Japanese.
77
  
 The conciliatory attitude adopted by segments of the Congress towards Japan 
alarmed Tan Yunshan, forcing him to steer beyond his jealously guided role of apolitical 
interlocutor.  Disclaiming in September 1942 that he was no more than a “simple Chinese 
Buddhist scholar,” Tan nonetheless proceeded to caution his “Indian brethren” against 
Japan’s pretense to anti-imperialism and support for Indian independence. He even found 
it necessary to refute Gandhi, whose non-violence policy and spiritualism he admired, 
and the Congress’s argument that shifting from languishing under British imperialism to 
living within the Japanese sphere of influence amounted to nothing more than a “change 
of Master.” Faced with the military prowess of a German-backed Japan, Tan adopted an 
internationalist position in urging India to support the Allies in order to save the world 
and India’s aspiration for independence from being “trampled under Hitler’s iron heel.”78 
Tan’s rare deviation from his primary concern in “cultural intercourse and co-operation” 
was a tacit acknowledgment that Pan-Asianism – with its inherent contradictions, 
ambiguities and mysticism – was no stable basis for a nationalist movement busy revising 
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their strategies amidst the rapidly changing contours of global military and ideological 
conflicts. 
 Gandhi’s eventual assurance to Chiang that all Congress’ decisions would “lead 
to the strengthening of India’s and China’s defence” in June 1942 was, in spite of the 
well wishes of Tagore, Tan and their associates, a result less of Pan-Asianist conviviality 
than a marriage of  political calculations.
79
 In February 1942, Chiang Kai-shek, now the 
Supreme Allied Commander in China, spent two days in Santineketan with his wife while 
on an official visit to India, reaffirming Cheena Bhavan as a symbol of revived Sino-
Indian amity. The Generalissimo told Gandhi that “colored peoples (youse renzhong) 
ought to find their own way towards liberation.” Now that Japan had forfeited its 
responsibility to lead Asia and joined the rank of imperialist oppressors, the liberation of 
humankind rested with the combined forces of China and India, whose relationship 
through the past two thousand years was one of cultural and economic fusion and never 
of conquests and wars.
80
 The Congress’ response to active participation in the Allied war 
efforts as a renewed expression of India’s historical camaraderie with China was 
equivocal at best, insisting instead that India’s support was contingent on Britain’s 
promise of independence. “I would not think,” Gandhi told Chiang, “that Japanese 
soldiers were more evil than the British.”81 Nehru explained to Chiang at another 
occasion that Congress’ active participation would be seen as collaboration with the 
British colonizers and undermine the party’s legitimacy in Bengal, Subhas Bose’s home 
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province and support base. As for the increasingly impatient Generalissimo’s proposal 
that China and India should fight shoulder-to-shoulder (bingjian zuozhan) for national 
liberation, Nehru offered this less than subtle rebuttal:  
Before the war, Japan had sent people to be in touch with me, offering money and 
weapons in support of India’s revolution. … [Yet, the Congress declined the offer 
because] whenever foreigners came about to support our independence, we 
invariably got vanquished in the end.
82
     
Neither Gandhi nor his successor, whose sympathies for Chongqing were obvious, were 
prepared to fathom an alliance with their fellow-Asians once practical political agendas 
of the two sides diverged. Tagore’s vision for a relationship of pure compassion and 
spiritual generosity between two societies free from the distractions of nation-state-
building and embroilment in “Western” diplomacy proved ephemeral.  
 
Figure 7. Tan Yunshan (second left) welcoming Song Meiling and Chiang Kai-shek to Cheena-
Bhavana,  1942. (Tan Yunshan, Twenty Years of the Visva-Bharati Cheena-Bhavana.)  
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 Ultimately, the Congress’s professed solidarity with China was a result of 
Chongqing’s hard-headed calibrations of its own interests in relation to India’s nationalist 
goals. A case in point is China’s response to the Congress-initiated Quit India Movement. 
On August 8, 1942, the Congress passed a resolution calling for non-violent mass 
struggle against the British. The decision to demand an immediate end to British 
colonialism was informed in part by Gandhi’s assessment that Japan, having already 
reached the Indo-Burmese border, would soon prevail over the Allies. The colonial 
regime reacted swiftly and angrily to what they portrayed as a pro-Axis act, imprisoning 
the entire Congress leadership including Gandhi and Nehru on August 9. Popular protests 
followed suit across India, prompting Chinese fear over a sudden collapse of colonial 
rule. Chiang conveyed to the British ambassador to China that the Nationalist regime had 
no business in telling Britain how to run its empire. But the Chinese leader thought 
nonetheless that the arrest of Congress leaders was premature. Himself being no paragon 
of political tolerance, Chiang mused that if China were to adopt the same hardline stance 
towards India, the latter “might feel beleaguered and threw itself to Japan’s embrace.”83 
The last thing the GMD wanted was an Indian declaration of independence with Japan 
waiting at the doorstep to fill the power vacuum. Grandiose proclamations of worldwide 
salvation gave way to unsentimental realism and military strategizing. 
    
From Pan-Asianism to Third Worldism 
        The limitations of a depoliticized Pan-Asianism, with its attendant discourses of 
reified cultural commonalities and ethical renewal, were put to sharper relief by the stark 
                                                 
83
 Transcript of Chiang Kai-shek’s discussion with Horace James Seymour, 12 August 1942,  Chiang Kai-





social and ideological choices that nation-states and political movements worldwide had 
to make after 1945 as the thinly veiled rifts between the wartime allies resurfaced. As I 
argued earlier in the chapter, the GMD’s Pan-Asianism was a product of the party’s 
rejection of communism and search for a framework of international engagement other 
than the maligned Third International. For Dai, Tan and even Tagore, the struggle for 
national and Asianist subjectivity was fundamentally an idealist process of overcoming 
servitude to the cultures of both communism and Western capitalism. Modern 
imperialism, and the capitalist modernity with which it was entwined, was understood as 
an expression of nihilism and demoralization confined to the Euro-American culture of 
excessive material wealth and industrial standardization. While Nehru did not shy away 
from the rhetoric of culture, his idea of Asian solidarity was clearly conditioned by his 
analysis of the political and social conjuncture that produced inter-imperialist rivalries 
and eventually the Second World War. When Nehru wrote in the U.S.-based journal 
Fortune in 1942 that Asia and Africa would play a critical role in determining the 
outcome of the Second World War, he meant nations that were subjected under the forces 
of imperialism and fascism.
84
 Nehru’s notion of Asia – which he often mentioned 
alongside Africa, Spain and Soviet Russia – was thus not a cultural or spiritual entity 
pitched against the West’s debased civilization but a coalition of colonized and semi-
colonized peoples fighting to free themselves from the politico-economic savagery of 
imperialism. The imprint of his involvement in Comintern anti-colonialism, an 
experience that the GMD would rather forget, is obvious. Indeed, the Soviet experiment, 
like nationalist movements elsewhere, was for Nehru a laudable attempt to put an end to 
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the hegemony of “finance-imperialism.”85 Nehru’s “Asia” was a call for social changes 
that, for colonized peoples, was inseparable from the quest for national independence. 
 The clash between Nehru's incipient Third Worldism and culturalist Pan-Asianist 
diplomacy was brought to bear in the quiet unraveling of the uneasy alliance between 
China and independent India in the few years leading up to the Cold War. In 1947 Tan 
played the unofficial diplomat again, as a member of China’s delegation to the Asian 
Relations Conference. The conference, held in the heady days shortly before the creation 
of the Indian state in 1947, was envisioned by Nehru as a forum to assert Asia’s 
independence from European and American interests. Asian countries, he declared, must 
“have their own policies in world affairs” and an independent “political, social and 
economic structure.” The prime minister-designate asserted again Asia’s affinity with 
Africa as fellow-colonized peoples fighting for national independence.
86
 As an 
independent Asian nation-state, India was to have no part in helping the capitalist West in 
its suppression of communist and other radical nationalist movements in Southeast Asia, 
which Nehru saw not as malicious expansion of the Soviet empire but legitimate 
nationalist struggles.
87
 These strategies were to form the core of the anti-colonial non-
aligned movement which Nehru and Zhou Enlai (1898-1976), premier of Communist 
China, gave rise at the 1955 Bandung Conference.
88
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 The radical tone of Nehru alarmed the GMD, whose Pan-Asianist affinities with 
India was strained by its involvement in the American-led global campaign against 
communism and its Chinese variant. Even during the Pacific War, the GMD had 
concluded already that its interests were best served by being aligned with Washington’s. 
Just months after China managed to persuade the U.S. and Britain to replace the infamous 
“unequal treaties” with new treaties in 1943, Chiang told one of his negotiators that “not 
only would we not dread U.S. hegemony (chengba) over East Asia in the next thirty 
years, we only feared that the U.S. would refrain from seeking such hegemony.”89 
Nanjing was also frustrated that Tibet, over whose sovereignty Dai and Tan engaged in 
claiming, was extended invitation to send a delegation to the Asian Relations Conference. 
In an article written for the GMD headquarters, Dai argued that while Nationalist China 
could not afford to simply turn down Nehru’s invitation, it should send a delegation of 
academics and avoid commenting on anything of substance like international relations 
because “China’s position was different” to India as far as Europe and the U.S. were 
concerned.
90
 These individuals, comprised of Tan and figures associated with Dai 
through the New Asia Society, the Sino-Indian Cultural Society or the Examination 
Yuan, were sent as a subtle snub of Nehru’s plea for Third World solidarity. When Tan 
suggested – apparently nothing more than echoing the Sino-Indian Cultural Society – that 
an All Asia Cultural Association should be set up to promote Asian culture and world 
peace, he was lampooning “our fashionable socialist friends,” to which Nehru probably 
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belonged, and their vision of social change.
91
 Tan did suggest in another article written 
not for the conference but for a magazine that an “Asia Union,” with the multiethnic 
British outpost Singapore as its capital, be formed. But that Asia Union, as part of the 
Great World Union (datong), would be bound by nothing but amity, mutual help, and 
self-sacrifice to offset the self-interest that energized imperialism, including that of Soviet 
Russia.
92
 Tan was quick to assure that his musing on a post-national order was not 
intended to upset the status quo or “existing powers and interests.”93 The apparently 
ambitious proposal for global and Asian unity, which under another set of circumstances 
played a pioneering role in mediating between the two nationalist movements of China 
and India, marked the parting of ways between the GMD’s staunch anti-communism and 
Nehruvian India’s left nationalism in the emerging Cold War order.  
 
The Limits of Pan-Asianism 
 As part of Visva-Bharati, Cheena Bhavana, along with the India chapter of the 
Sino-Indian Cultural Society survived the financial fallout of the GMD’s demise in 
Mainland China. The China chapter, however, was liquidated and its assets, including the 
funds raised in 1943 in support of India’s famine relief efforts, were transferred to Visva-
Bharati.
94
 By the early 1950s, the once wartime allies descended into full-blown Cold 
War rhetoric. Zhu Jiahua, a former chair of the Sino-Indian Cultural Society in China 
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who in 1942 pleaded Gandhi for India to work together with China to realize Asia’s 
renaissance (fuxing), now lambasted Nehru for his compromising attitude towards Mao 
Zedong and appeasement of Soviet Russia.
95
 At about the same time, the principal of 
Cheena Bhavana made a remarkable shift of allegiance from the GMD to the People’s 
Republic. In 1956, Tan visited Communist China with his daughter on Zhou Enlai’s 
invitation and was feted in Beijing by Mao Zedong. One year after, Tan welcomed the 
Communist premier to Cheena Bhavana and received a one-off donation from Beijing.
96
 
The symbolic donation, which afforded a veneer of continuity in Sino-Indian relations, 
could not hide the fact that the school was no longer the front organization for important 
and clandestine interactions between a China under Japanese imperialist assault and an 
India still searching for its own nation-state. It also marked the fact that the Pan-Asianist 
idealism that Tagore and Tan represented was no longer compatible with the 
internationalist agendas of either independent India or Maoist China. 
In a way, it was to be expected that the romantic longing for the unity of Asia as a 
religious and aesthetic entity was no blueprint for effective political action. Tan 
emphasized numerous times that he cared about nothing but culture, even when he was 
obviously making political statements. This seemingly contradictory claim suggested not 
that Tan – or, for that matter, Zhu Guangqian’s apparently apolitical support for Chiang – 
was disingenuous but that his involvement in state affairs and vision of Asia was not 
tainted by consideration of self-interest or even the interests of particular nations or social 
groups. In other words, Tan’s Asia entailed an aesthetical unity – in the Kantian sense of 
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a complete disregard of interest – that had little or no bearing on social relations and 
power structures.
97
 The substitution of cultural imagination for the contest of socio-
economic interests through political action explained why Pan-Asianists and liberals in 
China and abroad could endorse the GMD without agreeing fully with its ideological 
platform or behaviors in government. In fact, the Nationalists, as soon as they assumed 
state power in 1927 and more so during the resistance war, were keen to present their 
program as beyond political fray compared with their domestic and foreign rivals. They 
claimed to transcend Communist class warfare and any sectarian interests that drove mass 
protestors and the expansionist greed that characterized Soviet internationalism and 
Japanese nationalism.        
 
Figure 8. Tan Yunshan welcoming Zhou Enlai to Cheena-Bhavana, 1957. (Tan Yunshan, Twenty 
Years of the Visva-Bharati Cheena-Bhavana.) 
 
 
The pitfalls of this disinterested aesthetics were succinctly revealed by Karatani 
Kôjin in his analysis of the ambiguous relationship between many Japanese intellectuals 
and the Shôwa state’s expansionism during the Pacific War. Reading wartime figures like 
                                                 
97





Yasuda Yojûrô and Nishida Kitarô, whose intellectual genealogy could be traced to the 
great Pan-Asianist Okakura Tenshin, Karatani observes how romantic disinterestedness 
negated the need to tackle social contradictions as they were deemed to have been 
sublated a priori in one’s consciousness. This procedure allowed Yasuda, Nishida and 
others to jettison concrete political programs and simply entrust their desires for a 
conflict-free human order to the state and its objectives. Japan’s Greater Asia Co-
prosperity Sphere was hence idealized and celebrated as having transcended both the 




Tan and Tagore, to be sure, had no illusions about Japan’s continental ambitions. 
Yet, their call for Asia’s spiritual unity and disdain for any consideration of interest 
resulted in a politics that dovetailed nicely with the GMD’s conservative revolution of 
consciousness as the party actively oppressed any “materialist” challenge to the social-
political hierarchy. Historian Prasenjit Duara observes that regimes of authenticity and 
idealizations of cultural essences such as Pan-Asianism were expressions of alternative 
conceptions of time, history and collective identity that coexisted with and challenged the 
abstract and linear time of capitalist modernity. Yet, it is precisely their posture of 
transcendent existence vis-à-vis capitalist modernity that prevented them from actively 
engaging with the aporias and contradictions of capitalist modernity.
99
 Refusing to adopt 
a politics that confronted the material social relations and exploitation underpinned by 
capitalism, Pan-Asianist ideologies, whether they originated from India, China or Japan, 
were volatile and resulted either in religious withdrawal from the concrete injustices of 
                                                 
98
  Karatani Kôjin, “Overcoming Modernity,” in Contemporary Japanese Thought, ed. Richard Calichman 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 106-114.  
 
99




the world or co-option by the reactionary politics of Nationalist China and Shôwa Japan. 
Reading Tagore’s paean to Chiang Kai-shek cited in the beginning of the chapter and 
Tan’s pledge that his proposal of Asia Union would accommodate U.S.-dominated 
geopolitical configurations, one cannot help but feel the hollowness in their denunciation 
of modern imperialist violence. But while Tan would soon follow Nehru in engaging with 
Communist China and the Third World, the Nationalist regime submitted itself fully to 
the American imperium in order to continue its supposedly anti-imperialist conservative 
revolution.     
        
  




The Radical Conservative Legacy 
 
 
 In the foregoing chapters, we saw the conservative revolution mainly as a social 
experiment conceived and directed by party-state cadres to diffuse the threat of a class 
revolution led by radicalized workers and peasants. Arising out of the ideological 
ambiguity that was Sun Yat-sen’s legacy in the late 1920s, radical conservative GMD 
activists decided that the national revolution would have to re-engage the masses under 
the banners of patient economic development, interclass cooperation and moral uplift. 
Party elders like Dai Jitao, Li Shizeng and Hu Hanmin were convinced that materialist or 
class-based politics was detrimental to China’s precarious existence as a nation-state 
battling against hostile imperialist forces from Europe, Japan and even Soviet Russia. At 
the same time, GMD cadres themselves were faulted for their bureaucratic inertia and 
ideological agnosticism, and their behaviors were likened to the cynical, chattering 
political elite who dominated parliament under the warlord regime. Activists who came 
to power after the April 12 coup in 1927 went about realizing an institutionalized 
revolutionary nationalism imbued with youth vitality, strict Leninist-style hierarchy, and 
a commitment to tame but not topple capitalist social relations.  
 Demands for socio-economic justice were rechanneled into a party-led quest for 
refined customs and tastes. Everyday lifestyle became a unified realm in which a 
salubrious, voluntaristic, obedient national subject was to be nurtured.  In the 1930s, the 
GMD appropriated scouting, a quintessential treaty-port institution, as a politically 
reliable mode of mass activism. From the late 1930s through the 1940s, the National 
Spiritual Mobilization Movement consolidated the state’s claim on daily consumption 
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and time management as constitutive of popular defense against Japan during what was 
China’s first total war against a foreign enemy. Finally, the GMD’s ostensibly apolitical 
promise of spiritual rebirth from the materialism of modern life and Western 
technological prowess allowed it to win support from liberal humanist intellectuals like 
Zhu Guangqian and foreign nationalists like Rabindranath Tagore. 
 The centrality of everyday practices in the conservative revolutionary enterprise 
derived from the GMD’s distinct strategy on building social consent. Unlike radical 
leftwing parties, which typically expected all citizens to actively contribute to the 
political life of a revolutionary society, the GMD strived to sublimate political demands 
into aesthetic expressions. This approach was developed during the conservative 
revolution’s relatively stable first decade from 1927 to 1937. While Communists and 
leftwing activists mobilized students to take part in strikes that disrupted school routines, 
the GMD, through mass movements like scouting, worked to keep young people mentally 
and physically occupied with spectacular rituals, glamorous uniform, regular training and 
the occasional trips across the country or abroad. For GMD cadres, scouting not only 
served to divert young energy from subversive politics but also redeemed citizens’ moral 
callousness, a failing that was blamed for the Communist clout. The aestheticization of 
politics was pursued with renewed vigor during the resistance war, when national unity 
under rightwing Nationalists was portrayed as politically transcendent and endorsed, 
albeit reluctantly, by rival Communists for the first time until 1927. To shore up the 
nation’s amorphous spiritual force, the wartime state delivered its ideological and 
military defense priorities to the people by deploying monumental ceremonies, popular 
entertainments in speech and in text, and a healthy work-leisure pattern. By bringing 
257 
individuals into an order of disciplined beauty, the GMD aimed to ameliorate mass 
alienation from Nationalist society and stem popular support for communism.                  
 The GMD’s self-representation as an antidote to a disaffected and demoralized 
populace gained traction among the intellectual elites in China and abroad. Rather than 
being recognized as a coalition representing specific class interests, the regime was 
imagined as an unbiased custodian of spiritual and ethical renewal. Whether it was 
taming excitable philistines or heralding the revival of a non-materialistic Asian culture, 
the GMD appeared more as what Gramsci called an ethical or cultural state than as an 
institution that wielded only coercive power.
1
 Zhu Guangqian’s contribution to wartime 
propaganda was underlined by his identification of cultural and moral edification, a task 
which New Culture liberal intellectuals supposedly led, with the Nationalists’ emphasis 
on cultivating consent for their rule. The overlap between moralizing and political 
strategizing in the conservative revolution was stretched to its extreme in China’s 
flirtations with nationalist figures in other Asian countries. The Pan-Asianist ideals the 
GMD brandished in its engagement with Japanese and particularly Indian political elites 
had geopolitical implications, particularly as regards to the Comintern and the CCP. Yet, 
at the same time, the regional identity espoused by private individuals like Tan Yunshan 
and Rabindranath Tagore appeared as apolitical. Pan-Asianism was instead presented as a 
means to overcoming the spiritual crises of Western modernity and the cold calculation 
of material interests that pervaded government cabinets and factory boardrooms.     
 The foregoing chapters are primarily concerned with the state and figures close to 
the state.  They show that the GMD led a social movement that, in its embrace of 
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nationhood and denial of class politics had successfully tapped on the fears and 
aspirations of reformist educators, liberal humanists, and Indian nationalists. What 
remains to be examined is whether the conservative revolutionary tenets might have been 
internalized by local societies and remained relevant after the short Nationalist reign in 
Mainland China. How did figures geographical and intellectually removed from centers 
of political power and knowledge production understand the supposed threat to China’s 
unique moral essence? What connections did local elites and officials at the height of the 
Nationalist social experiment in the 1930s and the war of resistance make between drastic 
social changes in urban China, instability in rural areas, and Communist insurgencies? 
The GMD, along with the Falange in Spain and the Estado Novo in Portugal, was one of 
the few interwar radical right regimes that survived the supposed defeat of fascism in 
1945. The party’s strident anti-communism, preoccupation with authority and social 
hierarchy, and retrieval of a primordial Chinese spiritual essence were given a new lease 
of life in Taiwan as the United States consolidated its Cold War front in Asia with 
financial largess and military hardware in the early 1950s. These are questions that 
deserve further investigation. In the epilogue, I propose several directions that future 
research on China’s conservative revolution can take. First, by examining citizens’ 
petitions received from various parts of China by the national government, I will show 
how local expressions against communism converged with the state’s depiction of a 
pervasive leftwing threat to the nation’s moral and political constitution. Second, I will 
identify the ways that the GMD’s ideological priorities remained relevant after the party-
state was defeated by the CCP and forced into exile on the island of Taiwan after 1949. 
    
259 
Vernacular Anti-communism 
 Even when the GMD’s revolutionary hegemony was in full swing, one daunting 
challenge for party-state propagandists was to translate the party’s rejection of 
communism into a vernacular that would connect with local communities beyond people 
of national stature like writer Zhu Guangqian or scout organizers Zhang Zhongren and 
Zhang Xiaoliang. While the concept of anti-communist national revolution was 
buttressed with elaborately articulated understandings of Marxism, domestic and overseas 
revolutionary politics, and global capitalism as it related to semi-colonial China, it was 
also increasingly abused as a loosely defined but sacralized moral symbol.
2
  Labeling 
communism reactionary was as much about argumentation as demonization of a 
competing claim to the revolutionary mantle. Communism was portrayed as a moral 
symptom and a highly personalized experience akin to religious apostasy. Marxist-
Leninism, like Mussolini’s Fascism, was a dangerous novelty that inflamed (shandong) 
the impressionable masses. Exotic, foreign and alluring, these political imports, like sex, 
drugs and alcohol, hypnotized (cuimian) and anesthetize (mazui) young people who 
mindlessly dabbled in glamorous diversions.
3
 In repentance letters required of ex-
Communists, such as the well-publicized piece penned by writer and translator Yao 
Pengzi (1891-1969), the cultic appeal of Marxism was attributed to the ennui (kumen) 
and self-doubt (panghuang) a young idealist experienced under personal and social 
crises. Participation in the Communist movement was a deeply immersive process, 
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comparable to a religious ascetic (kuxing zeng) who opted out altogether from society in 
order to “lend the self a new life” (xinsheng ziji). Referring to Communist-inspired 
workers insurgencies in cities, Yao derided the party for behaving like a secret society 
(mimi jieshe) that “inspired terror among innocent citizens like a tiger.”4 The horror of a 
murky evil force threatening to destroy social hierarchy and private propriety ran deep 
informing popular views of Communism in Mainland China until 1949 and in Taiwan 
through the 1950s and beyond.                    
       Fear that a seedy organization was taking every opportunity to wreck havoc on 
innocent common people inspired a vernacular anti-communism that tainted radical 
leftwing politics with the stench of banditry and foreign heresy. If Zhu Guangqian was 
alarmed that the China’s cultural renewal was sabotaged by an excitable mob under 
political opportunists’ influence, rural residents anchored their anxieties over 
disintegrating social order, criminal activities, and declining moral standards squarely on 
evil communism. Lacking the knowledge of Marxist theories commanded by Dai Jitao or 
Hu Hanmin, educated citizens in rural areas and smaller cities encountered CCP 
maneuverings as disruptions to their daily life, challenges to local hierarchies, or simply 
ruthless malefactors. In a 1931 letter, Li Jiazhao, from Lanshan county, decried that land 
redistribution as carried out in Communist-controlled Jiangxi province was a recipe for 
faming harmful lust among village simpletons. The Japanese-educated high school 
headmaster, who earlier ran the local militia (tuanlian) in 1898 and oversaw his county’s 
transition to Republican rule as its magistrate in 1912, saw CCP guerilla forces as nothing 
less than a gang of brigands. “Red bandits” (hongfei), Li charged, were recruiting idle 
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hooligans and local thugs in their ranks and threatening social order. They even managed 
to infiltrate local pro-GMD militias responsible for “pacification.” Of particular danger 
was the Communist promise to divide the land and properties the party seized. Insurgents 
not only occupied possessions from their rightful owners but also “inflamed people’s lust 
to rob” from each other.5  
 Collapsing hooliganism or banditry with Communist practices rendered not only 
the political movement, but also leftwing cultural production, morally suspect. In his 
1931 petition, Zhang Yuan, a director of the Xikang and Tibet Expedition Society (Kang 
Zang buxing tuan) who also studied in Japan, claimed that he had written to warn Sun 
Yat-sen of the communist threat as early as 1919, when communism was beginning to 
gain currency among urban intellectuals. For Zhang, it was obvious that the communist 
seduction worked as effectively on jobless riff-raff as on these self-indulgent 
intellectuals. He stated, “Communists bring disaster to society not only by inflicting 
violence. They have an even more reactionary method in what they call proletarian 
literature.” Leftwing novelists, tabloid journalists and editors were a privileged corps of 
“well-fed and well-clothed literary hoaxes hiding in foreign concessions under aliases”. 
Aside from military extermination, extensive censorship was required to stem the 
attraction of class warfare to “ignorant workers and peasants and youths left without a 
future.”6 More than sheer criminality, Zhang suggested, communism reflected the 
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nation’s “hollowed social mores” (renxin fudong) that the GMD was uniquely placed to 
redress.  
 For regional notables like Zhang, the GMD’s enemy was a composite of mutually 
exclusive but equally repugnant qualities drawn from China’s diverse socio-economic 
landscape. Chinese Communists acquired multiple and sometimes contradictory 
attributes, featuring as rural bandits, urban bohemians and manipulating politicians. 
Wang Chaolong, from the interior province of Anhui, observed in 1931 that Communists 
posed the gravest challenge to the republic since Yuan Shikai’s (1859-1916) notorious 
monarchical experiment in 1916. Leftwing activists, the petitioner argued, were no 
different than warlords, local tyrants and evil gentry who terrorized rural society and 
bewitched the people. He then plunged into a tirade against the nation’s lack of moral 
direction, which ostensibly gave rise to forces that tore into China’s natural social order 
and hierarchy. Instead of learning about ethical scruples from the Confucian classics, 
people these days fed on Shanghai tabloids that pandered to sensual excitements and 
bohemian frivolity. “People,” Wang lamented, “knew only about the pleasures in life but 
neglected the moral teachings of the sages.” To Wang, political demands for common 
ownership of property were tantamount to treacherous heterodoxy plotting to reverse an 
agrarian society’s supposedly natural, asymmetrical relationships between fathers and 
sons, social superiors and inferiors, the old and the young, the rich and the poor.
7
 The 
specter of total anarchy inspired a vernacular anti-communism that had no interest in 
ascertaining whether Marxism was relevant to the China’s struggle for national liberation. 
To landlords and the local gentry, the idea that their social and material capital should be 
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collectivized was a travesty of Chinese communal life. Rather than dignifying radical 
peasants and urban leftwing intellectuals with the gravitas of a political movement, Wang 
and others saw them as social outcasts who should simply be eliminated like criminals. 
To be sure, the views presented above did not represent all local community 
leaders’. The three examples, all drawn from 1931, were after all petitions appealing to 
the state’s benevolent attention. The value of letters and self-published treatises rests not 
necessarily in their wide representativeness but in that they provide a window to the 
prejudices and biases that lent grassroots legitimacy to the GMD’s conservative 
revolution. These writings often took the form of hyperbole, exuding not sophisticated 
argumentation but commonsensical biases that prevailed outside China’s political and 
cultural centers. In addition, what was revealing about accusations directed to the GMD’s 
political opponent was not their veracity but the ways in which incrimination was 
attached. During and after the resistance war, the communist movement was branded as a 
traitorous, bloodthirsty army that was no different than the Japanese. Local informants in 
the heavily contested North China region painted the Red Army as a gang of lustful and 
greedy monsters, behaving in a manner reminiscent of the recently defeated Japanese 
invaders. Communists were stealing grains, looting homes, conscripting able-bodied 
men, and harassing women. In a desperate attempt to legitimize their heinous acts, the 
CCP in the Hebei county of Yutian even issued their own currency to buy grains from the 
people.
8
 Given North China’s rich experience living under successive warlord and 
collaborationist regimes in the Republican period, it was not too difficult for the region’s 
                                                 
8
 “Beiping di wu lei hanjian zhaiyouzhi ji fuhangao huiji” [A collection of abstracts of “category five” 




residents to imagine the Communists as just another group of corrupt, self-serving 
functionaries.  
If Communist advances were threats to life and property, thwarting such wicked 
schemes was fundamental to effective governance. Jiang Fengshan, a merchant from 
another county in Hebei province, wrote in 1945 that he was disheartened about the 
replacement of the local magistrate. Xu Chunlin, the Jiaohe (present-day Botou) county 
chief, reportedly maintained formidable defense against the Communist-led Eight Route 
Army.  Once Xu was replaced, however, the military balance immediately tipped against 
the Nationalists. The departing magistrate, Jiang asserted, “didn’t ask for anything from 
the people. He wished only to root out the threat they were facing.” Another unnamed 
Jiaohe resident even took the matter up with Chiang Kai-shek. “Your Excellency 
(daren),” the resident referred to the Nationalist leader in the archaic tone of an imperial 
subject addressing his benevolent patriarch (or, indeed, matriarch), “had come to Beiping 
to listen what the common folks (lao baixing) had to say. For us, seeing Your Excellency 
was as good as seeing our mother.” Continuing in the same colloquial language, the 
petition testified that “the old gentlemen (laorenjia),” i.e. Xu, “had personally fought and 
shot down many bandits (tufei) and was not greedy.” 9 In another instance of how anti-
communism was enmeshed in local or even personal vendettas, a Central Police College 
graduate by the name of Tan Jie wrote in November 1947 to seek for Chiang’s “sagely 
attention” (shengjian), another salutation formerly reserved for the Emperor or the 
Empress dowager. Apparently, the commandant Li Shizhen was so jealous of the 
petitioner’s fervent hatred for the “Communist bandits” that he was locking Tan up in cell 
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 By directly communicating with the Leader, whom Zhu 
Guangqian described as the locus of popular will, the accusation against Li implored 
Chiang to punish his own trusted official so as to reassert his – and the nation’s – 
determination to quell an existential threat to society.           
As the CCP grew bolder in its challenge to the state, petitions pointed to a larger 
postwar malaise in Chinese society for which the GMD was hardly inculpable. The fear-
inspiring “Red” cult was symptomatic of the terminal decay over which the Nationalist 
state presided, analogous of how religiously-inspired rebellions portended dynastic 
decline. Teachers at Yuzhang High School in Hunan observed that the failure to rebuild 
the Confucian moral economy tarnished during the war against Japan was to blame for 
the prevalence of Red Terror (chise kongbu). Defying the Confucian admonishment, 
outlined in The Great Learning (Daxue), that moral virtue was the basis for the 
possession of wealth and land, citizens were enthralled by communist heresy and set their 
desire on ill-gotten wealth by holding strikes and refusing to pay land rent.
11
 While its 
enemy exploited the ethical vacuum that afflicted Chinese society, the GMD was not 
doing enough to inject discipline and propriety into the economy. A petitioner from 
Beiping, who wrote under a pseudonym for fear of CCP reprisal against his family, 
lambasted the state for failing to rein in the laissez faire economy that was hampering 
postwar recovery. Wang Yiji charged that merchants were free to import luxury and 
unnecessary goods, thus depleting the nation’s limited resources and foreign reserves. He 
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echoed the state’s goal of crafting a “new life” for the country, arguing that the substance 
of this social vision lay in ending the extravagant lifestyle enjoyed by a small minority 
and ensuring inflation did not threaten common people’s everyday livelihood. 
Demonstrating exceptional awareness of international developments, Wang made the 
prescient suggestion that China’s fight against communism was not only a domestic 
concern. By aligning firmly with the United States, Nanjing could hold Washington 




 Another recommended strategy on preventing economic hardship from further 
undermining the government’s legitimacy would see shares of the China Textile 
Development Corporation, formed in late 1945 to take over Japanese-run textile factories 
in China, transferred to frontline workers. Sent from a silk mill run by the state-owned 
enterprise in downtown Tianjin,  Hu Nianzu’s petition made the corporatist argument that 
giving workers a stake in the nation’s industries would ensure private capital (siren ziben) 
not take lead over the country’s embattled economy, build harmony between antagonistic 
classes, and foster working-class support for the GMD state. Instead of privatization, the 
rumors of which were inspiring fear among workers, Hu wanted the government to turn 
employees into small shareholders so that they would restrain capitalists’ control over the 
enterprise.
 13
 Alluding to the Nationalist commitment to interclass cooperation, Hu’s 
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proposal highlighted the state’s lack of positive initiatives in luring people away from the 
Communist movement. 
Indeed, vernacular expressions of anti-communism spared no punches blaming 
the ruling party for contributing to the socio-political conditions that favored the 
demonized opposition. Of particular concern were corrupt local officials occupying the 
lower rungs of the bureaucratic ladder. Tang Yun, a thirty-two-year-old primary school 
teacher in the Hunan city of Xiangtan, submitted in 1946 that the local bureaucratic 
infrastructure was in total disarray. There was perhaps something self-serving about 
Tang’s letter, which accompanied his curriculum vitae and a plea to the state to “break 
rules so that people with real talent could be hired.” Yet, the recent GMD and Three 
People’s Principles Youth Corps recruit’s indictment of state functionaries remained 
striking. The Communists were unsurprisingly described as a frenzied lot who would not 
think twice about slaughtering their compatriots and sacrificing the country to benefit 
party. But while their opponents were at least fanatical (sangxin bingkuang) about their 
convictions, GMD cadres staffing rural governments, Tang decried, “toadied superiors, 
abused official power, oppressed villagers and applied exorbitant levies on the people.” 
Their disreputable behaviors served only to negate positive social measures enacted by 
the state to compete with the CCP, such as Chiang’s 1945 rent reduction directive issued 
days after the two warring parties agreed to convene formal meetings to deliberate on a 
new constitution.
14
 What is alarming about Tang’s depiction of bureaucratic greed and 
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harassment was how it rendered his GMD comrades almost complicit in the criminality 
attributed to their Communist nemesis.  
The critical tone adopted by some petitioners indicated a growing sense of 
impatience among the propertied classes and minor conservative intellectuals who 
represented the firmest of GMD’s social base. These figures, active in local institutions, 
formed the most fervently anti-communist segment of society. During the U.S.-mediated 
peace negotiations in 1945 to 1946, they faulted Chiang for conceding too much to the 
Communists and being too accommodating of the latter’s existence.15 It is precisely 
because of this staunch anti-communism that one must not interpret criticisms of GMD 
incompetence as subversive statements. In fact, as my analysis of the 1927 party 
purification initiative has demonstrated, there was a tradition within the GMD that saw 
misconduct and corruption within its own ranks and ideological heresy as two sides of a 
general paralysis inflicting the revolutionary project. As Tang Yun put it, “These days, 
the party-state institution exists in name only. … If our organization is not strengthened, 
thousands of youths will remain outside the party and the Three People’s Principles 
Youth Corps, giving others an opportunity to lure and coerce them.”16 Submissions like 
Tang’s were vernacular expressions of Dai Jitao’s longstanding unease with how 
bureaucratic inertia and the breakdown of ideological cohesion in his party compared 
unfavorably with the CCP’s organizational rigor.  
Like party leaders who tied popular alienation from the state with the lack of 
spiritual heft in everyday life, GMD loyalists in local society blamed modern urban 
                                                 
15




 Tang Yun to Chiang Kai-shek. 
 
269 
customs for weakening the nation’s moral fiber. Ruptures in the social fabric appeared 
not so much as concrete beliefs and ideologies as jarring manners and fashions. A 
Shanghai resident who hailed from the inland city of Hefei lambasted his compatriots’ 
fascination with European material culture. With the nation facing political instability, 
foreign intrusions and chronic natural disasters, Li Lie could not stand how his fellow-
urbanites were squandering money on Western fads. He suggested in 1936 that schools 
should prohibit students from growing their hair long and that health authorities and the 
police should ask hairdressers to throw away tools used for coloring and permanent-
waving.
17
 As in the days immediately after the 1911 Revolution when the queue was a 
symbol of subservience to alien rule, flamboyant hairstyles were regarded as signs that 
modern urban women were too hedonistic to identify with the crisis-prone republic. Body 
culture remained the most visible indicator of political and social doom. If conflicts 
between workers, peasants, and owners of capital were affronts to the natural order of 
things, exposed and intimate bodies were tell-tale evidences of break-down in ritualistic 
and social propriety. Effeminate boys, scantily-clad girls, erotic films, and even men and 
women sharing the same swimming pool were as anathema as Communist insurgencies.
18
  
Buffeted by bizarre fashion, frivolous dialogues, and cinematic carnality, 
conservative moralists sought solace in choreographed rituals that projected hierarchy 
and a common belief in Confucianism and Sun Yat-sen’s national revolution. Li Weixin 
and his fellow teachers in Hunan called for the reintroduction of liturgical elements in 
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mandatory monthly assemblies in late 1947. Taking a leaf out of wartime citizen 
assemblies and the recently abolished Sun Yat-sen memorial assemblies, Li and his 
colleagues recommended rites that included solemn music, bowing to the national flag, 
Sun Yat-sen’s portrait and a figurine of Confucius, and singing the musicalized version of 
an oft-cited passage from the Book of Rites.
19
 Internal critics of bureaucratic 
incompetence were ardent believers in the conservative revolutionary mantle that 
building a sustainable political community was ultimately a moral and ethno-cultural 
project of which the party was the sole vanguard.        
 Desires for moral rejuvenation, bureaucratic efficiency and a return to the 
familiar dogmas of a China before the onslaught of modernity thus gave shape to a 
vernacular construction of communism as radical evil. The appeal of this psychological 
approach resided in how it allowed those who held power in society to explain away 
conflicts of interest and ideas by invoking the innate derangement of the Other. Systemic 
challenges like semicolonialism, uneven economic development, and cultural dislocation 
brought by modernity were blamed on unseemly individuals – unpatriotic Communists, 
hedonistic urban youths, unscrupulous capitalists, and corrupt officials. It was this 
perception of failure in social edification that informed the submission by a county 
official in Guangdong province suggesting that the astronomical rise of grain price after 
the war was due to the upper class being overly calculating and lacking moral conscience 
(liangxin daode).
20
 It is also this obsession with moral cultivation that bound the 
vernacular anti-communism of local elites with the subtler endorsement on the part of 
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national figures like Zhu Guangqian for the Nationalist state. For both, leftwing activism 
was symptomatic of China’s frustrated search for social stability and cultural meaning 
through the Republican period. The moral investment in anti-communism remained a 
salient motif in Taiwan as the former Japanese colony was refashioned as the base from 
which Nationalist China would undergo great revival. 
        
Conservative Revolution in Nationalist Taiwan 
 In 1949, Chiang Kai-shek’s GMD was forced to retreat onto Taiwan by the very 
political force that gave radical conservatism its ideological identity more than twenty 
years ago. The Communist ascendency in China, Korea and Southeast Asia aligned the 
battered Nationalist state with U.S. designs for a global fight against the Soviet bloc. 
What remained of the conservative revolution, with its well-advertised ambivalence for 
capitalism, received a sorely needed lease of life by the capitalist “free world” under the 
Cold War order. Re-establishing itself in Taiwan, which Japan receded to China only four 
years ago, the GMD brought with it the political culture that emerged out of its two-and-
a-half-decade struggle with internal and external enemies that threatened its vision of 
national independence and a spiritually cohesive community free of class conflicts. A 
centrally organized national campaign, reliance on mass organizations, and attention to 
everyday habits and sentiments were rekindled as Chiang vowed to continue the national 
revolution in exile. Even the GMD’s traditional disdain for liberalism, downplayed 
during the 1940s, received a new boost as the party rushed to re-establish hegemony over 
a society still reeling from the bloody crackdown on Taiwanese and leftwing dissent in 
February 1947. The total war on which the GMD spent considerable intellectual and 
272 
social resources was extended well into the 1950s with the Soviet Union and its Chinese 
Communist agents taking Japan’s place as Free China’s nemeses.   
 The anti-communist vernacular that enjoyed wide currency in Nationalist China 
quickly took root in 1950s Taiwan thanks to the state-controlled press. A Manichean 
worldview dividing innocent people loyal to the GMD from wicked operatives loyal to 
Beijing or Moscow pervaded state propaganda and the cultural industry on the island. 
Official and semi-official discourses tapped on charges of promiscuity, thuggery, and 
dehumanization that made up vernacular anti-communism in the 1930s and particularly 
the 1940s.  Newspapers, novels, popular manuals deployed the same sensationalized 
language we have seen earlier to depict the Communists as absolute evil. Apparatchiks 
across the Taiwan Strait allegedly relished in gory torture rituals, sadistic domination of 
women, or garnered their own sexual appeal to curry favor from male cadres. Much like 
how citizens were encouraged to identify potential Japanese infiltrators living in their 
midst during the resistance war, Nationalist authorities demanded that Taiwanese society 
be on guard against an internal enemy that was constantly lurking beneath everyday 
normalcy. Fear that the clandestine Communist operation in the new GMD bastion had 
penetrated schools, national and local assemblies, the military and even the security 
service compelled neighbors and colleagues to spy on one another. Since even the most 
exemplary Nationalist citizens could be Communist “bandits” in disguise, one’s clothes, 
words, public comportment, and financial situation must come under scrutiny.
21
 The 
same mélange of sexual licentiousness, inhuman cruelty, and organizational sleekness 
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formed the omnipresent Communist threat to a state that confronted not only a rising 
military power in Beijing but also a wary exile community from Mainland China and 
disaffected local population in Taiwan.                
 The combination of suspicious locals and restless refugees whom the GMD found 
itself governing nervously from the grand compounds that Japanese colonizers left 
behind in Taipei conjured déjà-vu of the re-established Nationalist state in Chongqing 
just a decade ago. Focus was put on shoring up popular enthusiasm for a life-and-death 
conflict with an external enemy that hinged not only on military might but also cultural 
consciousness and lifestyle. It was unsurprising, therefore, that the most important 
campaign that the GMD launched in the 1950s should echo the National Spiritual 
Mobilization Movement. On February 1, 1952, Chiang Kai-shek inaugurated the Anti-
Communism and Resist Russia Mobilization Movement (Fan’gong kang E zong 
dongyuan yundong). The movement followed on the heels of the GMD’s reorganization 
plan launched in 1950 that streamlined the leadership, eliminated factional struggles, and 
integrated the party hierarchy with state institutions and mass organizations.
22
 In a 
pronouncement that would not have been out of place in 1940s China, Chiang demanded 
that military, economic and political reforms be broadened into a program that aimed for 
an overhaul of socio-cultural life. Punning on the character dong, cadres were reminded 
that mobilization (dongyuan) must not only be an imposition by state and party 
institutions but also spontaneous actions (dong) individuals took to reshape everyday life. 
Only by transforming social mores could revolutionary cadres hope to rally the masses 
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behind in defeating Communism. If a party “could not even mobilize a few hundreds or a 
thousand people a day,” Chiang asked, “it is no wonder that others do not see us as a 
nation-state, let alone a modern one.” 23 The GMD must come to the realization that even 
with U.S. backing, its tenuous claim to China’s national revolution rested on its ability to 
shape popular aspirations and tap into Taiwan’s mass society on which it harbored deep 
distrust.   
 Just as former Lixingshe affiliate Ru Chunpu had anticipated, total war 
mobilization became the norm as the Nationalists presided over a permanent state of 
emergency under the anti-Communist, anti-Soviet banner. Civil liberties enshrined in the 
1947 Constitution give way to repressive “temporary articles” (linshi tiaokuan) that 
lasted forty-three years, during which the President enjoyed increasing power.
24
 Yet, 
there was more to the extended total war order than the suspension of constitutional 
rights. Everyday culture and social relationships came to be shaped by actual and 
imaginary existential threats, by Communist armed forces from across the Taiwan Strait 
and an even murkier communist threat at home. In this sense, the so-called Cold War in 
China, and indeed much of Asia, was a continuation of the Second World War in its 
violence, militarization and the long shadow grand strategic designs cast on quotidian 
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 The new total mobilization campaign aspired to the same energetic readiness to 
heed government demands on citizens’ part facilitated by the layered fusion of the 
reinvigorated national revolution and everyday life. Hygienic practices and military 
training in schools gained renewed currency along with a robustly enforced household 
registration system to ensure the strength and political reliability of the state’s “human 
resources” (renli).26  
 The corporatist imagination extended to the social landscape. Citizens were 
pigeonholed into mass organizations based on occupation, age and gender, ensuring that 
the working class did not develop its autonomous political agency. Peasants, fishermen, 
salt harvesters and miners – constituents from which the GMD had long been alienated – 
were singled out particularly for government largess as long as they worked co-
operatively with capital. Students joined the China Anti-Communist Youth Corps 
(Zhongguo qingnian fan’gong jiuguo tuan), which subsumed other rightwing 
organizations as one unified youth movement headed by Chiang Kai-shek’s son Ching-
kuo. Hailed as the vanguard of their epoch, young people were challenged to relive 
moments of revolutionary triumph, particularly the Northern Expedition and the war of 
resistance against Japan, and herald the GMD’s glorious return to power in Mainland 
China. They were to learn revolutionary discipline, submit themselves to productive 
labor, and anticipate a reign of cooperation and service. As in scouting, a propensity to 
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battle (zhandou xing) was not professionalism confined to the military but part and parcel 
of cultural remaking to detoxify society from the human lust, material desires, and class 
animosity unleashed by communism.
27
 The anti-Communist and anti-Soviet movement 
was genuinely total in two senses: first, it aspired to transformation in society’s military, 
political, economic and cultural constitution; second, under the leadership of GMD 
revolutionary cadres, the entire populace was to live the revolution, whether it meant 
joining a sanctioned union or women’s association, informing against a neighbor, or 
submitting individual freedom to collective dictates. 
 The movement’s multimedia presence ensured that the resurrected conservative 
revolution make an impact on national psyche, connecting with consumers of both high 
culture and more popular varieties. Rituals carried over from Chongqing, such as monthly 
ceremonies of lectures, meetings and pledges, encouraged a scripted form of grassroots 
political expression in factories, schools and rural communities. Another state-sponsored 
mode of cultural production, one that combined propaganda and entertainment, included 
film, literature and art. Examples of this aesthetic paradigm in popular music provided 
contrast and variety to the liturgy and catechism at mobilization monthly assemblies 
(dongyuan yuehui). Mass-circulating songs like “Mao the Mongrel Put People in 
Jeopardy” (Mao zazhong hairen zhen buqing) and “The Communist Party Has No 
Conscience” (Gongchandang wu tianliang) tapped on vernacular anti-communist 
discourse in their graphic and brash language. Mao “treated young people like cannon 
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fodder” and his military adventurism “left corpses piling up like a mountain.”28 Others 
capitalized on the emotional distress of Mainland émigrés wrenched from their homeland. 
Taking the form of a folk ballad, “Selling Dumplings” (Mai jiaozi) told the sentimental 
encounter between a seventeen-year-old girl making ends meet by selling the iconic 
northern Chinese staple and a customer who also hailed from Manchuria. In stylized 
northeastern Mandarin dialect, the dumpling seller told her compatriot that she missed 
her class struggle-ravaged hometown. The poignant sentimentality of two exiles stranded 
on an unfamiliar subtropical island then gave way abruptly to combative hatred: 
FEMALE SINGER. When will Communist bandits in my hometown all die out 
 so that we can return to Manchuria (Dongbei) and spend a peaceful spring 
 festival? 
MALE SINGER. Be patient, young girl! 
TOGETHER. Let’s come together, re-conquer the Mainland, and return home in 
 triumph!
29
   
          
 Appeal to northerners’ homesickness was balanced by the trumpeting of 
ambivalent enthusiasm for the new, albeit temporary, Nationalist base. “The Great 
Alishan” (Weiwei Alishan) called upon loyal Nationalists to regroup on the Pacific 
Ocean-facing Taiwanese mountain range and look forward to the day when they would 
cross over the ranges in southern China, reoccupy the Yangzi in triumph, and camp 
around the Yellow River.
30
 Still others allude directly to the historical precedent of anti-
Communist total mobilization. Chen Lifu’s lyrics for “Spiritual Mobilization” (Jingshen 
dongyuan) hailed the supremacy of the state and the nation, called for the prioritization of 
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the military, and pressed for the concentration of will and power.
31
 Finally, there are 
songs that exhibited the familiar tendency to imbue violence with pleasure. In “Recapture 
the Mainland Rhapsody” (Fan’gong dalu kuangwu qu), excitement flowed from vows 
like “Charge, good men!”, “Capture Mao Zedong live!” and “Work with the armed 
forces, defeat Stalin, and target your artillery at Moscow!”32 Like drama performances, 
movie screenings, and mass gatherings aimed at mobilizing the populace against Japan a 
decade ago, the diverse tropes and registers employed by anti-Communist songs attested 
to a total war paradigm catering to a GMD loyalist community with diverse linguistic 
backgrounds, an ambivalent relationship with its adopted society, and a deep nostalgia for 
a land where many would never return.            
 Mobilization of popular culture and political will was but one dimension of the 
conservative revolution’s re-launch. In Basic Treatise on Anti-Communism and 
Resistance against Russia (Fan’gong kang E jiben lun), Chiang’s theoretical recalibration 
of the national revolution, the Leader rehashed the same themes that characterized an 
earlier radical conservative movement borne out of fear over internationalist class 
struggle and disdain for liberal capitalism. He reiterated Chen Lifu’s vitalism in refuting 
historical materialism, postulating that all matters were constellations of dynamic 
elements. Since humans were not static material beings, a valid intervention into 
historical evolution must be a holistic project based on the minsheng principle that did not 
privilege material needs and class-based economic struggles over spiritual rebirth of the 
entire nation. Despite joining the U.S.-led capitalist camp, Chiang remained 
                                                 
31
 Ibid., 85. 
 
32
 Ibid., 20. 
    
279 
uncomfortable with American economic and political ideals. In the West, democracy 
empowered the people at the expense of governments. In a country faced with grave 
foreign threats like China, democracy must empower the people and the state alike. One 
area in which the state’s command manifested itself was in its commitment to guided 
capitalism. The GMD vowed to resume a modernization program that curbed monopoly 
capital (longduan ziben) in favor of state-owned enterprises, redistributed land ownership 
to tillers, and developed consumers’ cooperatives to eliminate predatory mercantile 
interests. Finally, the world-historical significance of China’s conservative revolution 
was reaffirmed. The GMD’s Pan-Asianist credentials were again brandished even as the 
party’s cooperation with former Euro-American colonizers was presented as 
contributions to collective security and world peace. Identifying the Soviet Union as the 
latest installment of the Czarist empire trampling over China’s independence and 
freedom, Chiang presented his subordination under the Western capitalist camp as a 
strategy to recover China’s and Asia’s political subjectivity from Communist 
imperialism.
33
 With not a shed of irony, the nationalist goals envisioned as responses to 
the semi-colonization of China were now underwritten by the country’s submission to the 
American imperium. 
 The convergence of strident nationalism and the American informal empire was 
indeed the paradox of the Nationalist project. In many ways, the new Communist regime 
in China continued the society-building programs began by the GMD. Intolerance for 
ideological dissent and stress on unity under the state, hallmarks of total war 
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mobilization, became ingrained in political life under the new Communist order. Building 
a modern economy, capitalist or otherwise, remained a priority.
34
 Yet, the Chinese 
Communists were steadfastly insistent on national independence; their ideological and 
economic reliance on the Soviet Union even in the early years of the People’s Republic 
was fleeting and modest compared to the GMD’s fealty to the U.S.35 The brutal irony of 
the conservative revolution was that its state capitalist development vision was carried 
out under powerful American advisers stationed at almost every branch of Nationalist 
government and industry. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower’s military Keynesianism 
conspired with Chiang’s state capitalist impulse to create a state-led economy that 
thwarted the spread of Communism on one hand and departed from the U.S. obsession 
with free enterprise on the other.
36
 The price the Nationalists had to pay for economic 
stability and regime survival was the very raison d’être of China’s national revolution – 
the search for China’s political and economic subjectivity distinct from the capitalist 
West. Inasmuch as nationalism was one core appeal of radical conservatism, the 
revolution was aborted on Taiwan as the Nationalist regime survived and thrived on the 
fortified island.        
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